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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The Women's Land Army (WLA) of World War II helped bring 
to the United States agricultural front the needed labor for 
the country's farms. Established during a time of national 
emergency, the WLA placed more than three million women on 
farms. And while the WLA operated only from mid-1943 to the 
end of the war, its significance to American fairming and 
agricultural labor is multifold. The use of farm and nonfarro 
women, including middle-class, urban white women and women of 
color, initiated a change in the manner that the nation viewed 
the farm labor force. By accepting all available women as 
agricultural labor, farmers in the 1940s abandoned accepted 
labor practices and adopted wartime measures. This action by 
the nation's farm sector differed from earlier decades. 
Svibsequently, after World War II, farm labor practices in the 
country experienced change as more women remained in 
agriculture than had been present before World War II. 
The 1940s would become the watershed for major changes in 
American women's lives, including farm women. With the onset 
of world war, women faced the possibility, and then the 
reality, of entering the defense and manufacturing industries 
and the military. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 
December 1941, the federal government recognized the need for 
women in the work force. Women became war workers as a result 
of a national effort to win the war. Although the number of 
women who had worked in industry or had been members of the 
military previously, had not been prominent, in 1942 the 
federal government began actively recruiting women for defense 
manufacturing and military positions. Posters depicting Uncle 
Sam and "I Need You!" and similar advertisements such as 
"Women Wanted!" became common sights. By the end of 1942, two 
million American women had joined war industries in efforts to 
provide goods and services required for a country at war. 
Images of women in military dress xiniform and in defense-
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manufacturing uniform appeared in the media. The WACS, WAVES, 
and "Rosie the Riveter" became symbols for American women. 
These images alone, however, do not tell the complete history 
of American women during the Second World War. For millions 
of women, military and industrial or defense manufacturing 
positions did not encompass their assistance to the war 
effort 
For many American women, the cultural, economic, and 
social characteristics so often identified with the Second 
World War do not represent the total experience. More than 
three million women participated in a defense industry that 
has not received the publicity or attention that military or 
industrial service garnered. Beginning in 1943, and 
continuing through the end of 1945, women worked as 
agricultural laborers, assisting farmers to increase 
production and reach quotas established by the federal 
government. This wartime practice established a precedent 
that allowed women in the 1950s and beyond to justify the 
changing structure of American female employment that had been 
taking place since the onset of the twentieth century. 
The impact of World War II on American society brought 
great change to people's lives. As women prepared to enter 
the defense job market, they made changes that would radically 
alter their lives. It is within wartime that the role of 
American women in society transformed from the 1930s, allowing 
as well a change in society's perception of women. Federal 
administrators, assuming that women were content with their 
lives and that they were not needed for defense work, did not 
immediately recruit women for war work. Subsequently, women 
arrived late to positions in the defense industries, but more 
so to agriculture. With defense recruitment, manufacturing 
and industrial interests received the labor needed to continue 
operation. In terms of agriculture, however, the federal 
government hesitated and did not implement a comprehensive 
labor policy until mid-1943 when the situation had become 
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extreme. The hesitation to set in motion a farm employment 
plan at the same time as the industrial recruitment measure, 
coupled with the "unglamorous" nature of agricultural work, 
forced WLA, Extension Service, and United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) administrators to work hard to recruit 
female labor later in the war. 
Regardless of federal action at the time, or perhaps 
because of it, the historical study of female agricultural 
labor during the Second World War is an underdeveloped 
sxabject. While historians have long debated the military and 
social aspects of World War II both on the home front and 
overseas, the examination of agricultural labor has not 
received similar treatment. In the work that has been 
cotr^jleted regarding farm labor during the war, the main body 
of scholarship has concentrated on the analysis of work 
performed by convicts, interned Japanese Americans, Mexican 
nationals, and prisoners of war. Even so, more publications 
exist that deal with the social and cultural characteristics 
and actions of these groups then of their experience as farm 
laborers. In terms of American women, however, the 
examination of their contribution to agricultural labor during 
World War II has been almost nonexistent. Thus, a study of 
the WLA provides a worthy subject.^ 
A survey of the available literature, including 
contemporary farm and government publications, national media, 
and WLA annual reports, allows conclusions to be drawn 
concerning the status of women in agriculture and society 
during the early 1940s. Within this analysis, the 
relationship of the WLA to federal agencies and organizations 
illustrates the in^jortance of the group to the overall war 
effort. With the millions of women participating, the WLA 
effectively recruited, trained, and placed its labor on 
national farms. The continuation of this agency past its 
initial year relied on the farmers, federal government, and 
women to establish and maintain a successful program. To this 
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end, the number of women who enrolled as members of the WLA, 
as well as the presence of farm women in agriculture, gave 
further testament to the success of this program. 
Even so, the organization and success of the WLA did not 
occur without the support of federal agencies and officials. 
In this case, the USDA and one of its agencies, the Extension 
Service, promoted the WLA, along with other USDA agricultural 
labor programs, to create a viable Emergency Farm Labor 
Program. The establishment of these programs had been 
affected by previous state- and private-run labor initiatives. 
These earlier models allowed the USDA and Extension Service to 
effectively administer and organize their labor program. 
Relying on the experiences left by World War I and the New 
Deal, as well as state models for utilizing available sources 
for farm labor in the early 1940s, the federal government 
finally created its own farm labor program in mid-1943, years 
after the first call for such a program. 
In the period before the creation of the Emergency Faonn 
Labor Program and the WLA, individuals such as Eleanor 
Roosevelt and Dorothy Thompson, and organizations such as the 
Women's National Farm and Garden Association and the United 
States Women's Bureau, argued for the re-establishment of a 
land army. The federal government, however, did not 
immediately act following these calls for a labor program, but 
kept to a different timetable in its efforts to create a 
viable farm labor program. Clearly conditions existed that 
kept the USDA and Extension Service from adequately providing 
labor to the nation's farmers upon the onset of war. As a 
result, it would not be until more than one year after Pearl 
Harbor that the federal government would legislate and pass 
Pxiblic Law 45, the measure that created the Emergency Farm 
Labor Program. 
What kept the federal government from immediately 
creating the Emergency Farm Labor Program as demanded by 
farmers and others in 1941 and 1942? In part, the federal 
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government's hesitation can be attributed to the bureaucracy 
that controlled Washington, D.C. However, federal 
administrative and legislative structure cannot be held 
totally responsible for the delay in governmental action 
regarding an agricultural labor program; individuals also 
played a part. It is apparent from the national and local 
presses during the early years of war that many individuals, 
agencies, and organizations petitioned the federal government 
to create an effective farm labor program in the wake of its 
recruitment policy for domestic defense and industrial 
manufacturing. To accomplish their plans, private and pxiblic 
people and groups compared World War II experiences with 
earlier decades. In this case. World War I, the New Deal, and 
state- or private-run labor initiatives of the late 1930s and 
early 1940s provided these examples. As models for a 
successful labor program, these earlier events laid the 
groundwork and established precedents by which the government 
would formulate a successful labor organization in 1943. 
Additionally, the presence of labor initiatives in other 
countries also influenced the creation of a program in the 
United States. 
In World War I, the United States experienced its first 
labor shortage of the twentieth century. As men went to fight 
in 1917, the nation searched for alternative labor sources. 
One of these was the Women's Land Array of America (WLAA) . The 
WLAA had been created to recruit and place women on farms that 
needed labor. As a semi-private organization that did not use 
government resources, the WLAA placed fewer than 20,000 women 
on farms, a negligible number compared to the millions 
enrolled in the WLA. However, the precedent, a stooictured 
farm labor program that utilized female workers, for World War 
II had been established. This exaTt5)le from World War I 
assisted in efforts to create a similar program in the early 
1940s. Fortunately, American farmers and the federal 
government did not depend entirely on the events of World War 
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I, but also utilized experiences from New Deal work programs 
to create a comprehensive agricultural labor program. 
The New Deal and the decade of the 1930s provided 
examples to the federal government for the creation of an 
effective decentralized farm labor program. The New Deal 
brought reform and relief to a depressed nation by-
establishing federal, state, and local programs. With federal 
administration. New Deal programs extended into rural and 
urban areas with a variety of help programs for the nation's 
population. By mirroring the New Deal, the WLA depended on 
federal administrative control and monies, while allowing 
local control for the actual contact with those women employed 
on farms. In many ways, the WLA followed the precedent set by 
earlier programs to organize its administration, recruit 
women, and offer relief on a scale similar to New Deal 
programs. And, just as no one factor had been responsible for 
World War I's mobilization or New Deal relief work, no single 
precedent or cause was responsible for the creation of a 
defense program in World War II. For the most part, these 
separate actions made up the ideas and efforts that defined 
the WLA. Agriculture and society during the preceding decades 
of the twentieth century are important in the overall study of 
the WLA, because both provide clear precedents for the 
activities, programs, and policies established in the early 
1940s.^ 
Although much of the nation favored the New Deal and its 
policies, areas did exist that rebelled against government 
control and intervention. Many of these same locales also 
resisted war-time defense programs. Thus, within this study 
of the WLA, the organization's strength will be found in those 
areas and locales that did not initially accept female farm 
labor. It is in^jortant to discover states that did not openly 
embrace the WLA and address their reasons for doing so. In 
several cases the reluctance present in 1943 regarding the use 
of female agricultural labor would not be present in 1944 or 
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1945. The acceptance by these states to utilize women as farm 
workers is important to the overall study, especially in 
locations where biases and attitudes changed over time. On 
the other hand, a few states remained faithful to their 
farmers' prejudices and ideals, sacrificing agricultural 
production and money because of their opposition to women as 
farm workers. In this regard the opinions of farmers in the 
American Middle West and South are important to the analysis, 
because these regions did not openly embrace the WLA in 1943, 
but would use several hundred thousand women as farm laborers 
by the end of the war. States in the western and eastern 
coastal regions readily accepted the female labor force in 
1943 and continually hired women as farm workers during the 
war. And, states in the Great Plains and the eastern Rocky 
Mountain region found it difficult to establish WLA 
organizations and to endorse a program that local farmers 
rejected. It is these conflicting views of farmers and state 
officials that allow an in depth analysis of the WLA 
organization, one that will address the general concept of the 
use of women as agricultural labor, as well as the regional 
differences and biases, and the issues of class, gender, and 
race regarding the WLA and other farm labor programs. This, 
along with the creation, development, and practice of the WLA 
will encompass most of this project, taking into account 
issues such as type of work, wages, housing, transportation, 
safety and insurance, and length of time in service. 
The development of the WLA within the USDA and Extension 
Service in mid-1943 calls into question the development of 
defense programs during World War II. Although the 
establishment of such an organization had been discussed among 
various women's groups, governmental agencies, and individuals 
as early as 1940, Congress did not establish the WLA until 
midway through the war. Coming more than a year after the 
official declaration of war, as well as months later than 
defense and industrial labor recruitment programs, the WLA and 
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Other agricultural labor relief programs lagged behind 
industry in their creation. Abdicating to pressures by 
governmental agencies, individuals, and private organizations, 
the federal government worked to alleviate the labor shortage 
faced by the nation's farmers. By placing the WLA within the 
USDA's Emergency Farm Labor Program and the Extension 
Service's United States Crop Corps, the federal government 
became the caretaker for emergency farm labor during World War 
II. 
The passage of Public Law 45 and establishment of 
Emergency Farm Labor Program in 1943 did not represent che 
only agricultural worker plan in place during World War II. 
In the years before the federal labor plan, farmers had not 
sat idly by and waited for the government to create its war­
time program. Instead, American farmers addressed their labor 
concerns from the start and sought to provide themselves with 
needed workers. In efforts to obtain and reach production 
goals and quotas, farmers achieved their success with any 
means available. For the most part, that success hinged on 
farmers' abilities to increase their production and output. 
To reach production quotas, farmers turned to an example 
already in place--industry. Shortly after the declaration of 
war in late 1941, and before an official government policy, 
defense industries recognized the necessity of using female 
workers and encouraged their hiring. Although men saw women 
as threats to their permanent positions, defense and 
manufacturing industries hired women in significant numbers 
during the war. In some companies, such as the Vultee 
Aircraft Corporation, women accounted for 95 percent of the 
workers on the assembly line. While men had made up most of 
the workers in the late 1930s, as much as 98 percent of the 
work force, in 1942 women accounted for as much as 96 percent 
in arsenals." And while viewed as temporary employees, women 
proved themselves capable, and at times better than their male 
counterparts, as they worked to build airplanes and ships, as 
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well as other defense products. 
Just as industry auid manufacturing recognized the 
iir^ortance and contributions of women to the country's 
businesses, so did American farmers. Thus, prior to mid-1943, 
agriculturalists engaged available laborers to assist with 
harvests. While farmers demanded that the federal government 
institute a federal labor program, they did not wait for that 
eventuality. Specifically, eastern and western farmers 
searched for a way to locate necessary agricultural labor, as 
well as produce required crops for the war effort. During 
World War II, the federal government urged fairmers to "raise 
more soybeans and peanuts for oil, vegetables, and livestock" 
to meet domestic and international demands. In 1943, farmers 
were requested by the government to produce 8 percent more 
foodstuffs than the previous year, an increase of 38 percent 
over the period from 1935 to 1939. Over time, agricultural 
production increased more than 10 percent during the war 
years, and overall farm acreage in the nation increased about 
5 percent.® In terms of farm labor, women began to replace 
men as workers by the 1941 crop season. Recruited through 
several state-run programs, women labored on farms in 1941 and 
1942 and established the path for those who would follow as 
employees of the WLA. In some western states, the demand for 
labor occurred before the actual declaration of war. 
Individuals, state enployment services, and farmers set 
up programs for recruitment and placement of labor on farms 
during 1941 and 1942. While these early labor initiatives did 
not depend on federal money or assistance, these efforts 
committed states to the national war effort. During the 1941-
1942 crop season, states on the East and West coasts hired 
women (and high school students) to plant, cultivate, and 
harvest firuits and vegetables. Local, coxinty, and state 
organizations as well as individuals in these regions 
established their own forces in an effort to alleviate the 
labor situation. "Land army" states found it possible to 
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combat labor shortages within their own political sphere, as 
well as provide administrative models that other states could 
easily duplicate. 
In addition to providing other states with workable 
models, these early state initiatives also presented the 
federal government with a plan by which to recruit, train, and 
place a labor force for a national farm labor program. In 
their efforts to request the creation of a federal farm labor 
program, these state leaders were not alone as federal 
agencies, government officials, and the private sector also 
raised the call for a land amy. Women involved in state 
initiatives, such as Dorothy Thoirpson in Vermont and Corinne 
Alsop in Connecticut, advocated a commitment by the federal 
government to establish a national WLA. And, while considered 
a low priority by the federal administration, agencies such as 
the United States Extension Service and the Women's Bureau 
discussed ways to bring aid to the country's agricultural 
sector. Pressure exerted by these groups and individuals to 
establish a WLA had an effect on the administration. As a 
result, by 1943, the idea of establishing the WLA, as well as 
other farm labor programs, was acceptable to those in 
positions of power in the USDA, Extension Service, and other 
agencies. Prior to 23 January 1943, the U.S. Eitployment 
Service held "responsibility for the recruitment, placement, 
transfer, and utilization of agricultural workers." However 
after that date and by order of the War Manpower Commission, 
the USDA obtained the authority to raise a national farm labor 
force. Further legislation placed the Emergency Farm Labor 
Program, United States Crop Corps, and several labor programs 
within the Extension Service. This action allowed USDA and 
Extension Service officials including the WLA in April 1943, 
to appoint program administrators.® 
Florence L. Hall, a former extension agent, acknowledged 
the challenges of the WLA within the Extension Service and 
USDA and the retention of this program during the war. Thus 
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one of Hall' s first actions as WLA administrator occurred with 
efforts to recrxiit a labor force for the 1943 crop season. 
With the overall administration of the WLA based in 
Washington, D.C., each state's Extension Service and personnel 
worked effectively to run their WLA organization. Conmiunities 
and individuals, worked alongside Extension Service personnel 
in efforts to provide the nation with the needed and necessary-
agricultural labor. State agencies became responsible for the 
compensation, recruitment and placement, and training of women 
who volunteered to spend their summers, vacations, and 
weekends working on farms. 
The placement of the WLA within the USDA and Extension 
Service is conplicated at best. The political maneuvering of 
Congress and federal agencies affected the status of American 
agriculture and demand for labor in the early 1940s. The 
testimony of officials from numerous farm organizations such 
as the Federal Farm Bureau Federation and Grange, along with 
personnel from agricultural experiment stations, expressed 
their views regarding female agricultural labor. While those 
employed by the state extension services and experiment 
stations generally supported the use of women on farms, those 
from the Federal Farm Bureau Federation and Grange did not. 
These activities, as well as the reluctance of USDA 
administrators to engage women as farm workers delayed the 
establishment of the WLA and other programs within the 
Emergency Farm Labor Program.' 
The attitudes of the Grange and Farm Bureau members are 
indicative of the larger picture; many viewed the use of women 
as farm labor as unnecessary and inappropriate. Congressmen 
and senators regularly echoed the views of their constituents 
during hearings and sessions. In the South, congressmen, farm 
organizations, and farmers viewed the use of nonfarm white 
women for agricultural labor as socially unacceptable.® 
Historically, middle-class white women had not toiled in the 
southern cotton, tobacco, and other crop fields. Thus, the 
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war threatened to alter the perception of farming in the 
South, by including white middle-class women in fields that 
had previously been dominantly by tenant farmers and 
sharecroppers, black and white. The presence of nonfarm urban 
white women in the region's fields attacked the perceived norm 
and image of women in the South. But, while this image had 
been threatened during the war, a return to tradition in the 
following decades brought the conclusion that the South did 
not change its farm labor practices in non-wartime years. 
Other areas of the country also protested the use of women as 
agricultural labor. For example, the Middle West challenged 
the presence of all urban women in the fields. 
Middle western farmers contested the use of urban women 
on their farms, not because of race but for social reasons. 
For the most part, midwestem farmers did not trust the urban 
women and questioned their morals. Additionally, they did not 
expect the nonfarm women to be able to perform the required 
work. The farmers expected the women to corrupt their 
families, as well as tire of their farm experience quickly and 
leave. If this occurred, farmers incurred additional expense 
and time to locate and train new workers. To avoid this 
inconvenience, midwestem farmers did not actively recruit an 
urban labor force for the region. As a result of these 
preconceived ideas regarding the use of urban women, 
midwestem farmers hoped to rely on their own or local labor 
forces to achieve the required high levels of production 
mandated by the govemment. Eventually, midwestem farmers 
conceded the use of urban women for seasonal farm work; but, 
for the most part, midwestem labor shortages would be filled 
with farm women, usually their own wives and daughters. These 
biased farmer opinions were in direct conflict with states 
that established early labor programs, because these locales 
recognized the ability and necessity of farm and nonfarm women 
to the war effort. 
Had the rejection of these women as farm laborers in 1943 
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been the result of regional, ethnic, or cultural biases? The 
answer to this question lies in examination of agricultural 
and farming publications, national newspapers, and WLA state 
reports which illustrate the attitudes of midwestem and 
southern farmers in each year of WLA operation. What made 
these regions different from western or eastern areas that 
embraced women as agricultural laborers? The presence of non-
Caucasian farm workers in the East and West did not affect the 
hiring of other women as strongly as the use of nonfarm urban 
and middle-class white women in the Middle West and South, 
respectively. The questions and concerns surrounding the 
placement of women on farms throughout all regions of the 
country affected the significance placed on women as 
agricultural labor during the Second World War. By minimizing 
the role of women within agriculture, the federal government 
and USDA perpetuated an inaccurate image of the WLA within the 
Emergency Farm Labor Program. By expressing their reluctance 
at the use of women on American farms, federal administrators 
hindered the acceptance and placement expected by WLA 
officials, instead influencing regions of the nation to turn 
away available labor. Thus, it is important to examine the 
significant contribution that women made to agriculture during 
the war in order to perceive the position of women within 
American society. 
The WLA continued to the end of the war. Each year the 
federal WLA administration increased its call for women to 
work in the fields. And, this request was met each year. 
Consequently, it is possible to quantify the number of women 
who worked on the nation's farms during World War II. For the 
purpose of this research, farm and nonfarm women have both 
been coiinted within the figures of women employed in 
agriculture. Most government reports published during the 
war, and scholarly articles written since, use both 
characteristics to identify the number of women involved. 
Then, in terms of economic development for farmers, political 
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development of the state and nation, and social development 
for women, the WLA provided Americans with several 
opportunities in the period from 1943 to 1945. The WLA's 
significant contribution to the war effort as well as its 
contribution to agricultural policy and the status of women in 
the war and post-war period are issues that bear analysis and 
contemplation, because its members helped shape the position 
of women in society following the Second World War. 
Further, the success of the WLA demonstrates its 
significance to the agricultural and defense communities 
during the war. The recognition of the women's efforts to 
participate in defense programs brought the iir^jortance of the 
WLA and other farm labor programs to national attention, at 
least during the war. In the years that followed, however, 
the significance of women in the agricultural labor force has 
all but been forgotten. By ignoring wartime female 
agricultural labor. World War II scholars have removed from 
WLA participants any importance they might have regarding 
their war service. Without reaffirmation of the WLA as a 
viable defense program, women's war effort becomes 
marginalized. Examples of this marginalization can be viewed 
in several works depicting World War II, the American home 
front, and the defense industries. Susan M. Hartmann in The 
Home Front and Bevond: American Women in the 1940s, as one 
example of scholarly work regarding women and World War II, 
does not address the topic of agricultural labor. The same is 
true of scholars who addressed other groups during the war. 
Although studies exist that examine the presence of interned 
Japanese, Mexican nationals, and prisoners of war in 
agricultural labor during World War II, several more omit the 
svibject of agricultural labor from their analysis.® 
Primary materials, however, present a different story. 
The federal government published many documents discussing the 
importance of the WLA to the agricultural community, and the 
Extension Service, Women's Bureau, and USDA pxiblicized the WLA 
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across the coimtry. Additionally, contemporary periodicals 
such as farm journals, popular publications, and women's 
magazines determined the overall societal image of the WLA and 
the effect of this image on the organization's operation. In 
the period before the establishment of the federal program, 
p\ablications debated the issue of a land army, or promoted the 
state program in their area. After April 1943 and initiation 
of the federal program, journal and newspaper articles began 
to call for additional women farm workers, both rural and 
urban, to join farmers as they planted, cultivated, and 
harvested their crops. 
As the early 1940s became known as the period of WACS, 
WAVES, and "Rosie the Riveter, " it is past time to recognize 
the importance of the "regular farm girl" as well. Although 
the Emergency Farm Labor Program continued through the 1947 
crop year, the WLA did not. After ceasing operation in 
December 1945, the WLA did not remain an official part of the 
federal government's labor program. However, the end of the 
program did not result in the end of women's involvement in 
American agriculture. The placement of millions of American 
women on farms during World War II ensured the continuation of 
this practice after the end of the war. Even without the WLA 
as an administrative structure, farmers, states, and women 
carried on their labor tradition into the late 1940s and 
1950s. Women remained a part of the national agricultural 
labor force. 
Because farmers continued to employ women as agricultural 
labor after the end of World War II, the early 1940s proved to 
be a time that changed the status of women in American society 
and on farms. Women's efforts to join the nation's defense 
movement, in the early 1940s, demonstrated their desire and 
ability to assist the country during its time of need. In 
terms of agricultural labor, the WLA illustrates the 
importance of female war-time service. Women's presence in 
the nation's fields after the war demonstrates the need of 
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additional labor in those years as well. In numbers greater 
than the period before World War II, women remained as 
agricultural workers following 1945. The continuation of 
women on farms can be attributed to the success of the WLA 
during the years from 1943 to 1945, and, although, historical 
research and study has not readily included the role of women 
in agriculture during the war, that omission has begun to be 
reversed in recent years. Thus, recognition and importance 
has been brought to a group of women previously unseen by the 
academic, popular, and scholarly worlds. Thus the WLA will 
become as important to the historical study of women in World 
War II as "Rosie the Riveter" and the women who joined the 
military service. 
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CHAPTER 2. PRE-WAR PRECEDENTS 
The Women's Land Army of World War II provided American 
farmers with essential labor as their regular hands joined the 
military or industrial front. Created during a time that the 
nation faced a labor crisis in all aspects of society, the WLA 
had been overshadowed by labor needs in defense and 
manufacturing industries. Millions of women entered defense 
operations while farmers anxiously waited for legislation that 
would authorize their own labor force. As a result, the 
process by which the USDA formulated an agricultural labor 
program together with the time Congress spent debating the 
feasibility of such a program, resulted in a delay of almost 
eighteen months for the creation of the WLA after the 
declaration of war by the United States against the Axis 
powers. Thus it was not xantil April 1943 that the WLA 
officially began its service to the nation's farmers. During 
the course of its operation, the WLA recruited, trained, and 
placed millions of farm and nonfarm women on farms. With 
total participation reaching almost 3.5 million women, the WLA 
is an in^ortant component of the American home front during 
World War II, and especially during the period from 1943 to 
1945.^ 
During the war years, rural and urban women worked in 
agriculture assisting the nation's farmers in providing needed 
food products and supplies to the market. The presence of 
urban nonfarm women in agriculture changed the way farmers had 
been accustomed to operating. Aside from advancements made in 
agricultural biotechnology and hardware technology, the 
changes that occurred within the realm of agricultural labor 
forever altered the perception of those employed on American 
farms. The importance and significance of those women who 
participated in the WLA heightens our understanding of women's 
accomplishments and status within American society, as well as 
their position within the realm of American agriculture during 
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the war and beyond. The importance of the WLA, however, 
cannot overshadow the significance of earlier federal and 
private labor programs designed to offer assistance to a given 
sector of American society. Thus, the WLA can trace its 
origins to several movements in American history, which 
include World War I, the New Deal, and the early 1940s. 
Within each period, federal and/or private agencies 
established programs that provided labor to individuals or 
groups. 
The Women's Land Army of America (WLAA) in World War I, 
New Deal work programs of the 1930s, and state- and private-
run labor initiatives in the early 1940s influenced the 
federal government to organize a farm worker policy for the 
nation in 1943. As men and women left the farm under the 
guise of patriotism and national duty to enter defense 
industries and military service during World War II, those who 
remained behind discovered patriotic duty led to severe labor 
shortages. Between April 1940 and July 1942 more than two 
million men left the farm, and by the end of the war, the 
American farm population had decreased by six million. The 
federal government's official response to labor shortages 
became the Emergency Farm Labor Program, instituted in 1943 
under the auspices of Public Law 45. Recognizing the need for 
millions of farm laborers, the federal government, through 
this legislation, authorized the hiring of convicts, high 
school students, in^jorted persons (Caribbean and Mexican) , 
military personnel, prisoners of war, and women to work on 
farms. With its organization mid-way through the war, the 
Emergency Fairm Labor Program may have been too late to provide 
adequate benefits to farmers. While the federal legislation 
placed agricultural labor xinder its jurisdiction from 1943 to 
1945, the government did not make plans to accommodate labor 
policy in the years prior to 1943. Therefore, it is important 
to note any activity in the early 1940s that benefitted 
farmers and their desire for an established federal labor 
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program, as well as any requests to the government for labor 
relief 
Prior to the organization and formation of the Emergency 
Farm Labor Program, numerous agricultural and women's 
organizations and individuals requested relief for the 
nation's farmers. From the beginning of domestic war build­
up, individuals, federal agencies, and women's organizations, 
including First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt and the United States 
Women's Bureau, foresaw potential agricultural labor problems 
and began to call for the establishment of a land army. By 
using the models available from the First World War and Great 
Britain, many believed that the revival of a land army would 
effectively deal with the issue of insufficient farm labor. 
As war seemed likely by May 1940, the Women's National Farm 
and Garden Association hoped that the federal government would 
follow other coiintries' leads and realize the necessity of re-
institution of the land army concept for the United States.^ 
The Women's National Farm and Garden Association, active 
in the formation of the WLAA during World War I, led the 
charge in calling for a revival of the farm labor program in 
the early 1940s. Its call for a land army in 1940 echoed the 
calls placed in 1917 to encourage women to join the 
agricultural labor force. During World War I, the Women's 
National Farm and Garden Association extended its membership 
to include all women who wished to join their efforts and work 
on the land. The association's purpose had been to encourage 
women to "take up outdoor occupations and to bring together 
the rich and the poor in their common love for gardens."* 
With America's entry in World War I, however, the women's 
goals shifted as they placed additional eii^)hasis on the 
in^ortance of their participation in wartime activities. 
Projecting ahead in 1917, the Women's National Farm and Garden 
Association saw the goal of the Land Army to "increase the 
supply of food during the next five years, to conserve the 
live stock, to increase the cultivation of grains and 
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vegetables, and to be ready, if needed, to take the places of 
men on farms in case this coxintry should be drawn into a 
protracted world struggle."^ Thus, through this 
organization's influence, as well as other agricultural, 
defense, and women's groups, the establishment of a land army 
during World War I became a reality. 
The WLAA, created in 1917, was a semi-private 
organization with limited federal government interference.® 
Its administration operated in a manner that would be easy to 
duplicate in a later decade, and for all purposes was used in 
the 1940s. The WLAA had tenuous ties to the Department of 
Labor, as well as various local, state, and federal agencies 
and organizations. Farm and nonfarm women participated in the 
program on a strictly volxinteer basis. During the course of 
its existence, the WLAA recruited 15,000 women from twenty 
states 
The success of the WLAA during World War I established a 
precedent that would be used in a later decade and another 
war. Women's groups around the country worked to provide 
suitable conditions for the female agricultural workers. 
Women lived in camps, worked together or individually, 
received wages per hour or by the piece, and did all types of 
farm work. Women needed to be "physically fit and efficient" 
and work "eight or nine hours a day" in all manner of farm 
labor. Duties included general farming, such as "plowing, 
harrowing, seeding, planting, transplanting, cultivating, 
hoeing, weeding, harvesting, care of horses, cows, dairy 
work." Women were also used on specialty farms where their 
work included: "fruit and berry picking, sorting and packing 
of fruit, thinning of fruit on the trees (in which women have 
been found to be particularly satisfactory) , or canning and 
preserving of fruits and vegetables; or again it may be care 
of poultry, etc."® 
As a result of the semi-private, semi-piiblic status of 
the WLAA, states established work programs suitable to their 
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needs. In New York, the Mayor's Committee of Women on 
National Defense appointed a Standing Committee on Agriculture 
in May 1917 that placed women on farms as hired labor and a 
"form of patriotic service." Considered an "experiment" to 
use women as farm labor, the New York committee advocated the 
benefits and usefulness of women in the fields. The Mayor's 
committee discovered that certain women, particularly college 
and university women, "all-round" women, and industrial 
employees, worked effectively on the region's farms. The 
usefulness of student and faculty women can be determined by 
their ability to work during school vacations, especially in 
the summer. The "all-round" women were described by the 
committee as "unskilled, but strong, who might be turned 
permanently to this type of labor" ,- and factory workers who 
had been engaged in seasonal positions and could "derive 
benefit, physically, socially and financially, from a few 
months' work out of doors."® 
Whatever their classification, women were employed in the 
area surrounding New York City by farmers who expressed an 
interest in using women as farm workers. With money raised 
"to start the experiment" and automobiles loaned "for 
transporting the workers, " the WLAA became operational in New 
York. Women were hired to improve agricultural production and 
alleviate the farm labor shortage, while they themselves 
relished the opportunity to participate in the war effort and 
demonstrate their patriotism. On a fruit farm near Milton, 
New York, for example, six women worked together for five 
weeks, paid in the manner of piece work. The women for the 
most part were from xiniversities, working during their 
semester breaks. On average the women earned $31.07 for the 
five weeks of work. Their weekly expenses amoxinted to $3.09, 
and transportation to and from New York City cost $1.50. 
Thus, on average, the women received, after expenses, less 
than fifteen dollars for five weeks work.^" Less than three 
dollars per week for physical labor did not support female 
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agricultural laborers or their families. Thus, it is apparent 
that, during World War I and World War II, women worked for 
patriotic rather than financial reasons. 
At the same time, women who worked in the industrial 
sector during World War I received higher wages for their 
service. Over the course of World War I, women in industrial 
wage positions realized yearly increases from 5 to 12 percent 
over the previous year's rate. Women en^loyed in the railroad 
industry enjoyed monthly wages from sixty dollars to over one 
hundred dollars per month for a forty-eight-hour work week. 
In many cases, these women who worked in the rail industry had 
been paid on a similar scale as men during World War I; in 
other industries, however, that did not always occur. At the 
International Fuse and Arms Company, inexperienced women 
received two dollars per day for their work, with increases to 
as much as seven dollars per day once trained. These figures 
do not take into account the amoiint of money needed to pay 
room, board, and other expenses. Considerations of marital 
status and family size would require varying amounts of money 
for expenses; it had been estimated, however, that an average 
weekly amount for room and board in eastern cities for a 
single person ranged between eight dollars and fifteen 
dollars. Only during wartime did single women within the 
manufacturing sector receive wages high enough to pay 
expenses. 
Following the first crop season with the WLAA in the 
fields, a conference was held in New York City in December 
1917, to discuss the activities of the past crop year, and 
make projections for the future. Organized by the Women's 
National Farm and Garden Association, with the assistance of 
the Women's Committee of the Council of National Defense, the 
conference elicited a response from several agricultural, 
civic, and women's groups concerned about war-time labor 
needs. One outcome of the conference led to the organization 
of the Advisory Coxincil of the Women's Land Army of America. 
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This organization would "stimulate the foirmation of a land 
army of women to take the places on the farms of the men who 
are being drafted for active services."" Following the 
conference in December 1917, the advisory council met several 
times to formulate plans for the 1918 crop year. At its 
initial and siibsequent meetings other organizations 
participated, including: Women's Committee on the State 
Council of Defense; Garden Club of America; Federal Food 
Administration; National Board of Young Women's Christian 
Associations; College of Agriculture, Cornell University; New 
York State School of Agriculture, Farmingdale; Women's College 
of Delaware; New York State Grange; New York State Labor 
Bureau; Westchester County Farm Bureau; Committee of Women in 
Industry; New York State Suffrage Party; Women's University 
Club; Committee on Agriculture of the Mayor's Committee of 
Women; Agricultural Camp at Bedford; and Scarsdale Community 
Farm." 
The Advisory Coxincil determined that during the 1917 crop 
season certain impressions regarding the employment of women 
on farms had surfaced and been foxind important. Mainly, these 
impressions centered on the concepts of volxinteerism and 
patriotism. By volunteering for farm work, American women 
answered the nation's appeal for defense action. Pairmers, 
state officials, and federal administrators found that women, 
"even xmtrained, city-bred women," worked effectively in all 
aspects of agriculture. In return the women found health 
benefits in hard labor and working outside. The Advisory 
Council, through its publications, further enhanced the 
success of the first crop year by describing the conditions 
and experiences of women who volunteered for the WLAA. In New 
York, Virginia C. Gildersleeve, chairperson of the state WLAA 
organization, reported, "women enjoyed the work thoroughly. 
They were a healthy, happy community. The college girls 
proved especially well able to stand the physical strain of 
hard labor, and their zeal and enthusiasm were exceeding 
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valuable in developing a good spirit." Further, "women, with 
little or no technical training, could perform satisfactorily-
most kinds of farm labor and help remedy the shortage caused 
by the withdrawal of men from agricultural work." These 
comments by Gildersleeve brought the importance of the WLAA to 
the public eye and allowed, along with the ideas of the 
Advisory Council of the Women's Land Army of America, the 
continuation of the program in 1918." 
As a result of the December 1917 conference, the Advisory 
Council established guidelines for a successful harvest for 
the 1918 crop season. The Council asked agricultural and 
women's colleges throughout the nation to institute programs 
to assist the WLAA in its efforts for 1918. Recruitment for, 
and registration within the WLAA occurred at various colleges 
across the nation as women stepped forward to serve. Goals of 
the WLAA included the recruitment of college women early in 
the crop season to take advantage of women's labor from 
planting to harvest. Schools offered short agricultural 
training and extension courses for those in rural commiinities, 
and arranged academic credit for the women who joined and 
participated in the WLAA. Additionally, colleges cooperated 
with numerous employment and housing organizations to provide 
adequate work and shelter for WLAA workers. Other recruitment 
efforts encompassed a paper campaign to encourage 
participation, on the individual and institution level. The 
WLAA hoped to entice more women to join the organization, as 
well as encourage national academic institutions to administer 
the farm labor program. The involvement of the nation's 
colleges and universities further extended the exposure and 
participation that the WLAA enjoyed in World War I.'-® 
During crop seasons women completed a variety of farm 
tasks. Anita Voorhees wrote of her experience. As an 
educator, Voorhees had time to participate in the WLAA after 
the conclusion of the school year in 1918. During that summer 
she joined several of her students in a "farmerette unit" 
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placed in Whitford, Pennsylvania. The women cut, raked, and 
pitched hay, hoed com, and harvested soybeans. And while 
Voorhees wrote of the strenuous work involved in farming, she 
described her contribution to the war effort with these 
concluding comments to Ms. : "Yes, it was fun, and I believe we 
really contributed quite a bit to the farms of Chester 
County." Other women expressed similar sentiments regarding 
their involvement with the WLAA. In the West, farmers 
utilized the WLAA to assist truck-crop hairvests. In Colorado 
and Wyoming women worked throughout the summer months to 
participate in each year's crop season.^® 
Not all women who worked on farms during World War I did 
so on private farms; many labored on college and university 
farms. Eastern schools such as Vassar, Bryn Mawr, and Mount 
Holyoke colleges established programs that hoped to increase 
farm production, provide a patriotic opportunity for the women 
enrolled, and offer en^loyment opportunities at the 
institution. At Vassar, twelve women worked eight-hour days 
for $1.40 per day. Expenses included room and board at the 
school's main dormitory, at a minimum cost of $5.50 weekly,-
the women needed to work four days each week to pay their 
expenses. By working an additional two days, these Vassar 
students, like the women en^loyed near Milton, New York, would 
make approximately three dollars for their week's work. The 
college students employed at Vassar performed the following 
chores: "plowing (with traction and two-horse plows), 
harrowing, planting, cultivating, thinning, weeding, hoeing, 
potato planting, berry picking, mowing (with scythe and mowing 
machine) , hay-raking and pitching, reaping, shocking grain, 
making fences, and milking." The superintendent of the 
program wrote concerning the women enrolled in the WLAA, "They 
took great interest in the work, and did the work just as well 
as the average man, and made good far beyond the most sanguine 
expectations. 
At Bryn Mawr, work teams consisted of twelve to fifteen 
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women. Working in alternating shifts, eighty-five women 
participated in the Bryn Mawr program. In addition to the 
planting, cultivating, and harvesting of vegetables, the Bryn 
Mawr women also built a small cannery and processed "ten 
thousand quart cans of beans, com, tomatoes and peaches." At 
Mount Holyoke, four hundred women responded to the call for 
farm volxinteers during the spring term. Divided into teams of 
twenty, the women "removed brush, scattered fertilizer, 
planted crops, hoed, pulled weeds, picked potato bugs, and 
sprayed vegetables." In none of these cases does there appear 
to have been a shortage of women for the work, but in some 
cases, there was a shortage of work for the women. At Vassar 
and Mount Holyoke, for example, women were turned away.^® 
Initially termed as an "experiment" by many within the 
government and agricultural communities, the success of the 
WLAA prompted the idea that the use of women as agricultural 
labor should continue in the years following war. To this 
effort, the WLAA organized a system to keep the women informed 
of labor developments, issues, and situations. With its own 
pxiblication, the WLAA advisory council continued to reach 
those women who had participated in the war. Deemed their own 
"little newspaper," the first issue of Farmerette. was printed 
in December 1918. With Farmerette. the WLAA created a way for 
its members to remain in touch and report on farm life 
throughout the nation. Further, the WLAA would provide 
information regarding winter work or training and work plans 
for the 1919 crop season. With these arrangements made, the 
WLAA planned not to close its operation with the end of World 
War I, but to continue placing women on farms throughout the 
next decades." 
In the first issue of Farmerette. Ida H. Ogilvie, 
director of recruiting, wrote about the benefits that a land 
army provided for farm communities. After discussing the 
importance, need, and use of the land army during war, Ogilvie 
expressed the necessity of such an organization in peace-time 
as well. 
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Women have won their place in intellectual and in 
political fields; the Land Army opens the door of 
opportunity for physical work. The development of the 
labor movement has an ever-increasing tendency to give 
dignity to all labor, and to require that every member of 
a community should as a matter of duty and of right, 
contribute some kind of useful work. . . . The need of 
food production continues, but the Land Army has another 
and a higher duty in the reconstruction period that is at 
hand. To it is presented the supreme opportiinity of 
giving to large numbers of women the chance to do out-of-
door work under conditions which afford the chance for 
the working out of one of the most interesting of 
experiments in Democracy. To break through class 
barriers has hitherto been easy for men,- the Land Army 
camp shows to women the unreality of such distinctions, 
proves the imperative necessity for the sxibordination of 
the individual to the good of the whole, and illustrates 
these principles through the unhampered use of muscle and 
brain. The Spirit of the Land Army is the true siibstance 
of the democratic idea.^° 
Through Ogilvie's writing and other articles contained in 
Farmerette, it is clear that the WLAA expected to be present 
during the next decade of American agriculture. The WLAA's 
expectation to remain in farming in the 1920s illustrates the 
organization's short-sightedness regarding the position and 
role that women played in agriculture and society in the late 
1910s and 1920s. The group's assuirption that women would 
remain in farming due to their presence in World War I had 
been naive. The return of American men to the home front 
assisted in displacing women from the fields initially, while 
the arrival of the 1920s did much more to discourage the use 
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of women as agricultural labor. The goal of the WLA and 
Emergency Farm Labor Plan of World War II would be to devise a 
plan that allowed women to remain on farms after the armistice 
was signed. 
In terms of World War I, however, no post-war contingency 
plan existed, although the WLAA expected that its labor force 
would be able to remain on farms into the 1920s and beyond. 
And, according to the January 1919 issue of Farmerette. 
administration of the WLAA had been turned over to the United 
States Employment Service in the Department of Labor, where 
Secretary William B. Wilson saw great opport^lnity for the use 
of women a s  farm l abor for the coming crop s e a s on.The 
demand for farm labor in 1919 continued to perpetuate the 
WLAA's assumption that their labor would be desired in the 
coming decade. American farmers provided foodstuffs and 
supplies to Europe, and made use of all available labor to 
guarantee a successful crop. Twenty million tons of food had 
been promised to Europe by food administrator Herbert Hoover, 
and it had been recognized that this level of production could 
not be reached without assistance from the WLAA. Thus the 
WLAA made preparations for the recruitment of labor and 
continuation of its program in 1919. The organization's 
Washington, D.C. office directed women's training, while the 
office in New York assessed the program's success and 
published Farmerette and other WLAA materials. The WLAA 
recognized its association with the federal government as 
bringing "an unparalleled opportunity for usefulness." But 
WLAA leaders believed that "Direction from Washington can only 
be direction and the actual efficiency which the Army may 
attain rests on the cooperation of the State Divisions and on 
the spirit of the landworkers.Thus, while the federal 
government provided minimal support and administrative 
structure, the success of the WLAA hinged on the actions of 
local and state administrators and the women who participated. 
Women's participation in the 1919 crop year caused WLAA 
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administrators to assume their presence within the American 
farm labor work force would continue. However, these plajis 
never materialized. By December 1919, the WLAA had received 
from the Department of Labor a message that essentially fired 
the WLAA administration and labor force. Recognizing that 
returning soldiers would need to reclaim their pre-war jobs, 
the federal government announced that the presence of women in 
the national farm labor force would no longer be necessary. 
By allowing the WLAA to work in the fields during 1919, the 
government offered the women the possibility of continual fam 
service. This action would not be repeated by the federal 
government at the end of World War II, the WLA ceased 
operation after the 1945 crop season. However, in terms of 
post-World War I, the removal of the WLAA from the fields in 
1920, then the resulting farm crisis of the 1920s ensured that 
WLAA participants would not work in agriculture during that 
decade. And while that had been the rhetoric of the national 
labor organization, individual states had the opportunity, if 
necessity dictated, to hire their own labor force for the 1920 
crop season. For example, Pennsylvania continued to recruit 
female farm labor into the next decade." 
For the most part, however, the country had been plagued 
by an agricultural crisis in the 1920s. Increased 
agricultural production, over-extension in land and credit, 
loss of European market, and low commodity prices occurred. 
Farmers were not able to make their financial commitments. 
During World War I, as prices rose for such agricultural 
commodities as wheat, livestock, and com, farmers increased 
their land holdings and credit responsibilities. Without 
thought or regard for the future, American farmers, especially 
those in the Midwest, continued war-time production 
strategies. They still saw Europe as a viable market, but 
also needed to pay for their expansion, modernization, and 
improvements made during World War I. The farmers' practice 
of heightened production meant a large domestic suirplus when 
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Europe no longer demanded American foodstuffs and goods. The 
end result meant severe decreases in commodity prices and 
farmer bankruptcies.^* 
If a post-war plan similar to the one used in World War 
II had existed for World War I, farmers might have avoided the 
agricultural crisis that developed in the 1920s. World War II 
post-war policy had been devised in the early 1940s. 
Recognizing that much of the crisis of the early 1920s had 
revolved around crop prices, USDA officials established price 
ceilings and supports for farm products. In May 1941, as the 
nation dealt with its changing economy from depression to war, 
the federal government legislated to set agricultural prices. 
On the heels of the declaration of war in December 1941 
additional legislation was passed to handle crop prices. In 
January 1942, the Price Control Act regulated commodity 
prices. A price ceiling was issued only if crop prices 
reached 110 percent of parity. With this measure the federal 
government hoped to control prices to guard against high 
fluctuations and a repeat of the past. Thus, in October 1942, 
the government initiated additional legislation that 
guaranteed 90 percent parity for crops two years after the 
war.^® With these measures, the federal government controlled 
farm prices without sacrificing farmer income. Women hired as 
labor during this time recognized the nature of their 
employment. As terr^jorary workers, federal policy did not 
encourage the continual presence of women in the labor force 
in their war-time positions after World War II. Women would 
be relegated to their pre-war en^loyment positions or back to 
the home. 
World War II post-war policy had not been a result of a 
similar plain in 1918, but from the lack. The absence of a 
comprehensive post-war plan in the 1910s and early 1920s 
hastened the economic depression that occurred after World War 
I and brought an end to continued war-time labor measures. 
Faced with a severe farming crisis, the nation did not 
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anticipate the need for female agricultural labor and 
therefore did not utilize the WLAA after World War I. The 
women's presence, however, in the nation's fields during the 
war changed the structure of agriculture for the century. 
Legitimized as an acceptable farm labor source, women would be 
called upon in later decades to assist in agriculture and 
other war-needy areas. 
The WLAA, while in operation only a short time during 
World War I, represented a national effort to organize women 
as farm workers. Although the federal government established 
other labor programs, such as contractual Mexican laborers, 
that placed agricultural workers on farms during the war, the 
WLAA illustrated the first organized effort to use women as 
farm labor. The WLAA assisted in establishing a precedent for 
future action during times of national emergency. The farm 
crisis of the 1920s and the Great Depression of the 1930s did 
not allow another chance for the WLAA to re-establish itself. 
The federal government would seek other methods by which to 
alleviate agricultural labor issues during those decades. 
In the 1930s, the decade that became known as the Great 
Depression, legislative policy formed a collective body that 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt termed the New Deal. Within 
federal reform measures, Roosevelt initiated programs that 
changed the way the government had previously functioned. 
Moving away from the self-help mentality of Hoover's 
administration. New Deal programs instituted policy that 
allowed national programs to reach into communities. By 
operating on the local or county level, decentralized New Deal 
initiatives attempted to work for every American. Although 
not every measure reached the success rate that the president 
expected, New Deal programs did bring change to the nation. 
As a result, decentralized provisions such as the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA), Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) were administered 
on the local level by area officials, but funded by the 
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federal government.^® By staying out of the day-to-day 
operation of a particular initiative, the Roosevelt 
administration allowed local officials to effectively run New 
Deal Programs. This methodology and policy would later be 
utilized successfully to operate several programs initiated 
during World War II. 
In order to combat the nation's high xinemployment rate, 
New Deal policy enacted labor relief programs. The Civilian 
Conservation Corps placed unemployed individuals in 
communities and gave them jobs, and in doing so, gave towns 
and cities a needed labor force. Commonly the CCC placed 
urban youths and yoxing men in positions that rebuilt the land. 
Dependent on location, these jobs provided reforestation, 
erosion control, land maintenance, and other environmental 
projects to areas in need. In Vermont, CCC workers (men axid 
women) provided labor for dairy farms. Promoted as a 
successful CCC project, this Vezrmont farm labor tradition 
assisted the state's establishment of an agricultural worker 
program prior to the federal labor program initiated in 1943. 
The creation of the Vermont Volunteer Land Corps in the early 
1940s developed through the experiences of CCC workers in 
Vermont during the 1930s.Bridging the transition between 
New Deal policy and war-time build-up, programs such as the 
Volunteer Land Corps anticipated the drain of farm labor as 
men left for the military and defense industries, and worked 
to provide an alternative source. 
President Roosevelt and his New Deal programs sought to 
employ millions of men who had become unemployed in the 1930s, 
as well as provided relief to the population. The federal 
government instituted nationwide policy to establish work 
relief programs and other forms of assistance for the public. 
The methods utilized by the federal administration in the 
1930s have been likened to that of war preparation. Historian 
Lawrence E. Gelfand described President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
as attacking the "nation's domestic crisis as an emergency not 
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vinlike that posed by a war for national survival."^® With the 
implementation of New Deal programs, Roosevelt prepared for 
war in the form of economic depression and unemployment. In 
the next decade, it would become essential to prepare for 
actual war using the same methodology and planning. With 
World War I as the most recent example of American involvement 
in war, one might assume that World War I was the precedent 
for World War II labor programs. However, the scale of the 
New Deal, as well as its far-reaching programs, clearly 
outdistanced any precedent that World War I provided. Thus, 
due to size of its programs, far-reaching goals of the 
administration, and its structural influence 
(decentralization) toward future policy, it is not surprising 
that New Deal policy, rather than World War I, became the 
greater precedent for World War II programs. 
The beginning of war in Europe and the position that the 
United States held regarding neutrality and then assistance to 
its allies became all-encompassing in society in 1939 and the 
early 1940s. Through governmental action of 1940 and 1941, 
the American public became familiar with defense contracts, 
increased agricultural and industrial production quotas, and 
military enlistments. None of these actions, however, 
involved actual combat. Through the Lend-Lease Program and 
other diplomatic decisions of 1940, Roosevelt supplied the 
nation's allies with necessary war-time supplies and changed 
America's status as an isolated nation to one that intervened 
on behalf of its "neighbors."^® This move, as well as the 
eventual declaration of war in December 1941, would change the 
course of things to come. 
With the declaration of war in December 1941, the 
government's priorities changed. Military and national 
industry forces would be needed to combat the enemy. Even the 
terminology used later by historians and other scholars to 
describe the situation in the country during the war, 
"military-industrial complex," does not imply the importance 
of other sectors of domestic society. The importance of the 
military and industry to society can be viewed by the amount 
of money and manpower used in its mobilization for war. 
Millions of men and women joined the military forces and 
defense manufacturing centers, while Congress authorized huge 
budgets and spent billions of dollars to prepare the nation 
for war. The government continued its efforts to run programs 
in a manner similar to New Deal legislation by fxinding from 
Washington, while administering on local levels.^" Communities 
created local war boards and other community-action committees 
that urged citizens to assist in any manner possible. And, 
while the military response had been almost immediate, that of 
the domestic front progressed a bit more slowly. 
The establishment of the "military-industrial complex" 
allowed the federal government to improve conditions for 
American manufacturing interests. With the nation's permanent 
industrial work force headed to war, recruitment programs for 
defense and manufacturing interests began in 1942, just months 
after the declaration of war. As part of the government's 
plan to increase defense production, industrial recruitment 
included single and married women, and others who had not been 
in the work force previouslyIn the agricultural sector, 
labor relief continued to be needed; the federal government, 
however, did not listen to demands made by farmers as they 
asked for assistance. Instead, agency after agency had been 
created, each in an effort to remedy some economic, political, 
or social problem, and at times they overlapped or conflicted 
in duty and responsibility. Organizations such as War 
Production Board, Office of Price Administration, Office of 
Economic Stabilization, and others, had been created to 
maintain the nation's economy. 
As a result, much of the early war-time legislation 
regarded defense and industrial manufacturing businesses and 
employees rather than farm workers. Thus, not until several 
agencies, organizations, and well-placed individuals requested 
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assistance for agriculture did the government address their 
concerns. And while the nation's farmers had been expected to 
increase production, they had not been given the labor by 
which to accomplish it. The absence of an established 
agricultural policy resulted in the government's inability to 
draw up a quick plan of action. Instead, several groups 
debated the agricultural issue from all sides in efforts to 
implement successful policy. More than one year after the 
declaration of war would pass before the federal government 
brought forth a plan to assist the nation's fairoers in their 
search for labor. 
During that time, agricultural interests called for the 
revitalization of a national land array. In any event, the 
Women's National Farm and Garden Association had not been the 
only organization to request the return of the land army. One 
individual who worked hard to bring about this end was Eleanor 
Roosevelt. Committed to many causes, Roosevelt, as assistant 
director of volixnteer service for the Office of Civilian 
Defense (CCD), called for the use of a land army by the end of 
1941. Using the British land army as an example, Roosevelt 
announced the OCD's plans to recruit women as farm labor for 
the coming crop year.^^ 
The actual declaration of war against Germany and Japan 
brought a renewed effort by the federal government and 
American public to provide war-time services. Industry 
manufacturers and agriculturalists expanded to increase 
production. In terms of farm labor, the creation of the WLA 
in World War II resulted from many issues forcing action by 
the federal government during a time of national crisis. The 
precedents established by World War I and New Deal policies of 
the 1930s did much to foster the idea of a land array once the 
Second World War became a reality. The emergence of a female 
farm labor program in World War I, the WLAA, established a 
framework by which future state and federal administrators had 
been able to femulate their own agencies. Further, the 
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strength of New Deal programs, mainly the decentralization and 
effectiveness of organizations and their ability to provide 
jobs and income to the nation's masses, created a formula for 
the large-scale agencies developed in the 1940s. And, while 
World War I and the New Deal did foster action for the 
activities of the 1940s, they by no means represented the only 
exartples of precedents to the WLA. As the decade of the 1940s 
progressed, other issues developed and established additional 
assistance to efforts to formulate a Women's Land Army for the 
nation. 
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CHAPTER 3. ON THE FARM: PRECEDENTS TO THE WLA 
The path toward WLA development was further enhanced with 
the presence of several successful state-rxin labor initiatives 
in place in the years prior to 1943. In the early days of 
World War II, several states moved cjuickly to establish land 
armies. Based on labor-relief programs utilized during World 
War I and the 1930s, and from other coxmtries, several states 
recruited and placed workers in agriculture as early as 1941. 
Through the use of a non-traditional labor source, these 
states and nations successfully combatted their labor shortage 
during World War II as they organized work programs. Foreign 
programs, such as those in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, 
and New Zealand, illustrated the important roles that 
governmental agricultural labor programs could play as 
countries prepared for war. Thus, the presence of state-run 
initiatives and foreign labor programs brought the development 
of an American labor program to greater focus, as farmers 
waited for this country to enact a similar national program. 
The success of these early state initiatives, along with 
promotional materials from the national media, agricultural 
and women's journals, and some agencies of the federal 
government, convinced President Roosevelt, Secretary Of 
Agriculture Claude R. Wickard, and the USDA of the usefulness 
of the WLA to agriculture during the Second World War. 
The influence of state-run initiatives and their 
importance to the creation of the WLA cannot be minimized. 
Several states in the early days of war embarked on efforts to 
provide labor relief to farmers. State and local governments 
worked with civic organizations, farmers, and the pxablic to 
provide agricultural labor and, in turn, services for the 
women workers. States on both coasts planned and executed 
programs that recruited, trained, and placed women on farms, 
especially in those locales that desperately needed additional 
farm labor. 
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Local initiatives, utilized for the 1941-1942 crop season 
in California, New York, Vermont, and other states provided 
the national government with workable models for a federal 
emergency farm program in 1943. Farm labor shortages in 1941 
and 1942 caused states to search for a method in which to 
bring relief to their farmers. Through private land armies 
and labor programs, these states harvested their crops and 
achieved success. Farmers benefitted from female agricultural 
labor, making use of farm, rural, town, and urban women for 
their dairy, fruit, poultry, and truck-crop operations. 
States without labor programs encountered angry and frustrated 
farmers as crops rotted, spoiled, or were ruined by the 
weather because they did not have sufficient harvest workers. 
In New England, the Veirmont Volxinteer Land Corps (VLC) 
organized by Dorothy Thompson utilized nonfarm labor for 
agricultural work in 1942. Thompson, a newspaper columnist 
and radio personality, recruited students for the "voluntary 
land corps, " or Vol\inteer Land Corps, prior to the 
establishment of a federal program. Acknowledging that the 
federal government needed to be in charge of such a labor 
program, Thompson and the VLC administration understood, 
however, that with the absence of a national program, it had 
been necessary for states and private citizens to provide farm 
labor. In this vein, Thotr^son had organized her labor 
program. While some initial opposition to the VLC occurred, 
from agricultural leaders, biased farmers, and farmer 
organizations, most of the state's farmers foiind that the VLC 
laborers were reliable and capable of handling the assigned 
agricultural work. For many, the use of women benefitted 
their production and operation in 1942, and women would, 
therefore, be in demand for 1943 and beyond. Being what 
arguably has been called the best example of a workable farm 
labor program in the years prior to the establishment of the 
WLA, the VLC had still been termed an "experiment." 
Nonetheless, this "experiment" successfully recruited urban 
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youths to work on farms, and expected, at some later date, to 
demonstrate its program to other states. The organization's 
goals were summarized by Arthur Root, "As a private group, 
working and concentrating on a limited project, we [Volunteer 
Land Corps] hoped to accumulate experience in soxind techniques 
which could be of use in later expansion."^ 
During its first year of operation the VLC received 2500 
applications for service. Recruitment efforts were assisted 
by the publication of Thompson's regular newspaper column and 
Reader's Digest articles. Additionally, staff members 
traveled to northeastern private secondary schools, 
xiniversities, and colleges to interest students in the 
program. The majority of applications had come from New York, 
New York and Boston, Massachusetts,- in all, twenty-six states 
had been represented. It became the job of Thompson and her 
staff to select the most qualified and able-bodied from the 
individuals who applied.^ 
The VLC had a regimented process for selection which 
included an age limit, physical ability and fitness, parental 
consent, and "character." The last condition interested the 
VLC administration, and for the most part, became the most 
important of an individual's application. In terms of the age 
limitation, the VLC recruited men over sixteen years of age 
and women over eighteen. To determine a recruit's physical 
fitness, each person "was required to present a signed 
statement from a physician saying that the applicant had been 
examined by him and was in good health, capable of performing 
hard physical labor such as required on a farm." This health 
statement became necessary for federal farm workers as well. 
For those applicants who had been minors, the VLC required 
parental/guardian consent. And, finally, the issue of 
"character." In most cases, the VLC treated this selection 
criterion as the most telling for each recruit. At eveiry 
person's interview, their character would be evaluated and 
used to further or hinder their application for service. As 
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part of their annual report, the VLC stated the following in 
terms of determining an applicant's "character." 
This intangible was the most important, perhaps, and the 
most difficult to determine. In the pamphlet describing 
the purpose and organization of the Corps it was stated: 
"The Volunteer Land Corps welcomes young men and women 
who agree with the purposes of the Corps, who are willing 
to undergo the disciplines and rigors of hard manual 
labor, and who are ready to adapt themselves to the ways 
of living and the points of view of the farm people whose 
helpers they will be and whose daily life they will 
share." The chief purpose of letters of reference and of 
interviews was to find out who were reliable, 
conscientious, sincere,- who had stamina,- who were 
emotionally stable, and adaptable to new conditions of 
living.^ 
Of all of this process, for the VLC, the interview proved 
to be the most important. It was there that the interviewer 
and interviewee could acquire the information needed to make 
an informed decision. The applicant's "character" was 
determined by those who interviewed him or her, and the 
interviewee had the opportunity to ascertain specific 
requirements of the work expected. In all cases, the VLC 
staff hoped to discourage those applicants who wanted to treat 
their service as a vacation. Therefore, each recruit received 
an explanation regarding work, in efforts to prevent workers 
from assuming that anyone who went to a farm "would work six 
hours per day, get time and a half for overtime, go swimming 
in the evening, and have the weekend off." Even so, not every 
candidate would be interviewed. Those who lived out of the 
northeast and had no means to travel for the interview were 
accepted on the basis of their application and references 
alone." 
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With the application and interview process completed, 
more than six hundred students joined the VLC for its first 
year of operation. Not highly paid, these high school and 
college students joined the VLC under the wings of patriotism, 
as their positions did not pay high wages. In the 1942 crop 
season 626 males and females worked on fa2rms in Vermont and 
New Hampshire. Only twenty-four workers were placed in New 
Hampshire; thus the land corps can be "treated as having 
operated only in Vermont."® 
Just as VLC workers had been chosen through elaborate 
means, the farmers who participated also endured a screening 
process. The VLC and Vermont state agencies worked together 
to find farms suited to nonfarm labor. Additionally, the U.S. 
Employment Service and Extension Service agents located 
farmers who requested workers, and placed laborers with them. 
But the final selection of farmers for the program rested with 
VLC field representatives who had been placed in each county. 
In the process of selecting farmers, the VLC representatives 
determined the farm family's "decent"ness. By identifying 
their ability to deal with inexperienced urban labor, and the 
environment of their operation, farmers were chosen to 
participate. While some farmers had been enthusiastic about 
the VLC and the service of nonfarm individuals, others refused 
to participate and accept VLC volunteers. The refusal of some 
farmers to accept the urban labor did not hair^ier the 
organization as the VLC easily placed its first year's 
recruits. Upon placement, VLC representatives checked each 
student and farmer to determine whether their work arrangement 
had been satisfactory.® 
Initially, the VLC administration had been prepared to 
pay each laborer, at the minimum, twenty-one dollars per month 
plus room and board. This rate had been determined from other 
war service and equalled the wage paid to privates in the 
military. However, by the time the volxinteers had been placed 
on farms, policy dictated that farmers "pay the recruit 
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whatever he might be worth as a helper in that locality, 
providing it was not less than $21 a month." Additionally, 
farmers paid a ten dollar premium for accident insurance per 
worker for the three-month period of 1942 etrployment. 
Laborers were assigned to individual farms, or in groups 
en^loyed together on community projects. In general, these 
volxinteers fulfilled their labor requirement on a dairy farm, 
spending two or three months on the job. In some cases, these 
laborers worked for a full year. A Smith College student 
worked on a dairy farm in Randolph, Vermont. Without the 
presence of family members to assist in the work, the student 
provided the necessary labor for the farmer. She "had been 
the sole staff on which he [farmer] can lean and she has kept 
him from ruin cind despair by her work in the house and fields. 
'She's the finest girl I've ever known,' he says. 'I don't 
know what I'd do without her.'"' That attitude prevailed 
among farmers, once VLC members learned their jobs and duties. 
Although the Vermont program had been smaller than those 
established in other states, its organization and success of 
placements gained it recognition by Extension Director, M. L. 
Wilson, in 1943. Described by Wilson during congressional 
hearings concerning the feasibility and funding of a land array 
program, the Vermont initiative reached levels of success that 
guaranteed at least 80 percent of the farmers who used urban 
labor in 1942 would do so again in 1943 . This high rate of 
continuity and success was due to Thompson and her commitment 
to develop a good program. Also, Thompson, as well as Wilson, 
saw the involvement within the land corps as educational, and 
one that would provide a great life and democratic experience 
for each participant.® 
In Maine, the Women's Emergency Farm Service (WEFS) , led 
by Katherine Potter, worked to bring in harvests, and supplied 
labor year-round on dairy farms. The biggest concern, aside 
from labor needs, that Potter and her organization encountered 
in 1942 regarded housing for the workers. In communities 
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without adequate housing that would enable women to commute to 
their farm jobs, the state staff encountered gasoline and tire 
rationing problems. To alleviate rationing, farmers were 
asked to house as many women on farms as possible. By 
attacking housing shortages in that manner. Potter and the 
WEFs then turned to the issue of labor. In 1942, workers were 
needed for several agricultural commodities, including dairy 
and potatoes. To support dairy as a necessary product for the 
nation and our Allies, the WEFS and Katherine Potter sought to 
provide all needed labor for that industry.' 
Still, dairy did not pose the only opportunity by which 
Maine women worked on farms. Historically, women had assisted 
with the state's crop hai~vests; during war, however, their 
numbers increased. In Aroostook Coimty, fairmers employed 
women to harvest the potato crop each fall. As reported by 
the Maine Agricultural Experiment Station, the harvest of 
potatoes is a crucial time for the farmer. "Labor at harvest 
time is one of the most important items in the management of a 
potato farm. The period of time for harvesting the crop is 
relatively short normally and unfavorable weather conditions 
may shorten it even more." During the 1941 season, 1,708 
workers harvested the potato crop in Aroostook County; of this 
number almost 40 percent had been women. The remaining were 
high school students between the ages of fourteen and 
eighteen, as well as men not yet enrolled in the military or 
defense industries. Not just farm and unemployed women, the 
women employed by the Maine potato producers in the first 
years of war held office and professional positions in 
addition to their stint at farm work.^" Working women joined 
the harvests, taking breaks from their full-time employment. 
Later, the WLA would recruit women in the same manner, 
encourage them to join the organization during vacation 
periods from their full-time jobs. This short work period is 
in direct contrast to the situation that developed in Vermont. 
Thompson and the VLC recruited workers for two to three month 
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stints, while, in Maine, laborers worked only during the 
harvest season--filling positions as seasonal labor. The 
successful use of women and students as farm labor in the 1941 
harvest established a practice that would continue with the 
organization of the WLA and other World War II labor programs. 
In addition to the New England states in the Northeast, 
the state of New York also established a labor program during 
the early war years. In New York, workers were recruited from 
urban areas and placed on upstate or Long Island farms. The 
New York program, referred at times as "Fairm for Freedom, " was 
organized by Mrs. Frank Washburn, and actively used women as 
farm labor in numerous areas aroiuid the state. Additionally, 
women worked as cow testers for dairy herd improvement 
associations. The Farm Placement Office of the U.S. 
Employment Service assisted in the recruitment and placement 
of women on New York farms. In 1942, the Employment Seirvice 
assisted more than one hxindred Hudson River valley farmers who 
requested labor assistance from the government. Women and 
college students spent their summer months on these farms 
accon^lishing whatever tasks given to them.^^ 
Farmers who owned various truck-crop farms in the Hudson 
River valley. New Jersey, and on Long Island readily employed 
women from New York City to work during the cultivation and 
harvest months. The New York Times printed many stories and 
columns recruiting women to work on farms in Nassau and 
Suffolk counties on Long Island, upstate New York, and New 
Jersey. Farmers who needed labor in upstate New York and on 
Long Island, wrote of the eir^jloyment opportunities for New 
York City's college women and Chinese nationals. In the 
Hudson River valley farmers used women to pick fruits and 
vegetables and to cultivate vegetable fields. College women 
made ideal enployees due to summer break from class work; on 
the other hand, Chinese nationals also made excellent farm 
laborers. Many had been farmers before emigrating to the 
United States and therefore would qualify as experienced 
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labor. With living quarters provided, the Chinese would 
receive fifty cents per hour, a better wage than the 
inexperienced college women. In Columbia Coxinty, New York, 
women were paid the average rate of thirty cents per hour, 
with the cost of their room and board deducted from their 
wages. 
Each state in the Union, of course, desired to 
successfully harvest its crops during the war years. This, 
however, did not always occur because regions as well as 
states resisted the use of women as farm labor in the years 
prior to as well as after the creation of the WLA. Conflict 
occurred when one county accepted female farm workers, while 
other counties adamantly opposed this source of labor. New 
York provided a prime exair5)le of this situation in 1942. The 
New York Times discussed the agricultural situation in that 
state in 1942, and described the state's desire to better 
address state labor issues for the next crop year. Reported 
to have let fruit and vegetables rot on the ground in 1942, 
due to farmers' perceived notions regarding the lack of 
acceptable labor, in 1943 the state prepared for a better 
season and harvest. Although female farm workers had been 
accepted in some counties of New York in 1942, widespread 
approval had not occurred. Western United States' farmers 
were more receptive to the use of female agricultural labor 
than their coxinterparts in the Northeast. One reason for this 
would be the removal of western Japanese labor early during 
the war, thus causing the Northwest to rely on other sources 
of labor. Therefore, in states like California, Oregon, and 
Washington, nonfarm women had been active in crop harvests for 
some time prior to the official creation of the WLA." 
With increased military and domestic build-ups after 
Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and bumper crops in many areas 
of the country, most American farmers realized the need for 
additional labor in early 1942. In the years before WLA 
establishment, any effort made to recruit labor for 
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agriculture had been a result of the U.S. Employment Ser-vice. 
In the West, that agency had been called upon to provide 
workers for California growers. Without the monetary or 
structural means to adequately recruit a labor force, the 
Employment Service utilized all available public resources to 
raise workers. In this manner, the Employment Service 
contacted the press services. Departments of Agriculture, 
YMCA, YWCA, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, community chambers of 
commerce, and "harvest councils" to promote the labor drive. 
In general, day laborers were widely desired, and these 
individuals gave up other commitments to harvest crops. 
Professionals worked weekends and vacations, while students 
left school to provide agricultural labor where needed." 
In addition to the Employment Service, other state 
agencies recruited labor for farmers. In 1942, the American 
Women's Voluntary Services organized the Agricultural 
Committee that consulted governmental agencies, chambers of 
commerce, and other state labor groups to determine the best 
labor plan for California. The Agricultural Committee 
recruited and placed women eighteen years and older on farms 
for the 1942 crop haorvest. If adequate housing was not 
located, the American Women's Voliintary Services (AWVS) 
provided work camps for the women, as well as transportation 
to and from the work site. The success of this program, 
through the AWVS and the Enployment Service emphasized the 
necessity of labor for California, and hence, the nation, 
during World War II." 
The end of the regular 1942 crop season did not mean the 
end of labor problems for California. While most of the 
nation allowed a respite from labor worries over the winter 
months, in California, growers continued their agricultural 
practices. In December 1942 and January 1943, while the rest 
of the country relaxed and organized for the next crop season, 
California producers remained in operation. California citrus 
crops, especially lemons, were picked throughout the year, 
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while other crops such as almonds, beans, beets, lettuce, 
oranges, tomatoes, and walnuts, were harvested seasonally. 
Women replaced those who had been employed previously as 
seasonal labor, mainly interned Japanese laborers and men who 
had chosen to go to war or defense industries. However, even 
with the assistance of women, California did not have enough 
labor to harvest the entire state's lemon crop, and, 
therefore, the state instituted a program that allowed high 
school students to pick in the fields and orchards in the 
afternoons, while attending school only in the mornings.^® In 
this case, the use of women and youths in California 
emphasized the iit^ortance and necessity of a federal program 
to assist the nation's farmers. Clearly, California 
demonstrated states' needs for the development of a land army 
as it ett^jloyed any available person, yoxing, old, native, or 
foreign, to gather the harvest. 
In Oregon, women picked fruit, hoed hops, thinned beets, 
and drove tractors, as well as conducted other jobs that 
generally had not been done by women previously. In March 
1942, the publication Independent Woman reported about a 
survey to be used in Oregon that would deteiroine that state's 
female commitment to the war effort. The state organization, 
administered by Sadie Orr Dunbar conducted a comprehensive 
survey that addressed several labor concerns. The state-wide, 
house-to-house study of "womenpower" occurred in the spring 
and summer months of 1942. Reaching more than 300,000 women, 
the survey addressed issues concerning the use of women in 
defense and fam work; specifically, whether women had the 
skills needed to replace "manpower" within the state,- if 
Oregon women would provide enough labor to harvest the state's 
crops; and whether the state could depend on "voluntary 
enlistments" of women, or whether they would need a "national 
compulsory registration" for women. These questions and 
others made up the Oregon defense survey that many 
"housewives, business and professional women, debutantes. 
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teachers, farm women, and all the rest of the female citizens 
and non-citizens above high school age" would answer. The 
results were to be filed with local and state offices of the 
United States En^loyment Service, xintil such a labor need 
arose. Mary Anderson, chief of the United States Women's 
Bureau, observed the results of the survey and determined that 
as a model for other states the Oregon survey "set the pace 
for a nationwide survey of feminine skills."^'' 
As a result of the labor survey, Oregon requested all 
women who were available, as well as inclined, to work on 
farms during the 1942 crop season. Women who answered the 
call for labor would work in either unskilled or semi-skilled 
positions. In the previous season, with an absence of 
migratory labor for agricultural work, Oregon's office of the 
U.S. Ert^jloyment Service had accepted any Oregon woman or child 
who volunteered to work in the state's fields. The reliance 
on "the home folks" continued in 1942, as the Employment 
Service publicized the need for "every man, woman, and youth" 
to join the Oregon farm labor force. Although no structured 
farm labor force existed in 1942, through the "press, radio, 
and from public platforms," state residents knew of the 
agricultural worker shortage. Subsequently, thousands of 
women workers joined the work program that year.^® 
In 1942, Oregon's farm work included the harvest of 
apples, beans, cherries, hops, lettuce, peaches, pears, peas, 
potatoes, prunes, strawberries, sugar beets, and walnuts. 
Anderson as a Labor Department official expressed agency 
policy that women be paid similar wages to men, in order to 
establish equality among farm men and women. In 1942, women 
would receive the same pay as men doing the same work; that 
rate, however, was not discussed. Harvest pay reportedly had 
been "unusually high" in Oregon for 1942. Regardless of the 
unusual high pay involved, harvest work was still "regarded as 
a patriotic service, even though well paid."^® In this 
instance, Oregon workers received better wages than most 
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harvest workers prior to the creation of the WLA, as well as 
women err^loyed after 1943. In other locales, once farm labor 
had been equated as "patriotic service," workers could 
anticipate low wages. In some cases, workers wages had been 
so low that expenses were higher than the amoxint of money-
received for their labor. 
The success of state labor initiatives during the 1942 
crop season helped increase agricultural production. Due to 
agricultural improvements and good weather, the 1942 crop and 
livestock harvest had been 26 percent more than the period 
from 1935-1939 allowing farmers to obtain America's "Food-for-
Freedom" goals. During that crop year, American farmers 
increased acreage and production for many agricultural 
commodities, including peanuts, soybean, flax, milk, eggs, and 
garden vegetables. Generally farmers raised their efforts for 
all "strategic foods, fibers, and drugs." To accomplish their 
new production goals and acquire suitable labor, farmers 
turned to women for assistance. In April 1942, about 14 
percent of the farm workers in the United States were women, 
compared to just 1.5 percent two years before. The 14 percent 
represents an average of the agricultural workers in this 
country because states such as Florida, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, and South Carolina, reported women holding at least 20 
percent of the farm jobs, while Iowa reported only 8 percent 
of its farm force to be women. The 1942 crop year's higher 
production levels occurred even with the presence of less 
experienced farm labor in the fields and bams as men left the 
farms for better opportunities. Replacement of these men by 
women and youths clearly did not affect the capability of the 
nation to continually produce wartime levels of goods and 
products 
American farmers' ability to accomplish production 
increases with local nontraditional forces of labor forced the 
federal government to examine the feasibility of a federal 
farm labor program for the country. However, regardless of 
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the success foxind in state initiatives and farmers' productive 
efforts, the federal government still withheld its support for 
the establishment of a national program. In 1941, several 
sources had addressed the concerns and issues involved with 
the lack of farm labor available in the country. With the 
advancement of the crop season, annoxincements from Washington, 
D.C. concerned the necessity of hiring others to work in the 
fields. One agency that undertook the hiring of farm laborers 
was the Works Progress Administration. Under this agency, 
workers would be recruited to work on farms in areas where 
needs had become "critical." In Agriculture and National 
Defense the need for farm labor for the country was expressed 
in several issues at the end of 1941. In September and 
November, the publication described the need for national 
agricultural labor, as well as the need for a possible program 
that would provide farm labor in the coming months. And, in 
1942, agriculture and defense officials, conceimed by the rate 
which people left farms for defense jobs, described the 
expected conditions for that year as "definitely serious." 
Still, the federal government did not establish a labor 
program. 
The absence of a federal program did not stop 
governmental agencies from establishing guidelines for the 
hiring of agricultural labor. By issuing certain guidelines, 
agencies assisted states in creating and maintaining programs 
to implement state-run "land armies." In the U.S. Women's 
Bureau's publication entitled, "Guidelines for Wartime Use of 
Women on Farms, " the agency examined the current state of 
agricultural labor. By addressing the diminishing use of 
migratory labor due to their inability to follow the crops 
during harvest periods, the Women's Bureau advocated other 
labor sources to assist those farmers in need of agricultural 
workers. The agency suggested that farmers hire women to 
assist them in 1942. Further, the farmers should hire women 
not previously employed by the war industry, essentially 
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guaranteeing the employment of farm and rural women who had 
not left homes to enter manufacturing in the cities. In that 
case, the Women's Bureau assumed that the majority of women 
available for agricultural labor would be farm-raised or 
familiar with fairm life, and need little, if any, work 
training. 
By assuming that most farm labor would be "farm-raised" 
and familiar with agricultural practices, the Women's Bureau 
kept farmers from realizing the full potential of American 
labor. While East and West coast states still utilized all 
available labor sources, states in the Midwest and South did 
not. In that regard, although the programs in eastern and 
western states were important to the future farm labor 
program, they did not represent the dominant attitude of the 
time, but rather a more radical expression of the use of women 
during the Second World War. These states, including 
California, Oregon, and Vermont; Maryland and Virginia, where 
women picked berries and milked cows,- and Illinois, where 
women detasseled fields of com, represented the ideal of farm 
solutions for the coiintry during the war. These early 
initiatives established the concept that all women made ideal 
agricultural labor, and a federally-legislated farm labor 
program would work to bring about that end.^^ 
The remainder of the nation, in light of the Women's 
Bureau's suggestion regarding the suitability of certain women 
as farm labor, used members of the farm family as labor in 
1942. As sons went to war or the defense factory, daughters 
were "recalled" from their jobs in town to return to the farm, 
and take over where their brothers had left off. In 1941, 
one-quarter of the nation's farm women were doing farm chores 
both in the bam and in the field; by 1942, that figure had 
doubled to one-half of the nation's farm women and girls. In 
the Midwest, this trend is easily identified. As a region 
that resisted early state-run initiatives and nonfarm labor, 
midwestem farmers utilized female family members as 
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agricultural workers. This trend is shown in table 1, where 
statistics for specific states illustrated the increased use 
of women on family farms in 1941 and 1942. Thus, in the 
Middle West, daughters wore the overalls, drove the tractors, 
fed the stock, and assisted with the grain harvest.^* 
Table 1. Estimated percentage of farm women performing field 
work and operating machinery, 1941 and 1942 
Field work Operating machinery 
States 1941 1942 1941 1942 
Iowa 10 35 5 40 
Kansas 14 32 8 26 
Minnesota 22 38 12 28 
North Dakota 5 10 5 25 
South Dakota 5 20 8 30 
source: Katherine Jellison, Entitled to Power.- Farm Women 
and Technoloav. 1913-1963 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1993), 140. 
Throughout the Midwest, situations developed with the 
coming of war that brought farm women and girls back to the 
fields. Wives returned to the fields to assist husbands, 
daughters to help fathers, or sisters to lend a hand to 
brothers. In some cases, families asked for the return of a 
farm daughter from her job in town. One Iowa women did just 
that. In response to the absence of labor on his farm, John 
Jenkins of Griswold, Iowa told his daughter in 1942, "Annette, 
. . . it's time for you to quit that job in town, get into 
some overalls and give me some help aroiind here. " As her 
story is retold in Country Gentleman. Jenkins explained that 
she did not feel she had made much of a sacrifice to return 
home to the farm, as she could assist the war effort in her 
own way by producing crops and assisting her parents. Annette 
had left her off-farm position to return home when her 
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brothers left for military and defense work. Coirpetent as any 
of her brothers, Annette Jenkins returned to the farm in 
Fe b r u a r y  1 9 4 2 ,  a n d  w o r k e d  a s  a n y  h i r e d  h a n d  m i g h t . A n n e t t e  
Jenkins' attitude was common in the Midwest, as families 
recalled daughters from town to address their labor needs. 
For the most part, fairm daughters, and farm women, had been 
viewed as more appropriate labor than nonfarm women. In Iowa 
officials estimated that 90 percent of the farm labor present 
in 1943 had been furnished by the farmer and his family; in 
1941 that figure had been 75 percent. With the absence of 
hired labor, family workers became more common, and the use of 
women and children increased from 13 percent to 36 percent.^® 
Other lowans expressed ideas similar to those of the 
Jenkinses. In terms of a labor shortage, Iowa farm men and 
women had been more comfortable with the presence of farm and 
town women, although not immediate family members, than with 
urban women. In cpieries and letters to the editor, fam women 
told Farm Journal and Farmer's Wife that they held doubts 
regarding the use of nonfainti women on farros.^"' The efforts put 
forth by Farm Journal to address the issue of nonfarm women as 
farm labor is helpful in tinderstanding the dichotomy between 
farm and urban life. Attitudes of farmers and their families 
were important to the overall success of a land army project. 
By posing specific questions to its female readers concerning 
the use of town and city women on farms. Farm Journal could 
extrapolate, in its opinion, whether farm families would 
accept women workers. In most cases, farm women explained 
that the use of town women would be acceptable, provided the 
women had some experience, available time, and flexibility to 
handle all types of farm or house chores. On the use of city 
women, however, the respondents were just as sure that they 
could not be employable on farms. Many believed that city 
women would only be interested in romantic adventure or a 
vacation, and therefore would not prove useful on the farm. 
Mrs. William H. Dreier of Iowa wrote, "if we can get city 
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women sind girls who can live two weeks without bathrooms and 
nail polish, who can pump and carry water and use it 
carefully, who can work on a hot range all day, who can eat at 
a table with sweaty men in dirty overalls, who can take 
directions from a housewife as graciously as they can from a 
man in the office, who can work xintil 10 p.m. if the job isn't 
finished, and who can feel as patriotic doing all of this as a 
soldier earning $1.30 a day, we can use them in our homes." 
Few farm women, however, expected to get that sort of 
commitment from a "city girl." Some doubted that the city 
women could handle the physical labor of farm work, nor would 
they be accustomed to the hard life of the farm; most agreed, 
however, that city women would be acceptable to harvest truck 
crops such as fruits and vegetables.^® 
The attitude present in the Midwest regarding the use of 
women on farms was not unique to that region. In the South, 
farm families also relied more heavily on farm wives and 
daughters than nonfarm women in the period before the WLA. In 
many cases, wives and daughters took over the care of farms, 
as husbands built army camps, worked in factories, or enlisted 
in the military. McCall's magazine covered this aspect of the 
home front in its May 1942 issue. In Arkansas, a wife and 
daughter maintained their 185-acre farm during the absence of 
men. They cared for the numerous livestock on the farm, 
planted, cultivated, and harvested their crops, and processed 
crops for home consumption. But in contrast to Farm Journal. 
McCall ^ s magazine portrayed farm life as relaxing and 
prideful, an experience that any women would enjoy and be 
proud to have participated. The Arkansas women's lives are 
summed up in the following manner: "There is always time to 
watch the sun dip over the far blue hills, to play with the 
twin lambs, and to pat the faithful dog who brings in the 
COWS; and always there is time to be thankful that they belong 
to the army of American women fighting shoulder to shoulder 
with their men for the safety and health of their covintry."^® 
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In much the same manner that the nation had called upon others 
to participate, McCall^s. and other publications, played upon 
women's sympathies and patriotic spirit to join the effort to 
assist the coxmtry's farmers. 
Clearly, different publications in early 1942 addressed 
the farm labor issue in different ways. While the 
agricultural publication, Farm Journal and Farmer's Wife had 
not advocated the employment of urban women as farm workers, 
McCall's magazine called for all women to join the "army of 
American women" needed to bring in the crops. Siibsequent 
articles in popular magazines such as McCall's and Time, farm 
pxiblications such as Country Gentleman and Farm Journal, and 
national and local newspapers, further enhanced the position 
of women as suitable farm labor. Additionally, national 
organizations also advocated the use of women in agriculture, 
mainly through the revitalization of the World War I land 
army. The Women's National Farm and Garden Association, in 
its own publication, discussed the merits of American farm 
labor precedents and programs in other countries and their 
influence on the creation and organization of a similar group 
in the United States. 
Following the scarcity of farm workers in some regions 
during 1941, several publications began to debate the use of 
women as agricultural labor. Early in 1942, Time magazine 
called the public's attention to the role of farm women in the 
war. By reporting a meeting held by farm women in Chicago 
during the first week of January, the magazine recognized 
their efforts to assist the country during a time of war. And 
although, the farm women had not openly discussed the 
reinstatement of the WLA for World War II, they recognized the 
need for additional labor programs. These farm women urged 
the country's rural women and youths to join the war effort by 
providing assistance whenever warranted.^" The women in 
attendance, clearly, did not embrace nor advocate the use of 
all women on the nation's farms; they did not suggest the 
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recruitment of urban women. 
Other national publications also addressed the issue of 
farm labor in the early months of 1942. In an article by 
Esther M. Colvin in its April issue, Independent Woman, 
questioned the commitment of Secretary of Agriculture Claude 
R. Wickard to the revitalization of a national "land army." 
Wickard speaking for the federal government advised women to 
fulfill their patriotic duty by registering with their local 
War Boards and awaiting "further instructions," which he 
expected to come during the 1943 crop season. Colvin argued, 
as did others, that 1943 would be too late for organization. 
She saw the current year as the time for the revitalization of 
the WLA, and thus, brought to national attention the efforts 
by states to use women as farm labor. As an example, Colvin's 
presented Oregon and its success regarding the harvest of its 
"bumper string bean crop" in 1941. Calling Oregon's efforts 
the start of the mobilization process, Colvin advocated a 
similar national program. In addition to Oregon, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, 
and Virginia had also recruited women and reported labor 
successes for the 1942 crop year.^^ 
Colvin was not the only person calling for the 
mobilization of women as farm labor. Announcements in the 
Denver Post called for the use of women in that state's 
fields. And although Colorado had first discussed the 
employment of youths in the fields, Colorado State College 
representative, R. W. Roskelly, advocated the use of women as 
labor. "Women will have to help . . .it's veiry common for 
women to work eight hours in the field. Some of them are even 
spending eight hours a day on tractors.Other articles in 
the newspaper during May also called for the use of women in 
the fields. In a message from the United States Employment 
Service, Colorado, as well as other western states, had been 
told to "solve their own labor supply problems." The manner 
by which Colorado and the western states accomplished this was 
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to use all available labor, including women, in their fields. 
Initially, Colorado hoped to solve its labor shortage with its 
own residents and to avoid any assistance from Japanese 
Americans brought to the region. But that plan proved 
impossible as the war continued." Finally, the same 
publication atteir5)ted to show the glamorous side of farming 
with its portrayal of women working in eastern fields. Caught 
by the camera applying her make-up, Jean Kelly of New York 
worked on a Long Island farm as part of the land army forces 
present in the East coast. In later years of World War II, 
Kelly's photograph and others like it printed in national 
publications would be held against the WLA. Individuals 
against the WLA argued that the photos depicted WLA workers 
and nonfarm women desirous only of a vacation and not 
interested in assisting the war effort. Additionally, these 
women would corrupt the rural population with their 
s ophi s t i cated manners. 
These first articles of 1942 led the way for others, and 
piablications began in earnest to demand the institution of a 
land army for the coxintry. Country pman. Farm Journal 
and Farmer's Wife, and The Saturday Evening Post printed 
articles that described the use of women in the nation's 
fields during the summer. And their desire to see a program 
fully developed by the federal government in the near future. 
The Saturday Eveninq Post addressed the situation faced by 
farm women who moved into the fields in 1942. Comprising a 
labor force larger than that of England's Land Girls, this 
American "land army" worked to support the nation's farmers. 
Although the use of women as agricultural labor had declined 
steadily in the decades prior to World War II, during 1942, 
the percentage of working women on farms had increased. 
Additionally, the Saturday Evening Post described, as well, 
the use of nonfarm women as agricultural labor. And although 
used only in labor emergencies, the employment of such women 
would lead to the successful implementation of the WLA in 
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1943 
The Denver Post and Saturday Evening Post were not the 
only newspapers to discuss the use of nonfartn women as 
agricultural labor. Articles in and letters to the New York 
Times also advocated the creation of a land army. Oiarlotte 
Goodwin described her 1942 farming experience in that forum. 
"We can drive tractors. We can milk cows. We want to join up 
quickly in the farm production army. We are waiting to go. 
But we will not wait long, because there is too much to be 
done and we will find farms for ourselves. Let us get 
together and organize a Women's Land Army. Let us get 
together right away."^® These sentiments, and others that 
advocated the establishment of an agricultural labor program 
were common throughout 1942 and appeared in several 
publications. 
In Country Gentleman, articles recognized the labor need 
that women filled in 1942. In words of one author, society 
realized that "new sources of labor" were being used, and 
"soft white hands that used to pound the typewriter, wrap 
packages, wash dishes and make change are earning patriotic 
calluses this season pulling weeds, swinging hoes, steering 
tractors."^'' The call for the iir^lementation of a land army 
came mostly through newspapers, magazines, and women's 
journals, and with the possible exception of Country 
Gentleman, in all probability, did not reach a large 
agricultural audience. 
All that changed, however, with the publication of 
articles during the fall harvest in September. In that month, 
several journals began a serious call for the use of women as 
agricultural labor for the harvest in 1942 and future crop 
seasons. In that month's issue of Independent Woman, an 
article by Elizabeth Spence entitled "War Time Harvest" 
appeared. As a propaganda piece, this article furthered the 
efforts to gain a land array for 1943. In Spence's words, 
"America's 1942 Food-for-Freedom campaign would be incomplete 
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without special mention of the gallant service of women--a 
service which may well be the decisive factor in America's 
food production campaign." Continuing that discussion, Spence 
reported the women's successes in the nation's fields, 
including the work they did, the positions held, and the 
number of women en^loyed in agriculture during that particular 
year. As a result of women's involvement in the 1942 crop 
season, the nation produced a record harvest of its crops, 
thus illustrating the usefulness and suitability of women as 
agricultural laborers. 
The call for labor continued in the nation's agricultural 
publications. The September 1942 issue of Farm Journal and 
Farmer's Wife also advocated the use of women as agricultural 
labor. In "Sighted Goals; Met Same," the author discussed the 
conditions present in the coimtry at the time of journal 
publication. By expressing the success that agriculture had 
experienced for the year: 9 percent production increase over 
1941 and 25 percent higher than the period from 1934 to 1939; 
yields higher and acreage smaller than 1919; and accomplished 
with 75 percent of the labor available Farm Journal proposed 
the recruitment of available people to the war effort. 
Regional stories were retold, as the pxiblication illustrated 
the wonders that occurred in agriculture with fewer workers, 
higher yields, and somewhat fewer acres in production. In the 
words of this article, "Sighted Goals; Met Same," tells the 
"story of America's harvest victory."^® 
Regardless of the promotional material in print, it would 
be naive to assume that every American farmer became enamored 
of the thought of female farm workers because the national 
media expressed the desire for farmers to do so. And, while 
several thousand farmers would become tolerant of the use of 
nonfarm women as labor, the attitude of midwestem farmers did 
not immediately accept urban women as agricultural workers. 
In 1942, midwestem farmers implied through national and 
regional publications that urban women would be acceptable 
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only to harvest truck-crops, especially fruit and vegetable 
operations on the East and West coasts. As these attitudes 
became part of the written record, and distributed across the 
country in numerous national pxzblications, it is important to 
decide whether midwestem biases against nonfarm women had 
expanded to other areas of the country. It is conceivable 
that midwestem attitudes influenced fanners of other regions. 
This proved, however, not to be the case. In most cases, 
attitudes against the use of nonfarm women remained, for the 
most part in the Midwest. And, although farmers in all 
regions of the nation had qualms about nonfarm women as 
agricultural workers, no attitude developed as strongly as 
that held by midwestem farmers. With the exception of the 
South, where the issue involved race and class, the rest of 
the nation's farmers generally accepted the use of women as 
farm labor for the period from 1943 to 1945. 
Perhaps the most fervently worded support for the use of 
women as agricultural labor can be foxind in the Christian 
Science Monitor in January 1943. For the citrus growers in 
Califomia, the use of women to pick their harvests was highly 
acceptable and welcome. In a state that is flooded with crops 
at harvest time, farmers appreciated the presence of women in 
their fields as they mourned the loss of their traditional 
sources of labor; "the Japanese are gone, and the men and boys 
are in camps, in ships, in airplanes, and overseas"; also 
missing was the migratory labor that had previously traveled 
the state moving from harvest-to-harvest. In terms of 
replacement for the labor sources lost, Calif omia farmers 
welcomed the arrival of women in their labor force.-
"California women are donning slacks and overalls in ever-
increasing numbers to help save the State's bumper crops. 
Lemons, walnuts, almonds, beans, and tomatoes, not to mention 
beets and lettuce and, of course, oranges, acres and acres of 
them--all to be harvested!" California growers did not turn 
away the efforts of women who picked crops during that state's 
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harvest period."® 
Thus the midwestem farmer who suggested that urban women 
would be acceptable labor for truck-crop farms, need only look 
at California and its harvest record to determine the wisdom 
in that statement. But, with all its success and 
advertisement for the use of women as labor, California 
agriculture did not operate on the same scale as farmers in 
the East. Therefore programs that had worked in the West did 
not immediately transpose to other regions. With large 
commercial operations, Califomian farmers needed labor 
desperately to pick their crops, and in this case recognized 
this fact sooner than the federal government, and worked to 
bring about that end. The farmers discovered that the use of 
women was necessary and acceptable to California farms. Thus, 
while many publications worked to portray the use of all women 
as acceptable labor in the period prior to the establishment 
of the WLA, some agricultural publications described a 
regional farmer bias against the presence of nonfarm women on 
farms and their ineffectiveness as agricultural labor. 
The federal government not only had the examples of state 
initiatives or the influence of the media to assist in their 
development of a national farm labor plan, but the actions of 
other countries also illustrated the success acquired through 
the use of women as agricultural labor. Recognized as 
significant in the United States' efforts to establish a labor 
program, the Women's National Farm and Garden Association 
promoted the efforts of other nation's, such as Australia, 
Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand, to the federal 
government. The British had mobilized their domestic forces 
more thoroughly than other countries. Influenced by their 
action taken during World War I regarding the use of a land 
army. Great Britain recognized the need for a similar program 
in the months before World War II began. The mobilization 
efforts for World War II occurred more timely than those of 
World War I, when the British government, like the United 
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States, did not recruit farm labor until 1917. However, 
regardless of its late start and smaller national population, 
the British land army outperformed the American WLAA by 
enrolling more than twenty-three thousand women in the period 
from 1917 to 1919. These women worked on dairy farms, in 
fields, as tractor drivers and plowmen, and as shepherds. 
Thus, as the escalation toward war occurred in the late 1930s, 
Great Britain made plans to establish an agricultural labor 
policy. Therefore, the British Land Army had been organized 
months before the actual outbreak of war in 1939."'^ 
Gearing up for World War II, Britain recognized the need 
for additional farm labor in the late 1930s. British 
foresight in acknowledging worker need allowed the government 
to adequately prepare for labor shortages. Described by W. E. 
Shewell-Cooper, the government's efforts to organize the 
British Land Army allowed for the recruitment and placement of 
women who would perform farm work in the absence of men. 
Britain requested nonfarm women to join the WLA as "Land 
Girls" and assist farm women in their efforts to bring about 
successful harvests. Under the labor program, the British 
government recruited women under forty years of age to assist 
the war effort. However, in some fashion British farmers 
possessed the same prejudices and reluctances to eit^loy women 
as other nations. Initially, the response to the use of women 
as farm labor had been slow; as more men joined the militazy, 
however, this attitude changed. By the time of the United 
States involvement in World War II, the British Land Army 
numbered more than forty thousand women, and the demand for 
women continued. Additionally, the country worked to produce 
more foodstuffs, and in this effort needed more labor, thus 
the call for women for the British WLA became great. 
With forty thousand strong in 1941, the British WLA took 
to the fields and brought in the harvests. In a manner that 
differed from the American WLA, the British organization 
required that Land Girls work full-time for the WLA, and only 
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those women who made that full-time commitment were accepted. 
In the United States, most nonfarm members of the WLA worked 
during vacations from their full-time employment positions, or 
on weekends; in some cases women worked during the entire 
growing season, or stayed year-ro\ind on dairy farms.'*^ While 
the concept of year-round enrollment for the length of the war 
did not become part of the operation of the American WLA, it 
did not cause much concern over the establishment of the land 
army in the United States. The Women's National Farm and 
Garden Association continued to issue calls for a land army 
for the United States that drew on all the exatt5)les available 
to it, especially that of state-run initiatives and the Land 
Girls in Great Britain. In general, the eventual organization 
and development of the American WLA took over many new ideas 
and issues in the hope to create a successful, necessary, and 
helpful organization for the war effort. 
Britain, however, did not prove to be the only foreign 
exatr^le influencing American officials during the period prior 
to the creation of the WLA. Canada also developed its own 
farm labor relief program. The situation that developed in 
Canada was not unlike that of the United States. The rural 
population had been decreasing steadily since the early 
twentieth century, a fact that affected Canadian agriculture 
as citizens became involved in the national war effort. And, 
in actions that clearly echoed the United States during World 
War II, men and women left Canadian farms for service in the 
military or to join the defense industry. By April 1941, 
movement from the farm and other lesser important labor 
positions had been in full force, as more and more men and 
women joined the war effort. By that time almost 50 percent 
of the population over the age of fourteen had joined the 
armed forces or were employed in some position. By the end of 
the war, more than 56 percent of the adult population (those 
over fourteen years of age) were gainfully employed or in the 
military. However, after 1943, the number engaged in war 
72 
manufacturing had decreased to about 10 percent of the adult 
population; while those engaged in "civilian industry" 
increased after 1943, as did the number of ett5)loyers and 
farmers who joined the work force. 
The proportion of the civilian labor force engaged in 
agriculture during World War II represented about one-quarter 
of the total employed work force. Starting from a high point 
of about 30 percent in 1939, the proportion of those engaged 
in farming during the course of the war declined to less than 
25 percent in 1943, and then crept back up to just over 25 
percent by the end of the war. The low figure of those 
working in agriculture in 1943 corresponded to the sharp 
increase of industry and military employment during the war. 
As fewer and fewer people remained in agriculture, farmers in 
central Canada, especially those engaged in dairy and 
livestock farming, severely felt the need for assistance. In 
March 1942, the Canadian government instituted a policy that 
would control labor during the war, keep agriculturalists from 
leaving their farms and entering other employment, as well as 
postpone their military service. In latter years, the only 
way that an individual would be allowed out of his commitment 
to agriculture was by active duty in the military or seasonal 
employment in other outdoors eir^loyment, such as "lumbering, 
logging, forestry, fishing, or trapping." This policy enacted 
by the national Canadian government, brought the importance of 
domestic labor, especially agricultural, to the political 
forefront, as the nation examined the necessity of keeping 
help on the farms. All this was done with the thought of 
obtaining agricultural production goals for each crop year."® 
In addition to keeping labor on the farms, the Canadian 
government also made provisions to furnish additional labor to 
those areas that needed it. So, in the manner of other 
nations and other farm labor programs, Canada instituted a 
labor plan that incorporated local and provincial control. 
Under the War Measures and National Resources Mobilization 
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Acts, the Minister of Labour had the right to enter into labor 
agreements within provinces that recruited labor and 
transported recruits to other locales. With this legislation, 
the Canadian government paid for inter-province 
transportation, and shared with each province the cost of 
recruitment, placement, and intra-province travel. Local 
committees, backed by provincial officers, organized and 
planned the local work groups, and arranged for the "effective 
use of agricultural labor" in each region. Functions of these 
local committees were "to stimulate agricultural production, 
to assure the most effective use of local labor and equipment, 
and to recruit farm personnel for other essential work when 
not needed on the f artns." In acconplishment of these 
provisions, the government recruited and utilized the first 
groups of laborers during the 1942 harvest; workers were used 
"on an emergency basis, when weather and a shortage of 
manpower for the harvest fields threatened destruction to one 
of the bounteous crops of wheat and coarse grains in Canadian 
history." On that occasion, more than 5,000 farm workers had 
been sent from eastern Canada to Saskatchewan and Alberta to 
assist in the wheat harvest. Other examples of inter-province 
travel included the transportation of women and girls from the 
Prairie to Ontario to work in haying fields, and the movement 
of laborers from the East to British Columbia to participate 
in berry and fruit harvests.*® 
Regardless of the administrative structure in place, 
Canadian newspapers and publications also assisted in the 
effort to recruit an acceptable labor force during World War 
II. In the 22 January 1942 issue of Farmer^ s Advocate. the 
call for farm workers was extended. The request asked for 
volunteers to the land army, including high school students 
and women. Canadian farmers welcomed the labor that assisted 
them in the previous harvest, and expected similar results for 
the 1942 crop year. Other issues of the pxiblication 
concentrated on women's contribution to farm labor in Canada, 
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by examining their use on numerous farms in several provinces 
and region. Specifically, Farmer's Advocate reported on the 
women's success, as they assisted in saving various fruit and 
food crops throughout the nation."' 
In other efforts that echoed those of the United States, 
the Canadian government made use of a wide variety of people 
to assist in the nation's harvest. In general, these groups 
resembled their counterparts in America: "Canadian Japanese, 
Indians, prisoners of war, and men, women, and students 
residing in towns and cities." Military men were also 
available for farm work, due to the Farm Duty Plan, which 
allowed furloughs for planting and harvest seasons. In many 
provinces, women and girls were used to pick fruit and 
vegetables during the summer and autumn months after the 
federal provision in 1942 enacted Canada's labor program."® 
On the other side of the world, two island nations also 
affected the creation of a labor program in the United States. 
Wartime efforts in Australia did not differ much from other 
nations; farm population decreased as military and other 
employment increased during the early years of war. In areas 
of munitions factories and other defense industries, such as 
the states of New South Wales and South Australia, rural 
population decreased as defense build-up increased. By Jixne 
1942, the adult male population of the rural area had 
decreased to 80 percent of the 1939 level, while the temporary 
male portion of the population fell even lower, to about 60 
percent of the 1939 level; and by mid-1943, the temporary or 
seasonal male population had decreased to 44 percent of the 
1939 level. And, conversely, with the loss of men within the 
region, the number of women engaged in agriculture, by mid-
1943, had almost doubled since 1939. This figure would remain 
constant to the end of the war. By the end of January 1942, 
legislation had been enacted that would ensure the regulation 
of labor forces in Australia. The National Security 
(Manpower) Regulations gave authority to the Manpower 
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Directorate "to ensure 'that the resources of manpower and 
womanpower in Australia shall be organised and applied in the 
best possible way to meet the recjuirements of the defence 
forces and the needs of industry in the production of 
miinitions and the maintenance of supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community.'""® 
Thus, no one could be dismissed from service without 
governmental approval, especially in the area of industrial 
and defense work. In terms of agricultural production, other 
conditions developed. In contrast to the patriotic feelings 
invoked in the United States and Canada, farmers in Australia 
were reluctant to embark on increased programs of production 
without the guarantee of additional farm labor. Labor 
shortages developed on vegetable and dairy farms, a situation 
that would not affect dairy or vegetable farmers if they 
entered into government contracts,- as hired labor would be 
protected from wartime "call-up." Farmer participation in 
government contracts allowed agricultural workers to remain on 
both vegetable and dairy farms to provide the necessary labor 
for increased production levels. Even so, this effort to 
provide farmers with workers did not completely combat the 
labor issues of World War II in Australia.®® 
Additional means had been needed. The answer came in 
July 1942, as the government established the Australian 
Women's Land Array. However, its establishment and placement 
of women on farms did not occur overnight. Farm families did 
not immediately embrace the idea of women working as farm 
labor, and in that case did not utilize the women immediately 
upon creation of the Australian WLA. And, although the 
organization never reached numbers in excess of four thousand 
women, the Australia WLA did, along with other nations, 
provide a precedent for the American land army at its time of 
organization. The Australian organization gave relief for 
farmers during harvest, as the women employed in the 
Australian WLA worked in seasonal and imskilled harvest 
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positions. In addition to the WLA, other sources of labor 
existed for the Australian farmers. Prisoners of war, high 
school students, military personnel, and others assisted in 
the nation's efforts to bring in their harvest on time.®-
By mid-1943, the Australian government, recognized the 
importance of food and crop production, and requested the 
return of labor to the agricultural sector of society. 
Because of this, the government released a revision to the 
nation's manpower policy, in which, by June 1944, men would be 
released from the military to enter rural and farm positions. 
Eleven thousand of the fifteen thousand released would be used 
in the dairy industry. Others would be placed in munitions 
factory positions and other defense industries. And while 
these provisions existed to assist agriculture and other rural 
industries, the war department was slow to return workers to 
domestic eir^loyment; once men returned to rural industries, 
those who entered dairy work did not reach the numbers 
anticipated. In an effort to alleviate the labor problems and 
control the distribution of workers to agriculture, the 
government enacted other legislation in 1944. Manpower was 
distributed from farm-to-farm in an effort to balance labor 
needs and demands . 
Still, these efforts did not solely alleviate labor 
problems that developed, and more men were released from the 
military in 1944. This occurrence, mid-way through the year 
represented a redistribution of labor throughout Australia, as 
the coxantry prepared for postwar econoiry and society. At this 
time, the government and military released the men who had 
been recjuested by the dairy industry, as well as made other 
efforts to alleviate the farm labor problem." 
In addition to Australia, other Pacific nations also 
exerted efforts to combine their domestic and defense 
economies, as well as find relief labor for the agricultural 
sector of their society. In New Zealand, the situation that 
developed was different then the other industrialized nations. 
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As a predominantly agricultural nation. New Zealand did not 
have the heavy industrial manufacturing base that the United 
States or Britain had in 1940. Relying chiefly on agriculture 
for its commercial industry, farm labor became the most common 
form of defense labor during the war. And as men left farms 
for other eii:5)loyment opportxanities or the military, the 
nation's women remained behind and replaced men as the chief 
source of farm labor. Unlike other nations during wartime. 
New Zealand did not recruit women for defense manufacturing 
positions, instead relied on their labor for agriculture. In 
the occurrence of manufacturing positions for women, 
specifically in clothing or food manufacturing/processing, 
jobs were gender-specific and no more than menial tasks. The 
circumstance of war did not change women's role in industry,-
positions were not created for women, they remained in their 
sxibservient jobs of the past. To address wartime concerns, 
the national government concentrated on those areas of the New 
Zealand econon^ that required the women's assistance." Thus, 
due to stereotypes and biases against women as war workers 
during World War II, New Zealand women foxind themselves placed 
in agricultural service as their contribution to the war 
effort. 
New Zealand farms were owned and operated by families. 
Historically, New Zealanders did not commonly use hired labor 
on family farms, except on larger dairy farms and sheep 
stations- Because all family members participated and 
assisted in the operation of the farm, it was not unusual for 
women to work the farm along with the men. In most cases, the 
loss of a family member to the war effort meant a reduction of 
the number of livestock raised, cows milked, or crops grown. 
Many farmers lost their family labor early in the war, with 
labor shortages occurring from 1941 to 1945. During those 
crop years, farmers who requested assistance and received 
labor from the New Zealand government accepted furloughed 
military personnel. Known as the Army Harvesting Scheme, this 
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measure was enacted, in 1941, purely as a way to provide the 
New Zealand famners with harvest labor--"a stop-gap measure"--
not permanent labor. Farmers took advantage of this program, 
and through it, soldiers assisted the nation in producing 
acceptable harvests for the years during World War 11.®^ 
With the threat of Japanese invasion in 1942, and more 
military enlistments in the following years, the question 
quickly became whether New Zealand farmers could provide the 
necessary agricultural produce needed in the nation, and 
whether they could increase production as war needs dictated. 
And although it would have been possible to farmers to plant 
and cultivate, as well as care for their milch cows and sheep, 
the real issue during war became whether fairmers would be able 
to accomplish all their production demands without hired 
labor. Short of decreasing the number of men sent for 
military duty. New Zealand searched for answers concerning the 
status of agricultural production and labor in the nation 
during the war.®® 
Although New Zealand farmers saw men as the capable 
people to take care of agriculture for the nation, they were 
willing to try other labor forms. Farmers grudgingly accepted 
women as a relief form of labor, thus, farm and nonfarm women 
worked full-time on farms. And, while the number of men 
employed on farms decreased dramatically during the war, the 
number of women did not; with more than 6,000 women employed 
in farming in the late 193 0s, the nation boasted almost eleven 
thousand women engaged in agriculture by the end of the war. 
The organization of the Women's Land Corps in late 1941 
brought legitimacy to the use of women on the nation's farms. 
In efforts to assist family members, as well as work on dairy 
farms and sheep stations, these women provided an assistance 
to New Zealand agriculture not unseen in other nations. And 
while success cannot be measured in exact figures, the 
inportance of the New Zealand Women's Land Array reached the 
United States as it strove to establish a similar organization 
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mid-way through the war.®' 
Although the experiences in Australia and New Zealand did 
not lead to a resounding call for the organization of a 
women's land army in the United States, they brought forth a 
message that women were an acceptable form of farm labor. 
These experiences, along with the British Land Girls 
organization and state-run initiatives in the United States, 
illustrated the possibility and necessity of a similar 
organization in the United States during World War II. 
Positive images of farm and nonfarm women as agricultural 
labor in the United States and foreign nations, as portrayed 
in national publications, allowed the federal government to 
cautiously approach the issue of a land airray in the latter 
part of 1942. Bombarded by a media cart^jaign from women's, 
national, and agricultural publications prior to 1943 
convinced the national government of the importance of a land 
army to the agricultural community, as well as the public's 
resolve to bring about its incorporation. 
In the years of war before the establishment of the WLA, 
the federal government received some of its strongest pressure 
to create a labor program that included a land army in the 
spirit of World War I, and in accordance with the 
decentralized administration of New Deal programs. In the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, the government faced additional 
influences from individual states, foreign countries, and 
national media. These forces worked effectively to convince 
the federal government of the necessity of using women as farm 
labor during World War II. Although some individuals, 
organizations, and states did not embrace the concept of the 
WLA and the etrployment of nonfarm women, they did not remain 
hostile to the concept either. Regardless of every 
individual's personal preference concerning the establishment 
of a land array and farm labor program, media exposure for this 
possibility raised the public's and government's awareness of 
this necessity. As a result, in late 1942 the USDA begcin to 
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lead the way for the establishment of a national agricultural 
labor policy for the war effort. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE WLA 
The influence of World War I and the New Deal on the 
formulation of World War II farm labor programs is important 
to the general development of wartime measures. However, 
these two events do not provide the only influences for the 
WLA. Other influences existed as well, specifically, early 
state-rxin programs,- other countries' policies; and public 
media sources; all which assisted in establishing the WLA 
during World War II. In terms of the federal government, its 
action had been slower. Confined initially to agency reports 
and subcommittee and committee hearings, the federal 
government did not initiate formal proceedings to create the 
WLA until early 1943. Then the actions by Secretary of 
Agriculture, Claude R. Wickard, brought the jurisdiction and 
influence of the Emergency Farm Labor Program within the USDA 
and Extension Service. Still, however. Congress struggled 
with the necessity of a land army, and the reasons to 
establish the program. But, while the federal government had 
been ensnared in congressional committees, hearings, and 
testimonies, the American pxiblic demanded and requested a 
viable farm labor program. In regard to the nation's request 
for agricultural labor during World War II, Congress had 
little choice but to provide it. Thus, in its action to 
initiate the Emergency Farm Labor Plan (Public Law 45), the 
federal government created the Women's Land Army with the 
other labor programs. 
Aside from the technological, and production-based 
improvements that occurred in agriculture during World War II, 
its structure changed as well. As men and women left the farm 
under the guise of patriotism and suggestion of economic 
improvement to enter defense industries and military service, 
those who remained discovered that patriotic duty led to 
severe labor shortages on the farms. Between April 1940 and 
July 1942 more than two million men left the farm, and by the 
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end of the war, the agricultural population had decreased by-
six million.^ As a result, the nation's farmers called for 
federal measures to provide labor and assistance for the 
production of their crops. Initially, the federal government 
did not address these concerns directly, but left any action 
to local or state officials, or farmers. However, by late 
1942 the federal government initiated action concerning the 
farm labor situation in the country and worked to alleviate 
the problem as well as assist the nation's farmers. Through 
the work of committees, subcommittees, and congressional 
hearings, the federal government enacted a wartime 
agricultural labor plan that would provide necessary workers 
to needy areas. Decisions to create such a program, as well 
as the passage of legislation that initiated the plan, did not 
automatically bring change to federal agricultural policy but 
did establish a basis from which to start. Upon these 
decisions and legislation, the government and the USDA faced 
the difficult task of securing funding and support for a 
federal emergency agricultural labor program. 
Federal agencies discussed the revival of a women's land 
army. Specifically, the United States Department of 
Agriculture, Extension Service, and Women's Bureau explored 
the possibility of such an organization in 1941 and 1942. The 
USDA, which included the Extension Service, held several 
committee and siibcommittee meetings and hearings in which 
legislators debated the issue of farm labor and the presence 
of women within that work force. Throughout the two years as 
USDA and Extension Service officials discussed the 
agricultural labor and production situation that had developed 
within the nation, these officials did not, for the most part, 
reach a solution to the labor question. The Women's Bureau 
took their efforts further, and in 1942 supplied to interested 
state and federal enployees, guidelines regarding the 
employment, placement, and care of women who were engaged as 
agricultural labor during the war. The pxiblication. 
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"Guidelines for Wartime Use of Women on Farms, " advocated the 
placement of women on the nation's farms. At that time, the 
Women's Bureau expressed an opinion that had not been widely-
accepted by the federal government to date. Further, its 
choice to include women as farm workers grew from the problem 
that developed for migratory labor. With the country's 
rationing of tires and gasoline after Pearl Harbor, interstate 
laborers would be limited in their travels; thus, farmers 
would depend on local sources of labor. Therefore, the 
Women's Bureau suggested the hiring of local rural and farm 
women for labor. It advocated the placement of farm women on 
their own or a neighbor's farm, the use of rural women, and 
only in "extreme emergencies" the use of urban women.^ 
In an effort to meet their goals, the Women's Bureau made 
recommendations concerning the recruitment of farm labor for 
1942. The agency suggested that women be recruited in those 
areas that desperately needed additional labor, only women 
capable of doing hard physical labor should be considered, and 
that farmers or communities needed to provide the women with 
good living and working conditions. By recruiting only in 
areas that desperately needed workers and only women capable 
of doing hard physical work, communities had been assured of 
an acceptable labor force. And, while the Women's Bureau did 
not set a standard wage for agricultural labor, it advised 
farmers to pay the women at a rate comparable to other war 
industries, at least the equivalent of those employed in 
canneries--thirty cents per hour, as well as give the women 
one day per week free.^ 
Finally, the farmer, or community, needed to provide the 
women with transportation to and from their home or with 
suitable housing. The nationally imposed tire rationing 
affected transportation for women to the fields in the same 
way that migratory labor had been forced to suspend their 
practice of following the harvest. To this end, it would be 
to the fainner's or community's benefit to house the women 
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close to the labor area. For some areas, however, the issue 
of gas and tire rationing did not pose a major problem. New 
York state's ration board allowed extra gas and tires to those 
transporting farm workers to the fields. Lodging, however, 
posed a major problem. Determined to house World War II farm 
workers in better dwellings than migrant workers of the 1930s, 
the federal government discussed the way to construct or 
provide suitable housing. Still, some labor projects had to 
be abandoned when acceptable housing, as determined by the 
Women's Bureau, could not be located." 
Housing for female agricultural workers needed to be, as 
recommended by the Women's Bureau, clean with adequate and 
sanitary toilet facilities, protect from weather conditions, 
possess clean and comfortable beds, as well as provide pure 
and safe water for drinking and bathing. Even though the 
Women's Bureau made these recommendations it realized that 
individual communities or farmers would not have been able to 
follow each guideline "to the letter," but hoped the 
guidelines would be taken as minimum standards for housing. 
In that regard women would be housed in farm houses, community 
coxuitry clubs, dormitories, school buildings, ten5)orary 
buildings, tents, or catr^js established for the specific 
purpose of housing female agricultural labor. The use of 
camps to house farm workers had been previously utilized in 
World War I and for relief workers in the 1930s. Camps served 
the purpose of housing large numbers of seasonal labor during 
harvest time. Those employed in year-round positions either 
stayed with the farm family or was transported to and from 
their home to the farm.® 
These guidelines established by the Women's Bureau would 
influence housing and other regulations created within the WLA 
and other labor programs in 1943. As part of government 
policy, standardized services would be required for farm 
workers as members of the United States Crop Corps. But that 
did not occur xintil 1943. In the years prior to the passage 
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of Public Law 45, the federal government did not legislate any 
policy that affected housing and other issues necessary for 
safe and healthy conditions for those Americans who joined the 
agri cultural front. 
In addition to the Women's Bureau, the USDA also acted to 
bring about a plan for agricultural labor. Although not 
confined to the utilization of women as farm workers, USDA 
subcommittees and committees met throughout 1941 and 1942 in 
efforts to define an acceptable labor program. Influenced by 
successes seen in other federal agencies, and local and state 
government initiatives, the USDA searched for a way in which 
to provide the necessary labor on a national scale. Even so, 
the initial reluctance by the USDA to address the labor issue 
placed the agency at a disadvantage. Several states had 
established programs of labor use, including imported, 
migratory, military, and seasonal sources of labor, while the 
USDA had no such plan in place. However, no state operation 
had the breadth of wide-spread scale that a national 
agricultural labor problem would possess, and therefore the 
country still called for that policy. Additionally, the need 
for more labor during the early 1940s brought more pressure to 
states and federal agencies to provide all the necessary 
assistance. Demands for farmers and states forced the federal 
government to adopt an effort to initiate a federal farm labor 
plan. 
Beginning in February 1941, federal agencies suggested to 
the USDA the possibility of a labor shortage, as well as the 
means by which to address this issue. The Interbureau 
Coordinating Committee siibcommittee considered the possibility 
of labor shortage that month. And, although, committee 
members did not visualize an immediate lack of farm workers, 
they did recognize several concerns regarding the condition of 
the national labor source at the time. As a group, the 
sxibcommittee wrote, "the supply of farm labor in the United 
States for planting and harvesting the 1941 crop would be 
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adequate to maintain production." However, they recommended 
the necessity of moving agricultural workers to places of 
obvious and peak need. To combat regional needs, the 
subcommittee members suggested the use of unskilled workers 
and "older" men on farms. Additionally, they recognized the 
importance and necessity to keep conflict between workers and 
owners at a minimum, to develop cooperation between groups, 
cind to provide work camps for employed farm laborers. These 
recommendations were part of an effort to adequately address 
production concerns and quotas present during the 1941 crop 
year. In terms of future years, the subcommittee suggested 
that the USDA examine the nation's youth as a possible farm 
labor source. Finally, it had been suggested by this 
sxibcommittee that the labor situation of the nation's farms be 
monitored and watched to determine the severity of labor 
shortages in the future.® Without a direct and immediate 
threat of war, or labor shortage, this siibcommittee had not 
foxind it necessary to staunchly commit to a federal 
agricultural program. 
Just a month later, in March 1941, the USDA announced 
reorganization efforts to "take aggressive steps to meet any 
situation which may develop promptly and effectively, and to 
cooperate with other agencies in a position to contribute to a 
solution" regarding the issue of farm labor. Thus, the USDA 
Labor Committee, iinder the leadership of chairman Roy 
Hendrickson, USDA Director of Personnel, included numerous 
administrators from several agricultural agencies such as the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Agricultural Marketing 
Service, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Commodity Credit 
Corporation, Extension Service, and Farm Security 
Administration. The committee had been expanded in June, but 
by October had been replaced with another agencies. 
Therefore, no distinctive effort had been taken by the Labor 
Committee to alleviate farm labor concerns in 1941.' 
In August 1941, a subcommittee of the United States 
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Department of Agriculture's Labor Cotrimittee recommended the 
use of women as labor. They suggested that to ensure a 
successful harvest and adequate food supply and labor during 
the 1942 crop season, women should be recruited to work in the 
fields. The siibcommittee focused primarily on the use of 
urban women, who would be used to plant, cultivate, and 
harvest fruit and vegetable crops, as well as provide 
necessary labor for processing plants.® Clearly, however, 
urban women had not been their only concern, because the 
subcommittee expressed the desire for any available women to 
be recruited as agricultural labor. Echoing earlier arguments 
regarding the use of women in the nation's fields, this 
federal subcommittee openly stated the necessity of women as 
farm labor during World War II. Women, however, were not 
immediately incorporated into federal agricultural policy; the 
inclusion of women within the farm labor force required 
additional meetings and reports before they became part of 
federal farm labor legislation and policy. 
Throughout 1941, as the coxintry prepared for wartime 
build-up and domestic industrialization, agricultural agencies 
searched for answers to the nation's farm work problem. The 
USDA's Labor Committee, by the formation and eventual 
expansion of their committee and written report, addressed 
labor concerns evident in the United States. Ill-equipped to 
handle all labor issues, the USDA replaced its Labor Committee 
with an "interbureau planning committee on farm labor" on 20 
October 1941. Seen as more encompassing as the previous labor 
committee, this interbureau agency addressed several issues. 
Under the jurisdiction of Raymond C. Smith from the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, the Interbureau Planning Committee 
developed "plans for the utilization of farm labor in such a 
way as to make it most effective in contributing to the 
accomplishment of agricultural production goals, " as well as 
promoted the "welfare of farm laborers."' At the same time, 
the office of Agricultural Defense Relations established a 
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coinmittee to examine the labor issue. The Division of Labor 
and Rural Industries was granted a mission by the office of 
Agricultural Defense Relations that seemed to be more wide-
reaching than the USDA' s sxibcommittees and interbureau 
organization. In its plans to coordinate farm labor, the 
Division of Labor and Rural Industries, under the leadership 
of W. J. Rogers, worked to "facilitate the coordination of 
operations related to defense farm labor problems carried on 
by the various agencies of the Department; to serve as a 
clearinghouse to bring into common focus the consideration of 
farm labor problems as they relate to the defense program . . 
. and to assist in the planning of farm labor programs in 
order to meet defense needs." This new committee seemed to 
overshadow and encumber the purpose of the USDA's newly formed 
interbureau, thus, it became prudent for the two organizations 
to join forces. In late October 1941, the USDA's interbureau 
was absorbed by the Division of Labor and Rural Industries in 
an attempt to coordinate all efforts to examine the problem of 
farm labor in the United States during World War II. 
With the combination of these two organizations it 
appeared that USDA had moved toward a coordinated effort 
regarding farm labor. This, however, did not occur. Any 
advancements or efforts made by the Division of Labor and 
Rural Industries were further hampered by the attitudes of 
several key administrators within the USDA, especially 
Secretary Claude R. Wickard. In the move to reorganize the 
USDA's Labor Committee in March 1941, Wickard expressed his 
opinion concerning the federal government's involvement in 
farm labor. Wickard recommended that state "Land-Use Planning 
Committees appoint farm labor subcommittees to 'develop plans 
for dealing with the problems of farm labor shortages on the 
State and Local levels, and to coordinate the necessary action 
to this end'" in place of federal intervention and action. 
Additionally, the land-use planning committees would work with 
the United States Employment Service to determine the labor 
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problems present in the country, and establish a plan in which 
to correct those problems. The organization of the state 
committees, and their involvement with the Enployment Service 
excluded the USDA from any direct contact concerning the labor 
problem at that time. By the end of 1941, no one agency 
within the USDA had control of the farm labor problem,-
responsibility of labor had been divided among several 
agencies, including: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 
Division of Labor and Rural Industries, Farm Security 
Administration (Sugar Section) , as well as the land-use 
planning committees instituted on the federal, state, and 
local levels." 
This fragmentary approach to farm labor seen in the years 
prior to passage of P\iblic Law 45 does not suggest a viable 
agricultural program for the nation's farmers by late 1942. 
And although efforts had been made to streamline and 
coordinate department efforts and programs, the USDA and the 
federal government would not achieve this until the passage of 
labor legislation. In part, this delay can be attributed to 
Secretary Wickard's desire to place responsibility of farm 
labor within the Employment Service, rather than in the USDA, 
as well as his announcement that possible labor sources, such 
as women, should register with their local war boards and wait 
to be called for service. By taking this reactive, rather 
than proactive, position regarding farm labor, Wickard did not 
instill confidence in the nation's farmers regarding their use 
of an unorthodox labor source, such as urban women. Without a 
positive response from farmers concerning the use of women as 
farm labor, government officials disregarded the effectiveness 
of women in 1942 and for 1943. Thus, once the established 
federal plan was announced in 1943, agricultural organizations 
and farm individuals demonstrated their opposition to the use 
of women as farm labor by speaking against female farm 
participation to the public, the media, and Congress. With 
the secretary of the USDA not supportive of female 
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agricultural workers, many within the farm cotrarainity would not 
be either." 
Throughout 1942, agencies in Washington, D.C. continued 
their efforts to create an acceptable farm labor program. In 
that year, the War Power Commission directed the USDA and its 
secretary to make every available effort to provide 
agricultural workers as needed. However, even in these 
directives no mention of gender implied that the presence of 
women as farm workers had not been widely accepted. It had 
been the mandate of the War Power Commission that the USDA 
provide adequate housing and transportation for workers, as 
well as health and welfare services, faonti deferments for some 
individuals, and liveable wages. However, even through the 
USDA received directives regarding the status of farm labor, 
for most puarposes, the Employment Service and other agencies 
handled the hiring and placement of workers on the nation's 
farms. This would change, however, when in January 1943, the 
War Power Commission passed the control of farm labor 
management from the Employment Service to the USDA." 
Until then, however, congressional committees and 
subcommittees met to debate the issues regarding farm labor. 
One such committee, the House Committee on Agriculture held 
hearings in late September and early October 1942 that 
addressed farm labor and production. Discussion included the 
lack of available farm implements, due to the industrial 
manufacture of defense machines and weapons, as well as those 
who had remained on the farm to assist in production, and the 
status of military personnel. Further, although the USDA did 
not have responsibility for the farm labor problem in 1942, 
Wickard described efforts that his agency had taken to that 
point; which included the placement of Mexican nationals and 
domestic labor in "vital war crop areas, " use of Japanese 
American internees as farm labor, and attempts to defer farm 
personnel from military service." 
Although USDA labor sources did not meet the total needs 
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of farmers in 1942, the agency had transported workers to 
needy regions aroxind the country, as well as offered training 
courses for those engaged in year-round and seasonal work. In 
transport efforts similar to the Bracero Program, the federal 
government requested fxmds to move surplus labor to "critical 
areas." In the words of Secretary Wickard, "By using this 
transportation program, the fullest possible use will be made 
of our migrant labor force, and workers who might otherwise 
lose a great deal of time wandering from one place to another 
will be transported at once from one job to another and put to 
work where they are needed with the least possible delay." 
Additionally, training of inexperienced labor would "take 
several forms." Just one method involved programs that placed 
urban labor on farms under the guidance of experienced farm 
personnel. 
Even with these methods in place, the transportation of 
labor and training programs for workers, the USDA and Wickard 
recognized the possibility of more labor needed as the war 
progressed. Thus, to Congress, Secretary Wickard discussed 
alternate sources of farm labor, sources that included "large 
numbers of women and young people." In the years before the 
establishment of a federal labor policy, farm women and youths 
had taken over many farm duties, but even they would not 
provide enough agricultural labor as the war progressed. 
Consequently, Wickard discussed the necessity for urbanites to 
join the war effort. But, even though Wickard expressed the 
idea and concern of urban women as farm labor, he immediately 
qualified his suggestion. Wickard described the current 
efforts at national labor recruitment for both agriculture and 
industry, stating that these efforts should be altered to 
allow urban labor sources to enter the defense and 
manufacturing plants, while farm women, youths, and men should 
remain on the nation's farms. Thus, with experienced labor on 
farms, agricultural production goals could be reached and 
surpassed. 
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Wickard had not been the only administrator to testify-
before Congress regarding "farm labor and production." Others 
also appeared before the House Committee on Agriculture in 
September and October 1942. One was Lieutenant Colonel 
Francis V. Keesling, Jr. with the Selective Service System. 
Keesling also discussed the issue of farm labor, especially in 
terms of military deferments and wages paid to workers. In 
general farm men and boys had been given six month deferment 
periods, with the ability to extend the time another six 
months. And while, Keesling agreed with most, that 
agricultural men belonged on their farms, he also stated that 
any available, "physically cjualified, " and reliable farm man 
or youth should be placed in the army if they could be 
successfully replaced on the farm by someone else. As long as 
another body could be used in their place, then farm 
individuals should be drafted for service. 
In addition to the issue of deferments and farm 
production, Keesling discussed other concerns, one of these 
being the rate of pay received by those involved in the war 
effort during the 1940s. With the cotr5)arison of industrial 
labor available, those who worked on farms could easily 
determine their lack of parity and buying power with other war 
workers, and, thus, moved from the farm to join the industrial 
defense forces. Congressman Reid F. Murray from Wisconsin 
discussed the disparity between farm and industrial workers 
this way, "Take the boys who have gone into the shops and are 
getting 5, 10, or 20 dollars a day; after the war they will be 
able to tell their children what good fellows they were, but 
the farm fellow has to take the ridicule of all the others, 
and if we are not careful we will put him in that difficulty." 
The federal government, in efforts to stop mass migration from 
the farms, insisted that it was patriotic to be employed as 
farm labor during World War II as well as established minimum 
wage rates per hour or per day for farm workers. Minimum 
wages had still been low, however, and in most cases, would 
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not pay a worker's expenses.^® This effort to portray farm 
work as patriotic war work was used as women joined the WLA to 
justify the low wages paid, especially in those regions where 
the average pay had been less than fifty cents per hour. 
Others who testified followed, such as General Lewis B. 
Hershey, director of Selective Service, who spent his time 
before the committee discussing the role, or lack thereof, 
that the Secretary of Agriculture played in the nation's 
defense. Hershey, along with others of the Committee on 
Agriculture, discussed the timeliness that the USDA and 
Wickard had reacted to implementation of defense efforts for 
the nation. W. R. Poage of Texas and Orville Zimmerman of 
Missouri agreed with Hershey concerning the absence of effort 
exhibited by Wickard and the USDA in combatting the farm labor 
problem. As vocal critics, these men questioned the actions 
of wickard and the slow progress that had been made in the 
effort to find an acceptable farm labor source.^® Clearly to 
those who testified and made up the Committee on Agriculture, 
the actions taken thus far by the USDA and Wickard to 
alleviate the farm labor problem had not been adequate to the 
national war effort. 
Throughout the autumn hearings of the House Committee on 
Agriculture, the continuing theme regarded the lack of effort 
by Wickard and the USDA in resolving the agricultural labor 
problem. And, while most agreed that the secretary had been 
overworked and busy on many projects and that labor had not 
been a priority in the previous years, in the future the 
committee wanted labor to be an important concern for the USDA 
and other federal agencies. The committee also gathered the 
opinions of the Selective Service, War Manpower Commission, 
and War Production Board and addressed their concerns 
regarding the status of agricultural labor in the nation.^® 
Regardless of USDA positions concerning female farm 
labor, the agency did not abandon the examination of the labor 
issue in 1942. Throughout October, Extension and USDA 
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officials met to discuss possible labor sources for the coming 
crop year. As a result, and through the information provided 
by journalist Dorothy Thompson, the Committee on Extension 
Organization and Policy of the Land-Grant College Association 
"recommended that the Extension Seorvice encourage the use of 
urban youths and women as farm labor in 1943 . " During October 
1942, Thon^son convinced Extension and USDA policy-makers of a 
necessary farm labor plan that utilized the urban population. 
As a newspaper columnist and radio personality, Thompson 
utilized the media to discuss publicly the advantages of 
employing teenagers and women as farm workers during the crop 
season in locales that needed labor. As her example, Thompson 
discussed the Volxinteer Land Corps. Through this program, 
Thompson had, in the summer months of 1942, organized an 
effective labor supply program for northeastern farmers. The 
Volunteer Land Corps placed urban youths on Vermont and New 
Hampshire farms. As administrator she recognized the 
necessity and suitability of this program to Vermont, and on a 
larger scale, to the nation. Further, she urged the Extension 
Service, and thus the USDA, to assume the responsibility for 
recruitment and placement of national labor for the next crop 
year. 
As a result of Thompson's actions and editorials, USDA 
Secretary Wickard appointed another committee to recommend a 
course of action for the problems associated with agricultural 
labor in the nation during World War II. Headed by Extension 
Director M. L. Wilson, this committee included J. W. 
Coddington, Agricultural Conservation and Adjustment 
Administration; James S. Heizer, Farm Security Administration; 
Otis E. Mulliken, Office of Agricultural War Relations; and 
Perry A. Thompson, Forest Service. These men incorporated 
ideas proposed by earlier committees and discussed the use, on 
a national scale, of urban youths as farm labor and the 
creation a women's land army as a separate organization. 
However, the committee, in its final report dated 11 November 
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1942, made no recoinmendation for or against the creation of a 
women's land army, instead saw the influence of the Volunteer 
Land Corps to the creation of a "nationwide city youth 
organization" that contributed to the wartime faorm labor 
effort. Thus, the USDA made no formal plans to establish a 
women's land army in November 1942.^^ 
Although presented with several labor recommendations, no 
decisive governmental policy had been established concerning 
farm labor by 1943. Thus, farmers had been advised to "make 
do" with the labor that they had, and to use all available 
local labor sources. In the case of farm women, they were 
advised to remain on their farms, and provide labor where it 
was most needed.By the end of 1942, different government 
agencies had examined the farm labor problem and presented 
their recommendations to the USDA secretary. With pressure 
coming from several fronts, such as numerous federal 
committees and subcommittees. Extension Service, Women's 
Bureau, and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt in January 1943, 
Wickard looked for a quick answer to the nation's farm labor 
problem. 
Even though no formal action had been taken, the federal 
government appeared resigned to the fact that a program to 
assist the nation's farmers was needed. In late 1942, 
Extension director, M. L. Wilson had assigned the chief 
administrator of the Division of Field Studies and Training to 
prepare estimates for funding and other requirements to 
establish "a national youth farm labor program and a Women's 
Land ArTty" for the country's farmers. Along with Meredith C. 
Wilson, Extension Director M. L. Wilson also named Grace E. 
Frysinger, Florence Hall, and Mary Rokahr to discuss the use 
of nonfarm women on the nation's farms. Their recommendations 
regarding the placement of women on farms, and Meredith C. 
Wilson's budgetary estimates for a proposed labor program 
provided Secretary Wickard and the USDA with information that 
forced them to consider the establishment of such a program to 
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assist the nation's famers in their search for adequate 
labor 
By January 1943, in an effort to answer and relieve some 
of the pressure, the USDA made provisions to create a national 
program for agriculture. At meetings conducted in January, 
Secretary Wickard requested that state extension services and 
others consider and plan for the use of nonfarm labor, 
including women, for the year's crops. On January 8 and 9, he 
broached these topics with representatives from twenty farm 
and women's organizations. Meeting in New York City, Wickard 
outlined the ideas to be used to create a land army for 
benefit to the country's farmers. With this action and the 
sxibsequent federal farm labor plan, Wickard, the Extension 
Service, and the USDA had established a manner by which to 
mobilize a force for labor in 1943. In doing so, they 
precipitated the War Manpower Commission Directive XVII of 23 
January 1943, which placed "responsibility for mobilization of 
farm labor in the Department of Agriculture."^® 
With Directive XVII, the War Manpower Commission removed 
the responsibility of hiring farm labor from the Employment 
Service and placed it with the USDA. This directive 
authorized the USDA to recruit, place, and train agricultural 
workers for the nation's farmers. Even though the USDA now 
had the responsibility to develop the farm labor program, it 
did so under the directive of the War Manpower Commission, and 
it needed to operate according to Commission standards. 
Additionally, the use of iir^jorted farm labor could occur only 
after the coxintry had exhausted all domestic labor sources, 
and only with the War Manpower Commission's permission and 
approval. Under these conditions, the Extension Service 
received the jurisdiction of the proposed labor forces. 
Mobilization of forces became the key issue discussed at 
Extension meetings in late January 1943. Held in Chicago and 
Washington, D.C. with state extension agencies and the 
Extension War Advisory Committee, respectively, these meetings 
102 
annoxinced the USDA's intention to mobilize farm labor forces 
for the 1943 crop year. In February, all state extension 
agencies were advised of their expected part in labor 
mobilization, and the utilization of American nonfarm youths 
and women as well as local forces for agricultural work.^® 
In the process of securing funding and support, the 
federal government moved through various stages of development 
and con^rehension regarding the severity of the labor issue. 
On 17 February 1943, the federal government announced its 
intention to organize a farm labor program and granted 
authorization to the Extension Service to mobilize nonfarm 
labor, including women, for the nation's farms. The creation 
of the Emergency Farm Labor Program gave the Extension Service 
jurisdiction over agricultural workers, including the WLA. In 
that manner, the Extension Service would be responsible for 
the "Development and supervision of a program for the 
organized recruitment and utilization of non-farm women for 
the appropriate types of farm work wherever practicable; also 
for cooperation with and rendering appropriate assistance to 
other groups sponsoring and organizing activities along these 
lines." In terms of the importance of the WLA in the 1943 war 
effort, the Extension Service originally estimated that the 
program would recruit 10,000 women for year-round labor and 
50,000 women for seasonal work, one month or more in duration. 
Another 300,000 women were to be hired for short-term 
emergency work. The agency would discover rather quickly that 
more labor would be needed to sustain the country in 1943, and 
most certainly, through the war.^' And while other labor 
programs contributed to the overall effort, the participation 
of women in the WLA, and thus World War II, multiplied tenfold 
over Extension Service 1943 estimates. 
With the structure in place to establish the farm labor 
program, the process to do so progressed much faster than it 
had previously. Almost immediately measures were taken to 
create three distinct units within the Extension Service. 
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"Nonfarm youths," "Nonfarm women," and "Labor placement" units 
were initially set up in February, with Meredith C. Wilson 
installed as the head of these units. She held this post 
through the remainder of the war.^® 
Legislation and mobilization for the farm labor program 
established the physical structure of the United States Crop 
Corps. And, while the structure of each orgainization needed 
to be determined at its inception, other issues were also 
addressed before the full-scale recruitment or labor occurred. 
In this case, the issue of appropriations or fiinding for the 
labor programs needed to be resolved. In efforts to acquire 
appropriations for the Emergency Farro Labor Program, Secretary 
Wickard sat before a siobcoramittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations in the House of Representatives in February 
1943. In these sessions Wickard described the status of 
domestic agriculture for the war, and the problems that the 
USDA expected for 1943. Among those problems, Wickard 
believed that labor would prove to be the most difficult to 
solve, and therefore required the appropriation of funding 
almost immediately to meet all national needs. And in 
announcements that echoed the documentation of the Emergency 
Farm Labor Program, Secretary Wickard discussed ways in which 
the labor situation would be met. To this siibcommittee, 
Wickard described the type of persons that would be used as 
farm labor through the legislated farm supply program, labor 
that included military deferments for men eit^loyed on dairy, 
livestock, or poultry farms; urban and rural seasonal workers 
(at least 3.5 million); Mexicans nationals (50,000 of the 3.5 
million) ; African Americans; and women.The use of women as 
farm labor during the war warranted last place on Wickard's 
list of acceptable persons, and in most cases, that is the 
position that Congress also viewed the women. 
In his testimony before the House of Representatives' 
siibcommittee, Wickard described the status of American 
agriculture during the early 1940s. Clearly the war had 
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affected the labor needs for farms, as there were 200,000 less 
farm workers in 1943 than the previous year. By citing this 
statistic, Wickard told committeemen that his, and the 
department's, request for additional farm labor sources was 
justified. Further, Wickard described the types of farm 
laborers who would be recruited for work in the nation's 
fields in 1943. The majority of those recruited for 
agricultural work would include nonfarm students and others 
available for seasonal field work. This group of laborers, at 
least three and one-half million strong, would not be 
concerned with low wages, but would work due to a strong sense 
of national defense, patrioticism, and pride. Therefore, it 
would be necessary to appeal to their sense of loyalty to the 
United States in these efforts to save the crops. 
Others en:5)loyed by the federal government, as described 
by Wickard, included Mexican nationals io^jorted to the United 
States specifically for farm work. Guaranteed at least three 
dollars per day, the Mexicans and other inported labor sources 
became the responsibility of the local communities to provide 
them with basic necessities, such as housing. Wickard further 
described the minimum housing standard established for the 
imported workers. In terms that were reminiscent of the U.S. 
Women's Bureau standards established in 1942, these dwellings 
needed to be weather-proof; possessed a supply of fresh water 
for drinking, bathing, and laundry,- provisions made for waste 
disposal and sanitary toilets; and relatively uncrowded (four 
people or fewer per shelter). Further, urban and/or out-of-
state workers would be brought to a specific location for 
field work if need dictated. Paid an initial wage similar to 
the contractual Mexican laborers, these intra- and inter-state 
workers received more money per day if the average wage of the 
region was higher. Although the gender of these additional 
workers is not mentioned in Wickard's testimony, he had 
referred only to the use of men as farm labor. 
Throughout Wickard's comments concerning the structure of 
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the fairm labor program, as well as his description of the 
status of American agriculture and its labor needs, he 
frequently described the use of men as farm labor, without 
regard for the nation's women, or the importance of the WLA to 
Public Law 45. Clearly, while the official stance of the USDA 
and Extension Service supported the use of women as farm 
labor, at least in publicized statements, many officials 
involved in congressional appropriation hearings did not. By 
not strongly advocating the use of women as farm labor, 
Wickard's comments can be con^ared and aligned with those 
issued by most of the national agricultural establishment, 
including farm organization and state officials who did not 
believe that the use of female workers on farms would assist 
the war effort. 
Leaders of the American Farm Bureau Federation, National 
Council of Farmer Cooperatives, and National Grange expressed 
their opinion regarding the federal government's position 
concerning American agriculture during World War II. 
Testifying before the House subcommittee Ezra T. Benson of the 
National Council of Faormer Cooperatives, read a prepared 
statement by the three organizations that described their 
position pertaining to the farm labor program. For these 
groups, their efforts centered on a fundamental change within 
federal policy structure rather than a concerted effort to 
recruit the largest labor force for farmers. The statement 
presented the means by which Benson and his colleagues sought 
to "solve this farm manpower crisis" and alter agricultural 
administration. To begin, the groups suggested that 
agriculture be recognized as a war industry and receive the 
benefits of this classification. Thus, farmers and farm 
laborers would acquire deferments from military service until 
replacements had been found, especially those faanners engaged 
in an "essential agricultural occupation." Additionally, the 
government should adjust price ceilings on commodities in an 
effort to provide "adequate allowance for farmers' increased 
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costs, including farm labor, thus enabling agriculture to keep 
a supply of labor to maintain adequate production." This 
action would, as believed by the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, and 
National Grange "carry out the intent and purpose of the Price 
Control Act." Finally, to ensure an acceptable level of 
labor, these groups asked that "all bureaucratic, xinworkable 
regulations and controls, including fixing of minimum wages 
and regulating maximum hours and conditions of employment of 
agricultural workers, be eliminated." Benson and his 
colleagues theorized that through these proposed structural 
governmental changes Congress would address the labor issue 
without "bureaucratic regimentation" but by "democratic 
methods. 
This attempt to sway Congress to change governmental 
policy allowed the Farm Bureau, Farmer Cooperatives, and 
national Grange to express their reluctance to employ non-
traditional labor sources on farms. In their prepared 
statement, the groups did not mention the use of women or 
other non-traditional labor sources as agricultural workers, 
but assumed that the "farm manpower problem" would be 
"adequately [met] through democratic methods, without resort 
to bureaucratic regimentation and compulsion." In terms of 
women and high school students as labor forces, Benson 
continued, "the food shortage cannot be averted merely by 
putting on a campaign to recruit townspeople, high-school 
students, and urban women for seasonal farm work. It is 
essential to defer necessary workers who are now on the farms 
and to adjust price ceilings and price supports on 
agricultural commodities at levels which will enable farmers 
to pay sufficient wages to get back on the farms some of the 
labor which has gone to the cities because of higher wages." 
The way to accoir^lish these goals and suggestions, according 
to Benson would be to place a "competent agency" in charge of 
the labor program. Further, these three groups would advocate 
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a restrictionless agreement regarding the hiring and placement 
of Mexican nationals on American farms.'^ 
For three farm organizations, the efforts by the federal 
government to enact an acceptable farm labor program had not 
occurred as they wished. Intent on the change of federal 
pricing structure rather than initiation of new labor 
legislation, these groups led the opposition to the use of 
non-traditional farm labor, i.e. women, during World War II. 
Men had still been viewed as the prominent farm labor source, 
and therefore would have been better suited to agricultural 
work. With the attitudes of the nation's farm organizations 
and state officials clearly against the use of women as farm 
labor, it required much promotion and good will from the WLA, 
U.S. Crop Corps, and women to convince these men that the 
presence of women in the agricultural war effort was 
essential. 
Throughout the appropriations hearings, representatives 
of numerous farm organizations presented their concerns 
regarding the agricultural labor situation. Farm 
organizations discussed their ideas separately, and in 
general, they were in cotrplete agreement. Albert S. Goss, 
master of the National Grange, and Earl Smith, president of 
the Illinois Agricultural Association and vice president of 
the American Farm Bureau Federation, agreed that labor posed 
the most serious problem for agriculture; they refused to 
endorse, however, the use of women as possible workers. W. R. 
Ogg, director of research for the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, stated that the labor problem should be solved 
through the use of farm boys, either via military deferments 
or permissible furloughs in which they returned home during 
crucial production periods. Representative Jed Johnson from 
Oklahoma saw this idea as a hassle that involved too much "red 
tape" to guarantee the return of farm men and boys as the need 
arose. Therefore, he disregarded the use of farm boys as the 
agricultural labor supply in the nation. 
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While farm organizations atteir^ted to dissuade the 
government from using women as farm workers, state extension 
service etrployees discussed the benefits that might be found 
with women workers. L. R. S. Simons, director of the 
Extension Service in New York described that state's success 
with the creation of a single council that administered the 
state's work program on the local level. Started in 1940, New 
York's plan proved to be a success in the years before the 
official federal creation of the Emergency Farm labor Program. 
Simons indicated that New York state had recognized that a 
labor problem existed in agriculture long before the federal 
government acted on the issue. And while each state's 
situation was different, Simons described the success 
experienced in New York. Their state-wide council, made up of 
representatives from the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration, 4-H, Dairymen's League, Farm Bureau, Farm 
Credit Administration and Soil Conservation, G. L. S. 
Exchange, Grange, Home Bureau, Horticultural Society, State 
Poultry Council, and Vegetable Growers Society worked 
effectively to combat the labor problem in New York. Their 
workers consisted of high school students, urban dwellers, and 
women. In order to house the thousands of workers used in the 
state during the years prior to 1943, communities utilized 
work camps, country clubs, and schools. Simons saw advantages 
for the federal government, and, sxibsequently, the states, to 
adopt New York's plan." 
The philosophy of the New York extension director can be 
understood by examining the success that the state had with 
its early initiative to provide labor to farmers. Female 
agricultural labor had been badly needed on dairy and poultry 
farms, in fruit orchards, and on truck farms in New York. 
Eastern states recognized the benefit of female agricultural 
labor, making use of farm and nonfarm women in the years prior 
to 1943 . In New York and other eastern states pxiblic and 
private groups established early programs that set the 
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precedent for other states, and, ultimately, the federal 
government in organizing a land army. Eastern states openly 
accepted female agricultural labor in the years prior to the 
establishment of the WLA. Mrs. Joseph Alsop (Connecticut), 
Katherine Potter (Maine), Dorothy Thompson (Vermont), and Mrs. 
Frank Washburn (New York) each established and ran successful 
state programs before the WLA. While some initial opposition 
occurred, most farmers found the women to be reliable and 
capable the work as assigned.^® The establishment of a federal 
program in 1943 only increased the use of women in eastern 
states. 
Simons did not provide the only positive statement 
regarding women as agricultural workers, as another federal 
eTr5)loyee concurred. T. 0. Davis, director of the Extension 
Service at Alabama Polytechnic Institute in Auburn also 
advocated the placement of non-traditional labor on farms. 
Davis drew on the British example and recommended the creation 
of a land army for the United States on that basis. By 
comparing the initial reaction of British farmers to that of 
American farmers in general, extension agents in Alabama 
discovered that farmers had not been eager to use women as 
laborers. However, by educating the farmer on the best 
possible use of women labor, as well as utilization of unused 
school buildings and buses for housing and transportation, 
extension agents and other federal agency officials convinced 
farmers of the viability of a women's program.^' 
Throughout the course of the House appropriations 
hearings, Vermont had been cited as the best example of a 
workable farm labor program. For the most part, this 
distinction resulted from Dorothy Thonpson's ability to 
recruit for and promote her program, not the actual number of 
participants. Further, Thompson's vision of the land corps 
experience as one of democracy, education, and patriotism 
impressed the national legislators, Wickard, and M. L. Wilson. 
With a promised wage of twenty-one dollars per month, the VLC 
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recruited its workers under the guise of patriotism, as they 
would not make them much money as farm laborers. In this 
regard, VLC volunteers fit the first criteria for Wickard's 
proposed sources of labor,- the use of local youths and 
students who would work for little money and remain patriotic 
and devoted to the war effort.^® Regardless of the 
organization's recognition by federal officials, the Vermont 
program did not employ a large portion of farm labor in 1942. 
While, the VLC had been successful, other state initiatives 
also demonstrated the ability of states to organize a labor 
program and recruit workers. However, federal appropriations 
hearings did not recognize other states' activities in 1942, 
instead choosing to concentrate on a program operated by a 
national personality. This absence of information regarding 
other state labor initiatives did not present a complete 
picture to Congress regarding the use of women as workers, 
possibly hampering the results of the appropriations hearings 
and limiting WLA fvinding. 
Along with the appropriation hearings conducted by the 
House of Representatives in February and March 1943, the 
Senate also held hearings for the purpose of fxuiding the farm 
labor program in 1943. Beginning in late March 1943, the 
Senate hearings contained much of the same information and 
testimony as in the House of Representatives appropriation 
hearings. A statement of the issues, followed with remarks by 
Secretary Wickard and testimony from various federal and 
agricultural agency individuals did not vary much from the 
focus of hearings in the House earlier in the year. The only 
difference between the hearings was the amount of money each 
legislative body had been willing to offer to the USDA and its 
Emergency Farm Labor Program. 
Beginning 22 March 1943, the United States Senate began 
its own appropriations hearings concerning farm labor in the 
nation. This subcommittee was composed of eleven men, with 
Senator Richard B. Russell presiding. The resolution passed 
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by the House of Representatives addressed the structure of the 
farm labor program, including the need for appropriations to 
recruit, train, and place "workers needed for the production 
and harvesting of agricultural commodities essential to the 
prosecution of the war." The Senate accepted this resolution, 
although the two houses differed on the amount of money that 
should be appropriated for the program, the importance of such 
a program for the nation's farmers could not be understated.^' 
Secretary Wickard's testimony before the Senate committee 
mirrored many of the statements that had been given to the 
House of Representatives hearings earlier in 1943. At the 
Senate hearing, Wickard was accompanied by Wayne H. Darrow, 
director. Agricultural Labor Administration,- M. L. Wilson, 
director. Extension Service,- R. Lyle Webster, assistant to the 
secretary, USDA; and R. W. Maycock, assistant director of 
finance, USDA. Wickard's testimony included discussion of 
USDA estimates regarding funding for the 1943 calendar year,-
USDA's acquisition of the farm labor program from the U.S. 
Employment Service,- administration, establishment, and 
organization of the Agricultural Labor Administration on 
behalf of the national farm labor problem; timeliness with the 
USDA's efforts to enact a farm labor program; sources of farm 
labor, as well as the methods used to recruit, train, place, 
and pay the workers; establishment of a "junior army," which 
would include youths aged fourteen to eighteen years; and the 
use of Native Americans as farm labor. Within each of these 
issues, other concerns had also been discussed, including the 
farm situations in numerous locations around the nation, rate 
of pay for individuals, and the use of unskilled seasonal 
labor including youths and women. In terms of the creation of 
the WLA, Wickard's testimony did not indicate any great 
involvement on his part to utilize women as farm labor during 
the war. "We expect to use older girls and younger boys and 
girls from 14 to 18," he said, "I don't know whether it is 
possible or not."" 
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Secretary Wickard's statement, along with the USDA's 
reluctance and slow efforts to establish a workable farm labor 
program underscored the lack of commitment to such a program. 
And, while the presence of migratory and imported labor had 
been common prior to 1943, any new sources of labor, which by 
default would be youths and women, did not appear to have been 
a high priority of the USDA or the secretary until forced to 
act by Congress. And even then, it is apparent by the USDA 
officials' testimonies that they had concentrated on hiring 
the nation's youth to provide the necessary labor, rather than 
both American women and youths as possible farm labor sources. 
For, in addition to the bill to enact the "junior airmy, " the 
USDA and Extension Service had drawn up a measure that would 
create, establish, and organize the Victory Farm Volunteers 
(VFV) At the time, it had appeared feasible to place more 
emphasis on the youth program as the government expected 
millions of participants in the VFV, while only an initial 
sixty thousand in the WLA. To that end, the USDA and Wickard 
would be proven wrong, as the WLA numbered in the millions, 
becoming the largest agricultural labor group during World War 
II. 
With the completion of Wickard's testimony, the Senate 
turned its attention to others. At that time, representatives 
of the nation's agricultural organizations addressed the 
Senate and shared their concerns and recommendations regarding 
the issue of farm labor for the country. Once again, as with 
the hearings before the House of Representatives, Edward A. 
O'Neal, president, American Farm Bureau Federation, and W. R. 
Ogg, director of research at the Farm Bureau, addressed their 
comments to an appropriation subcommittee. The necessity for 
a federal farm program and organization within the Extension 
Service was central to their comments. In that regard, they 
saw no need to delay further, but would endorse the plan 
established by the House of Representatives, and urged the 
Senate to follow that program. Senators had been concerned 
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with the issue of responsibility between the U.S. Employment 
Service and the Extension Service pertaining to the farm labor 
program. This point seemed a problem for those who engaged in 
the discussion, be it Senators or those testifying. Other 
concerns included the use of Mexicans and migratory 
individuals as farm labor, as well as the wages to be paid to 
all farm workers." 
The other individuals who testified before the Senate in 
March 1943 included L. R. Simons of New York, P. 0. Davis of 
Alabama, and C. E. Brehm of Tennessee. Each of these 
individuals had been responsible for the Extension Service and 
its programs in their states, and therefore, also important in 
the establishment of a state labor program. Simons and Davis 
offer similar statements to their testimonies before the 
House, again calling for additional sources of labor for the 
coiintiry. Brehm reiterated the farm labor problem for his 
state, and described characteristics particular to Tennessee. 
In that state the agricultural concerns regarded the 
possibility of not enough labor for harvest, especially as 
farmers prepare to plant more land than in the past in an 
effort to capitalize on high wartime prices. As labor 
sources, Brehm welcomed the "j\anior army" of high school 
students and 4-H members, but he made no mention of women as a 
possible labor source in Tennessee." Men like Simons and 
Davis provided the best-case scenario regarding WLA acceptance 
in states, while the reality of the 1940s inplied that most 
male state Extension directors echoed the sentiments of USDA 
Secretary Wickard. 
Others also testified before the Senate subcommittee in 
March 1943, including H. L. Mitchell, who served as the 
general secretary of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union (STFQ) 
in Memphis, Tennessee. Representing the states of Alabama, 
Arkansas, Mississippi, and Missouri, this organization had 
also been concerned with farm labor during the war years. In 
regard to the national labor crisis, the STFU sent labor to 
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Other states to assist in harvests; workers went to Arizona, 
New Mexico, and Texas to pick cotton and to Florida to assist 
on vegetable farms. Additionally, others were ready to travel 
and cultivate and harvest as long as the transportation could 
be provided. In these cases, Mitchell stated that many 
southerners could travel to other regions of the country to 
assist in farming efforts without upsetting southern farming 
operations. And, in most instances this available labor force 
was "white people who live[d] in the poor or hill sections of 
the country, and people who drift [ed] into the Delta 
plantations sections to pick cotton in the fall." Mitchell 
argued that his region of the country had several thousand 
xinemployed men who routinely looked for seasonal agricultural 
work, and would benefit by participating in a federal labor 
program.*" 
Mitchell did, however, note problems with proposed 
federal farm legislation, specifically the efforts to place 
the farm labor program under the jurisdiction of the Extension 
Service. Mitchell, and one must assume the STFU, had been 
opposed to any action taken by the federal and state Extension 
Service agencies in placement of farm labor, linking that 
organization with the Farm Bureau and problems associated with 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, AAA checks, and 
Farm Bureau membership dues. 
A second witness from the STFU also discussed the use of 
migratory labor. In this case, F. R. Betton described the 
southern practice of "labor exchange." A prevalent action 
among African Americans, Betton illustrates the success of 
such a program. In this case, he described the agricultural 
situation experienced by African American seasonal farm 
workers in the South. In November 1942, once their 
responsibilities to their cotton employers had been met, 
blacks in Cotton Plant, Arkansas, traveled to Arizona to 
assist in the long-staple cotton harvest. All 380 men and 
women who had labored as day workers in Arkansas went to 
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Arizona. Others traveled to Florida to assist in the 
vegetable crop. Finally, these men and women returned to 
Arkansas to begin the cotton season in 1943."® The presence of 
both men and women in the cotton fields is not as unique as 
the presence of urban white women in the nation's fields, and 
in most cases, the distinction regards race and class. In 
hearings before the House of Representatives and the Senate 
siibcommittees, these issues had been avoided. The presence of 
African American women in southern fields was a time honored 
tradition, and unlike conditions in the North, where white 
woman had been removed from the fields as the family moved to 
the city or approached a higher economic class. 
Robert Handschin of the National Farmers Union also spoke 
before the Senate siibcominittee in March 1943, and addressed 
the main issues regarding farm labor. In addition to the 
available and necessary fiinding for agriculture, the Farmers 
Union also had been interested in issues that concerned the 
amount of labor required for the year, as well as the most 
needy locations, programs in place to "recruit, and transport 
and mobilize" labor, and the jurisdiction for a farm labor 
program. And while the STFU had been opposed to the Extension 
Service being in charge of a labor program, Handschin and the 
Farmers Union had no such prejudice. The Farmers Union saw 
the Extension Service as necessary to help organize migratory 
labor that would be useful across the country. Additionally, 
other sources of labor, such as nationals from the Bahamas, 
Mexico, and Puerto Rico, and struggling American farmers, 
would be utilized to assist the migratory labor force. 
According to Handschin, these groups would provide the 
assistance needed for the nation's farms during the war. He 
made these statements without concern for gender or age, in 
general implying the American and foreign men would make up 
the balance of the agricultural labor force."' 
Further testimony before the subcommittee brought a 
representative of the governor of California. Charles C. 
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Teague, who held positions within the California Fruit 
Growers' Exchange, the California Walnut Growers' Association, 
and the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, spoke to the 
senators on 25 March 1943 . His concerns regarded the status 
of agricultural production in California, and the state's 
dependence on seasonal labor, especially at times of hairvest 
for its many specialty crops. The absence of farm labor in 
California resulted in lost agricultural commodities in 1942, 
and the growers did not want the same loses in 1943. Thus, 
the presence of Teague before the Senate subcommittee 
demonstrated the farming interests of a successful 
agricultural state in a federally sponsored labor program. 
And, although, the presence of large corporate faims would 
have influenced the action taken by California, they did not 
represent the entire agricultural population of the state. 
Family-owned operations suffered the same labor fate as many 
of the large corporate farms, and therefore the state, as a 
whole, needed a way to combat its labor problems.*® And while 
Vermont provided the best example of a workable program 
according to federal officials, California agriculturalists 
represented the best exan^le of a state in drastic need of 
labor. Even as it utilized all available labor in 1942, 
including closing schools and using students as labor, 
California still lost crops,- therefore, additional labor had 
been needed for 1943. 
Teague continued his testimony by examining one practice 
that had been used in California. In addition to the use of 
Mexican and migratory labor, the Farm Security Administration 
had instituted a state labor program, but that effort had not 
been effective for California. Likening those farmers who 
participated in relief programs to "serf[s] of the 
Government, " Teague denoiinced the actions of the FSA and the 
government's methods of paying subsidies to farmers. Instead, 
Teague asked the government to expend more effort, energy, and 
money to provide labor and equipment to farmers. To 
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accomplish these goals, he suggested that additional labor be 
imported from Mexico, responsibility for a labor program 
placed within the Extension Service, farm workers be properly 
trained, and labor placed in regions where it had been 
severely needed."® These suggestions would provide more 
support than any FSA or other agricultural program to date in 
California. 
Then, Ivan G. McDaniel, as a representative of the 
California Agricultural Producers' Labor Committee, reiterated 
many of the points stated by Teague. McDaniel also addressed 
the issues regarding the use of Mexican nationals as farm 
labor in California, as well as in other areas of the 
Southwest. Discussion continued and examined the status of 
migratory labor, the structure of the agricultural program 
within the USDA and Extension Service, and the proposed 
expenditures for the in^ortation of Mexicans to California 
under different proposals.®" McDaniel's statement, as with 
much of the testimony before the Senate, centered around the 
issue regarding the use of imported labor, specifically that 
from Mexico. Without mention of the gender of farm workers, 
these hearings before the Senate appropriation subcommittee 
differed greatly from those hearings before the House 
subcommittee which examined the use of women as farm labor. 
Final testimony by the administrator of food production 
and distribution, Chester C. Davis, reiterated most of the 
preceding statements. By advocating control of the farm labor 
program to the Extension Service, Davis laid the grotindwork 
for discussion of anticipated sources of labor, implementation 
and mobilization of an accepted program with county and state 
extension agents, and organization of a "land army." 
Unfortunately, the term, "land army, " as part of Davis' 
testimony does not distinguish between gender in its 
definition and explanation. He did, however, allude to the 
creation of the VFV, with the use of high school students as 
farm labor, but again, no mention of women in his or others' 
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statements regarding the use of a land army for agriculture.®^ 
The exclusion of "women" from all but one of the Senate 
siibcommittee testimonies indicates the inability of those 
before the Senate to accept the presence of white women as 
farm labor. And, while the House of Representatives 
siibcommittee hearings spent more time discussing the presence 
of women within agriculture, those who testified still had 
been opposed to their use as labor. Only those involved with 
farmers at the state and local level, such as extension 
agents, were enthusiastic regarding the presence of women as 
seasonal farm workers during World War II. 
Regardless of the results of the testimony before 
Congress regarding the presence of women as farm labor, the 
main puorpose for the siabcommittee hearings had been for 
agricultural appropriations. And in that regard, the USDA and 
its wartime labor program experienced success. In specific 
reference to Public Law 45, the USDA had requested sixty-five 
million dollars for the period from March 1943 to December 
1943. This request had been made in addition to the funds 
that had been requested in 1942 and early 1943 (approximately 
four million dollars), to effectively operate labor programs 
for 1943. Of the 65 million dollars, only 150,000 dollars had 
been suggested for the WLA. The total expenditures requested 
for the mobilization of nonfarm women and youth and local 
labor forces for the period from March to December 1943, which 
included recruitment and placement, totaled just over six 
million dollars." 
Although criticized by several agricultural 
organizations, such as the American Farm Bureau Federation, 
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, and National Grange 
at the appropriation hearings, the Emergency Farm Labor 
Program was successful in receiving fiinding. Each of the 
criticizing agencies had also been given the opportunity to 
express their own ideas concerning labor relief, as well as 
debate the appropriation of funds. Recommendations to the 
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House of Representatives proposed that only twenty-six million 
dollars be given to the USDA for the farm labor program; while 
the Senate increased the funding amount to forty million 
dollars. Still, the eventual appropriation for the Emergency 
Farm Labor Program stood at twenty-six million dollars, the 
original House of Representatives figure. Funding was divided 
among state Extension offices and other governmental offices 
that provided hired labor within states, between states, and 
from overseas." 
With the funding and organizational structure in place 
for the farm labor program, Wickard prepared an administration 
for that program in mid-March 1943. The creation of the 
Emergency Farm Labor Program, under Public Law 45, brought 
about the development of several organizations as part of the 
nation's agricultural defense plan. The employment of 
convicts, imported persons, military personnel, prisoners of 
war, women, and youths successfully met the needs of American 
farmers in the last three years of war. Under the farm labor 
legislation, the United States Crop Corps became the umbrella 
organization for all federally employed farm workers. In 
terms of imported labor, the presence of Mexican nationals in 
the country imitated a similar plan in place during World War 
I. The Bracero Program imported contractual Mexican farm 
labor to the western United States between 1942 and 1947." 
Military personnel and prisoners of war were also utilized as 
farm labor. In terms of the use of military personnel, the 
debate centered aroxmd the manner by which the men would be 
used. Generally, during 1943, troop units were eirployed on 
farms; in North Dakota, 5600 men joined the grain harvest, in 
South Dakota, 350 soldiers labored, and in Maine, about 700 
servicemen assisted in the potato harvest. And although the 
U.S. Crop Corps successfully placed servicemen on farms in 
1943, they would be replaced by others during the latter years 
of war, including prisoners of war, women, and youths. 
Other labor programs in force under the Emergency Farm 
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Labor Program include the inclusion of conscientious objectors 
and Japanese internees. Present within the federal government 
since early in 1941, conscientious objectors were housed in 
thirty camps across the nation, and engaged in several 
different agricultural or environmental positions. The 
internment of Japanese Americans, however, represented a 
different situation. Perceived as a threat, most Japanese 
Americans residing in the West were removed from their homes 
and placed in camps. There, they worked and lived out the war 
years. Residing in ten "relocation centers" throughout the 
western states, these Americans were treated as prisoners. In 
many cases, the intemees assisted farmers within their 
relocated area or worked on other farms of the region.®® These 
farm labor cfroups mentioned here are only a few of those that 
were active during the war. 
While 1943 proved the most difficult year for the USDA 
and Extension Service to acquire fxinding and organize a 
successful labor program, the following years would be 
challenging as well. In late 1943 and early 1944, the USDA 
faced the task of applying for appropriations to sustain the 
labor programs for a second year. Needing fxinds for the 1944 
calendar year, the USDA requested money from Congress for its 
different agencies and programs, including the Emergency Farm 
Labor Program. In hearings before the House of 
Representatives' sxibcommittee regarding agricultural 
appropriations, administrators requested monies for several 
farm labor programs. For the 1944 year, the Emergency Farm 
Labor Program requested almost forty million dollars to 
operate the numerous programs within its operation. Of that 
figure, the WLA requested $624,550 from the House of 
Representatives appropriations subcommittee. An increase from 
the amount requested and received in 1943, this figure would 
be utilized to further WLA "recruitment, training, placement, 
and supervision." Again, the WLA appeared to have been short 
changed from the monies reserved for labor programs; the VFV 
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requested $1,380,600.®' 
As with the hearings for the 1943 calendar year, those 
who testified in favor of the federal labor program had not 
openly discussed or advocated the WLA as a viable labor 
organization. And, even though, the WliA had recruited several 
hundred thousand women its first year of operation, its place 
within federal policy had not been proven. According to House 
of Representatives testimonies, the WLA placed more than two 
hundred thousand women on farms in 1943, and hoped to recruit 
four hundred thousand for 1944. These figures are 
considerably lower than the actual number of women involved in 
farm labor in the coxintry for either year. Regardless of 
whose figure you use for 1943, WLA or Extension Service, the 
reported number of women recruited had been six hundred 
thousand or more than four hxindred thousand, respectively. Of 
course, these numbers are less than the total 1943 
participation due to the inaction by farm women to register 
with the Extension Service or WLA. Because of the lack of 
farm women in the WLA, USDA officials presented to Congress a 
severely lowered figure of women recruited for the WLA and who 
worked on farms in 1943.®® 
For the 1944 calendar year, the WLA administration 
accoxinted for its distribution of the requested $624,550. 
Unlike the hearings for the previous year's labor, which did 
not break up expenditures, the request before the House of 
Representatives for 1944 needed money for its state and county 
supervisors, training centers and courses, equipment, 
transportation, and supplies.®' The Senate also heard 
testimony regarding the structure of the federal labor 
program. And, xinlike the House of Representatives, the Senate 
did not take time to discuss or hear testimony regarding the 
use of women farm workers or the WLA for 1944, or the results 
of the organization's first year of operation. 
In early 1944, the Senate met to discuss the 
appropriations to be granted to the Emergency Farm Labor 
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Program. Like the House of Representatives this legislative 
house listened to testimony of numerous USDA and Extension 
Service officials regarding possible funding for the federal 
labor plan and its work programs. Without explicitly listing 
each expenditure as the House hearings had done, the Senate 
accepted the amount requested by the Extension Service for its 
labor program. While the Senate and House agreed on the total 
amount to spend for the program, the Senate did not, in any 
manner, discuss the use of women on the nation's farms. 
Without mention of their success in 1943, or their continued 
use in 1944, it is impossible to determine the amoxint of money 
the Senate would have appropriated for the organization. The 
WLA had not been alone, however, as the Senate did not discuss 
the VFV either.®" 
The final decision regarding the labor program's funding 
occurred 14 February 1944 with the passage of Public Law 229. 
At that time, the accepted measure appropriated thirty million 
dollars for 1944, with remaining funds from 1943 added to the 
total. In that case, the total appropriations for the 1944 
calendar year for the Emergency Farm labor Program had been 
about thirty-five million dollars. Without a more substantial 
breakdown, it is assumed that the amount of funding requested 
during the House of Representative hearings for the WLA would 
have remained consistent with the actual appropriation 
granted. For the 1945 calendar year, an appropriation of 
twenty million dollars had been added to the remainder from 
1944, eight million dollars. The federal government, perhaps 
realizing the end of the war had been near, had not seen the 
need for high appropriations for 1945. Thus Pxiblic Law 529, 
passed 22 December 1944 authorized farm labor appropriations 
for the 1945 calendar year.®^ 
Appropriation hearings for later years did not entertain 
the same witnesses as the first year of the Emergency Farm 
Labor Program operation. Testimony contained within the 1944 
and 1945 hearings addressed the administration of the program. 
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as well as the manner by which certain issues were addressed. 
Specific concerns, especially the use of women or youths as 
farm labor, did not occupy much time in the House of 
Representatives or Senate hearings in the remaining two years 
of war. Instead, congressmen and senators discussed foreign 
and migrant labor; worker service centers,- transportation of 
labor; program administration; regional/state requests for 
labor, wages, and housing; and regional/state successes or 
failures. States described labor situations and 
accomplishments along with the crops produced each year. 
Clearly, legislators had been interested far more in the 
operation of the program and the manner by which the money had 
been spent, than the individuals performing the work during 
the previous year. The use of women and youths had not been 
viewed as a large part of the Emergency Farm Labor Program, 
and therefore had not been addressed at length. 
This omission by the congressional subcommittees 
regarding the WLA and VFV is unfortxinate. The two 
organizations established the validity of the Farm Labor 
Program as they numbered more than 5.5 million workers during 
the period from 1943 to 1945. By involving farm and nonfarm 
women, the WLA entered the war effort and work force, and 
provided farmers with acceptable agricultural workers. 
Influenced by governmental actions of the 1910s and 193 0s, 
foreign labor programs, and early state initiatives, such as 
those in Vermont, New York, and California, the development of 
the VFV and WLA established a viable manner by which the 
nation received farm workers in 1943. It is these early 
programs and initiatives, as well as federal agency, 
committee, and subcommittee actions that persisted in creating 
a national labor program in 1943. The influence of USDA, 
Extension Service, and Women's Bureau personnel in these 
efforts to establish a farm worker program assisted in the 
eventual passage of Pxiblic Law 45 in February 1943. Clearly, 
these initiatives prior to February helped the government to 
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create a federal program. Thus, regardless of the opinions of 
several federal administrators and farm organization 
personnel, Congress, by Public Law 45, legislated for the 
inclusion of women and the WLA within the Emergency Farm Labor 
Program. 
The administrative creation of the Emergency Farm Labor 
Program represented only the beginning of the national effort 
to recruit, train, and place labor. The development of the 
WLA as a viable organization in 1943, and its continuation 
into 1945 are of importance and significance in the overall 
study of the Women's Land Army during World War II. As part 
of the U.S. Crop Corps and the Emergency Farm Labor Program, 
the WLA represented the greatest agricultural group 
participation during the war. Accounting for 3.5 million 
workers, the WLA became an important component of the American 
home front during World War II. 
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CHAPTER 5. MONEY, CLOTHING, HEALTH, AND HOME 
The establishment of the Women's Land Army as well as the 
placement of women on farms could not occur without an 
organized structure. To accomplish this, the U.S. Extension 
Service created an effective administration, suggested a 
workable wage, designed a uniform, prescribed safety-
precautions, and procured housing for the women workers. 
These actions allowed the WLA administration to organize an 
effective national agency that would be efficient on the 
federal, state, and coxanty levels. With the close of 
congressional hearings for appropriations, it became necessary 
to establish the federal and state offices by which the WLA 
would operate. As a central administrative agency, the WLA 
Division of the Emergency Farm Labor Program supplied state 
organizations with essential information and coordinated 
efforts between the WLA and organizations interested in women 
and farm labor. In order to effectively administer and create 
a viable farm labor program, the Extension Service and WLA 
administrators drew upon the assistance of other federal 
agencies and individuals to place the WLA at the top of the 
wartime farm labor plan.^ 
Although, initially, the WLA did not appear to have been 
a feasible or viable part of the Emergency Farm Labor Program, 
with only 60,000 women requested for recruitment. However, 
the organization's first year of operation changed that 
erroneous perception. Assuming that the WLA would be able to 
recruit only a small labor force of women to provide seasonal 
labor during 1943, the federal officials did not visualize the 
WLA as a being an iir^jortant part of the goverament' s labor 
program. Instead, first year appropriations and 
administrative assistance focused on other components of the 
farm labor policy rather than the WLA. The WLA, however, 
would prove the government wrong as the organization recruited 
more than 600,000 women for its first year of operation. Much 
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of the credit for this accon^lishment can be traced to the 
individual who became the WLA administrator in April 1943. 
Responsible for national media and recruitment campaigns, as 
well as overseeing state and local WLA organizations, the 
administrator needed to be an individual who understood the 
in5)ortance of all women being utilized for farm labor. 
Florence L. Hall had been chosen by the USDA to head the 
federal WLA program. A senior home economist with the 
Extension Service, Hall grew up on a Michigan farm, earned 
degrees in home economics, and worked as an agricultural agent 
during World War I. She represented the image that many 
within the USDA and Extension Service hoped to promote as 
labor was recruited for the war effort. By merging her rural 
background with her urban education and career. Hall 
epitomized the vision of the perfect WLA experience as 
prescribed by the Extension Seirvice in 1943. In efforts to 
forge a comparable likeness for most of the women joining the 
WLA, the program administration hoped to entice urban working 
women into the nation's fields and onto the farms. With the 
merger of city and farm lives, cooperation would be fostered 
among participants and farm families as everyone labored and 
toiled to produce the bountiful harvests needed during World 
War II. Thus, Hall emphasized the cooperation and merger of 
rural and urban lives that the WLA hoped to accomplish by 
placing urban women on farms.^ 
Before her stint as the WLA administrator, Hall worked in 
the USDA's Dairy Bureau, and then as a senior home economist 
from 1928 to 1943. With that position. Hall became the chief 
spokesperson for the WLA, and an effective recruiting tool. 
With an acknowledgement of the work expected. Hall's initial 
statements to the press concerned the work that women should 
be prepared to endure. "The work is hard and long . . . and 
applicants must be physically fit." Although that statement, 
along with the list of attributes women should possess, 
"dexterity, speed, accuracy, patient, interest, curiosity, 
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rivalry, and patriotism," did not appear to have popularized 
the WLA to the general public, women rushed to join the 
organization. Through numerous propaganda articles and 
materials. Hall and the WLA administration annoxinced how women 
would participate in the organization and provide labor to 
farmers. Fronctioning as a decentralized organization the 
national WLA encouraged women to deal directly with local or 
state WLA offices, or county Extension agents rather than the 
national organization.' 
Under the direction of the federal WLA administration, 
state and local offices administered the work program. State 
Extension Services controlled organizational and work aspects 
of the WLA within its state. Through the WLA organizational 
structure developed by congressional legislation and 
iir5)lemented by the Emergency Farm Labor Program, as well as 
the money appropriated for the program, states were able to 
ertploy a full- or part-time WLA supervisor. This individual 
worked with county Extension agents to recruit and place women 
on farms. During the first year of operation, thirteen states 
had full-time WLA supervisors, while thirty states had part-
time supervisors." This individual, in most cases a woman, 
held the title of "Assistant State Farm Labor Supervisor, 
Women's Land Army." Each state WLA supervisor was responsible 
for the operation of the program, and to her superiors 
regarding the WLA's success in the state. The state WLA 
official maintained a relationship with the federal 
organization, and represented the state in regional and 
national labor conferences, as well as "prepared information, 
publicity, and recruiting material for State use." WLA state 
supervisors held positions of tremendous responsibility and 
importance to maintain and operate effective organizations. 
Successful state supervisors had been described within the WLA 
literature as "a person of initiative, resourcefulness, and 
imagination," and able to "fit," the WLA, "into the overall 
farm labor program." This person also "plans special 
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recruitment caii^aigns, can^s for women workers, training 
courses, child care centers, etc." Additionally, the state 
supervisor examined farmer and worker opinion in an effort to 
judge the effectiveness of the WLA in a given area. Through 
these efforts, the state supervisor formulated an educational 
and publicity program to influence given attitudes, or to 
change attitude regarding the placement of women on farms. ® 
With these expectations, state WLA supervisors recognized 
their need to effectively organize and successfully 
administrate their programs. But not every state had the 
advantage of a WLA supervisor, and without the presence of 
such an individual, a member of the state's farm labor program 
would administrate a "women's program." The lack of a state 
WLA organization was not common, but it did occur, especially 
in areas that resisted the use of women as farm labor. In 
these states, farm labor supervisors split their time between 
programs. Locations throughout the Middle West, South, and 
Southwest that had not been able to overcome the opposition 
toward women as farm labors did not organize a viable state 
program that hired women for farm labor. And while many women 
worked in agriculture within these states, the absence of a 
formal organization bastardized their in^ortance to farm labor 
efforts. Without their recognition as members of the WLA, the 
presence of women in these fields would be overlooked and 
trivialized.® 
The influence exerted by the WLA supervisor over the 
state's labor program depended on the position and role of the 
WLA within the state. In some cases, state WLA administrators 
recruited and placed labor, while in other states, that 
responsibility had been assumed by coxinty extension agents and 
county WLA personnel. The organization of county WLA 
administrations were guided by the USDA publication, "Outline 
of Suggestions for Developing a County Plan." This plan 
established a procedure for the creation of a county WLA 
office, and its relationship to the larger farm labor program. 
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Once in place, coiinty officials recruited women from local 
sources, and cooperated with women's and civic groups in an 
effort to sign up as many women as possible. To accomplish 
their recruitment goals, county agents were advised about 
program improvements and disseminated information to local 
farm groups. In states with large WLA programs, the addition 
of county-level administrators or state assistant supervisors, 
placed the state WLA supervisor in a position of advisor 
rather than administrator.' 
Through these efforts, the WLA organized an effective 
federal- and state-based structure to implement its program. 
And with this administrative structure in place. Hall and her 
staff turned to issues regarding the actual working conditions 
endured by the workers. Thus, in addition to recruitment 
campaigns and work completed, WLA administrators had also been 
concerned regarding each program participants' wages, dress, 
safety, and housing. For those who had entered farm work 
before the creation of the WLA, they had been dependent on 
conditions given by the employer, or in some cases, conditions 
demanded by a state agricultural council or federal agency. 
However, with the organization of the federal labor program, 
workers were guaranteed certain services and conditions before 
they started their WLA service. Hall and her administration 
worked to assure WLA participants that they received these 
benefits. 
In the years prior to the established federal wartime 
farm labor program, farmers had been able to set their own pay 
rate for their workers. Although some states, such as 
Vermont, set a minimum wage, most states left the decision of 
pay to each farmer. With the stipulation to pay the average 
wage for the area, farmers could set any pay scale. The 
federal government did issue wage standards and suggestions 
for the female farm workers,- the most prevalent being the 
"thirty cents per hour" in 1942 quoted by the Women's Bureau 
and Department of Labor. Still, these figures represent an 
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average rate of pay, and in many cases, women were paid more 
or less than the average national or regional figure. In 
Vermont, the minimum wage in the VLC was reported to be the 
equivalent of a private in the military, or twenty-one dollars 
plus room and board per month; in New York state, farm workers 
received thirty to fifty cents per hour, dependent on 
experience and other criteria; and in California, women were 
paid for piece work or on an hourly basis. In many cases, the 
California rate of pay had been dependent on the type of work 
completed. In 1942, women who picked apricots received little 
more than three dollars per day, while those who picked grapes 
in the San Joaquin valley received sixty-five cents per hour, 
or just more than thirty-five dollars for a week's work.® 
Clearly, the rate of pay across the country in the years prior 
to the establishment of the farm labor program, had been 
dependent on supply, location, and demand. 
With the official creation of the WLA, the initial 
decision regarding wage rates had been left to area farmers. 
However, within months of the organization of the WLA, the 
federal government instituted "county farm wage boards" whose 
responsibility was to establish the prevailing wage for a 
given area.® Thus, WLA wages were established in the summer 
of 1943, which would provide the women with money to 
compensate them for their patriotism, but not necessarily for 
their time, as low wages were common. The ability for the WLA 
to set a prevailing wage, had been a result of Farm Security 
Administration action in February 1943. The agency had 
established "effective prevailing wages as determined by the 
Secretary of Agriculture within the particular area of 
eir^loyment, " which were not to be "less than 30 cents per hour 
or its equivalent in piece-work rates." Thus, prior to the 
creation of the Emergency Farm Labor Program and the WLA, two 
government agencies. Farm Security Administration and Women's 
Bureau, had advocated thirty cents per hour as a minimum wage 
for farm workers.With this guideline in place, wage boards 
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could set a prevailing wage for their region. 
Initially, without a wage control, eastern states, New 
York specifically, had set low wages. However, as time 
passed, and the "women's value" had been appreciated, minimum 
wages increased. New York established a minimum of forty 
cents per hour as a wage in 1943, having raised the minimum 
average hourly rate from twenty-five cents. This increase 
alone indicated that women's value in agriculture had been 
clearly underestimated. In Maine, the labor organization 
guaranteed a higher wage. At thirty dollars a month plus 
board, these workers had been given rates similar to those 
used in Vermont with the VLC. For the most part, WLA hourly 
or piece wages in the East for 1943 barely paid a worker's 
room and board, let alone any other expenses. Thus, women 
found themselves dependent on family members for their living 
expenses. As reported by Frances W. Valentine, the average 
rates of pay in eastern states had been between twenty-five 
and forty cents per hour, in some cases, as high as fifty 
cents. However, if paid a guaranteed weekly or monthly wage, 
eastern WLA workers found themselves in a better economic 
situation. 
To avoid low wages in the following crop years and to 
encourage the continuation of women as agricultural laborers, 
Valentine suggested that female farm workers be paid the same 
wage as men in similar jobs. She further insinuated that 
these women were not migratory workers and should not be 
treated as such. 
Women who go into farm work are not out after 'big 
money.' They realize that, come what may, America and 
the families and children of her allies must have food. 
They are willing to work for moderate pay. But they 
cannot be recruited, for harvest or for long-season farm 
work, on the old basis of migratory workers who are 
expected to come when wanted, to work and be paid only 
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for such days or hours as they are needed and to sit 
around in idleness the rest of the time. They must earn 
sufficient to pay their board and expenses and something 
over. If the women do the given job as well as men, they 
should have the same pay. 
Even though she advocated higher hourly and piece-work wages, 
Valentine still recommended that women workers be paid a 
guaranteed salazry for their service. In that way, laborers 
and farmers acknowledged a standardized rate of pay, and both 
understood the responsibilities and duties necessary to 
receive the wage." 
In the West, agricultural laborers were paid either for 
piece work or by the hour. For inexperienced farm workers, 
piece work was not profitable; however, for experienced 
workers, piece work had been preferred over an hourly wage. 
The disparity between inexperience and experience is noticed 
when one compares the amount of fruit picked and money 
received for the work. In hourly rates, the average for 
California in 1943 had been between sixty and seventy cents 
per hour; for piece work, however, the rate depended on the 
crop. Women made, from piece work, two dollars to eleven 
dollars per day; the average being about four dollars per day. 
In Oregon, the hourly rate extended from sixty to ninety-five 
cents, and in Washington, the hourly rates had been higher. 
Generally, experienced farm labor in Washington worked at 
hourly rates of sixty cents to one dollar, but inexperienced 
female labor had been paid less, and usually by piece work." 
The rates paid for farm labor in California, and other 
western states were higher than most of the rates paid in the 
East. At the time of WLA organization, wages paid to women 
farm workers followed this trend. Reported, as of 1 April 
1943, in the Pacific states region the average rate of pay for 
agricultural laborers had been as high as 105 dollars per 
month with board, while the lowest wage was in the East South 
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Central region, where the rate of 29 dollars per month with 
board had been paid. The national monthly average in April 
1943 had been 57 dollars with board or 67 dollars without 
board for farm workers. By the end of the 1943 crop year, 
however, wage increases, although slight, had occurred for all 
agricultural laborers. It is easy to argue that this happened 
due to the quality of work accoTt5)lished, and that farm labor 
had become a precious commodity. Sxibsequently, by October 
1943, the average monthly wage in the nation had increased 
accordingly as shown in table 2." 
Table 2. Average farm wages, October 1943 
Region 
Per Month 
with board 
Per Month 
without board 
New England $ 70 $104 
Middle Atlantic 60 90 
Middle West 62 83 
Southeast 31 42 
Southwest 43 59 
Mountain 80 108 
Pacific 113 148 
source: Louis J. Ducoff, "Wages of Agricultural Labor in the 
United States," Technical Bulletin No. 895. Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics, USDA, 1945, 32. 
Still, women farm workers did not receive ecpiivalent pay 
as men in the same positions. Even though Frances Valentine 
had suggested sufficient pay increases for 1944, not all 
states had been inclined to offer equal pay. And, while 
exceptions did exist, such as Oregon, for the most part 
women's wages and pay did little more than meet the bare 
necessities, and in some cases did not cover those. 
Regardless, American women continued to labor in the 
nation's fields. They did, however, demand to be recognized 
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as war workers. One way that the women's patriotic service 
would be acknowledged by the general ptiblic involved the 
design and manufacture of a WLA uniform. Designed by the 
Bureau of Home Economics and extension clothing specialists 
from Maiyland, New York, and Wisconsin, the WLA outfit was 
described as a "comfortable 'sloppy but swagger' blue denim 
uniform." The uniform combined blue denim overalls with 
"tailored powder-blue sports shirt," blue jacket, and cap. 
All but the jacket was required for 1943; the women could 
purchase the three-piece uniform for $6.20. The jacket cost 
an additional $2.50 and another shirt could be purchased for 
$1.35. For $10.05 women could purchase a complete set of WLA 
clothing. Additional items such as gloves and shoes were 
optional, but recommended. As women underwent recruitment and 
placement during the first crop season, they had been advised 
to purchase the uniform. For the most part, the request to 
buy the clothing gave women laborers the opportunity to 
demonstrate their loyalty and patriotism and to proudly show 
their service to the national defense effort. However, 
several problems developed that harr^jered WLA workers from 
wearing their uniform in 1943. First, many women did not 
receive enough money in wages to cover necessities, let alone 
the cost of the uniform. Consequently, many women opted to go 
without the WLA uniform and "made do" with their own clothing 
in 1943. However, regardless of their personal decision 
concerning the uniform, WLA workers did not get the 
opportunity to purchase xiniforms during the first year of WLA 
participation. 
The discussion concerning the purchase and use of the WLA 
uniform in 1943 turned out to be for naught. While the 
official announcement of Hall's appointment and the need for 
uniforms had been made in April, by May 1943 it had become 
clear that viniform manufacturers did not have the supplies on 
hand to turn out the expected number of WLA uniforms for the 
year. In an effort to aid defense and military operations, 
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cloth manufacturers had converted from denim production to 
twill and other fabrics used for tents and military supplies, 
while the surplus of denim was sent overseas for the lend-
lease program. Additionally, because of the high level of 
participation in 1943, uniform manufacturers would not have 
been prepared for the number of workers who exceeded the 
government's initial estimate of 50,000 women. As a result, 
in 1943 WLA workers made do with what they already had for 
clothing, and instead purchased the uniform when it became 
available. Thus, in the absence of a uniform, women received 
instruction on the type of clothing to wear to protect 
themselves as they worked; overalls or slacks, cotton shirt, 
straw hat, and low-heeled shoes with thick soles. Safety 
precautions required that workers wear comfortable clothing 
without bows, frills, or strings. Nothing that could catch in 
farm machinery.^® 
By the second WLA crop year, the controversy regarding 
the manufacture for WLA workers' xiniform had diminished. For 
the most part, women had the opportunity to purchase a uniform 
and did so. According to the 1944 North Dakota annual WLA 
labor report, the cost of a coir^lete uniform, including cap, 
two shirts, jacket, and overalls, had remained at ten dollars. 
However, as of 24 July 1944, the Commodity Credit Corporation 
in North Dakota authorized a reduction in the uniform price. 
As an incentive for women to buy the WLA clothing or to 
deplete the stock on hand, this decrease in price allowed 
women to purchase a complete uniform for $7.65. If women 
purchased the three-piece uniform as required in 1943, then 
the discounted 1944 price had been $4.70. Without 
collaboration from other sources, it is not possible to 
indicate whether this "sale" of WLA uniforms occurred 
throughout the country, or was a situation in North Dakota.^' 
Regardless, it seems that in 1944, even with an abundant 
supply of WLA uniforms, workers did not rush to buy the 
official uniform; instead it appeared they preferred to use 
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their own clothing. 
WLA workers who did not purchase the WLA xinifortn received 
instruction and advice concerning acceptable suJostitute 
clothing for farm labor. For the most part, the safety of the 
worker had been the WLA's first concern, and her clothing 
reflected that. Thus, to protect against injury and accident, 
state supervisors and home demonstration agents addressed the 
issue regarding women's farm clothing. The agents assisted 
the farm workers in making their clothing safer and themselves 
more productive on the farm. In Oklahoma, "clothing 
demonstrations include[d] practical, comfortable, and safe 
working clothing" that were also considered "attractive." 
Other states also used home demonstration agents and their 
programs to advise women on proper clothing for farm work. To 
press these points, Kansas agents presented farm-safe clothing 
for female agricultural workers at home demonstration meetings 
across the state. The WLA in Louisiana did not design a new 
outfit for its women farm workers, but redesigned existing 
outfits. Louisiana clothing specialists assisted women in 
altering clothes left by absent men and boys, "to make them 
comfortable for women. The failure of the federal WLA 
administration to provide a uniform affordable and available 
for all workers did not, however, in any way hamper the 
women's ability to successfully complete their work 
assignments. 
The confusion surrounding the WLA-uniform production is 
reminiscent of 1930s programs and the federal government and 
its agencies and administrators whom had not always appeared 
informed of happenings in Washington. Without an analysis of 
materials available, the WLA administration and USDA had 
promoted the existence of the uniform. Once the situation 
regarding the unavailability of the uniform had become known, 
WLA workers who had been prepared to buy the clothing found 
themselves without proper dress. The WLA administration 
stating the presence of a work uniform when one had not been 
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available, gave the pxiblic the iti^ression that the federal 
government had not been aware of activity within its 
administration. 
The lack of a tiniform became just one problem with which 
the administrators of the WLA contended during its first 
official year of operation. On the national scene, the WLA 
administration worked to better working conditions for women. 
Proper training and conditioning for heavy work, sanitary 
facilities, and plaimed recreational activities were adopted. 
Safety issues had also been a concern for farmers and workers 
as women took over jobs unfamiliar to them. In order to 
prepare those involved in agricultural labor (farmers and 
workers) for conditions on farms, the Extension Service 
produced several informational brochures that described farm 
environments and situations. Some were aimed at all farm 
workers, while others were specifically written for the WLA. 
In March 1943, following the official annoimcement 
regarding the existence of the WLA, the Extension Service 
produced "Safety C3ieck List for Women and Girls Doing Farm 
Work." This paitphlet contained a checklist for women who 
conducted work on farms. Questions regarding the way in which 
workers handled agricultural irt^jlements, dressed for work, 
cared for their health, handled farm animals, and consumed 
nutritious food were asked. Additionally, the brochure 
discussed the need for women to get adequate sleep, so that 
they would not be too tired to properly perform their jobs.^® 
From the start, the WLA and Extension Service administrations 
strove to protect and guide the women laborers. Farm safety 
regarding all aspects of their lives became an important 
aspect of each worker's service to agriculture. 
While the Extension Service and WLA had been the 
governing bodies associated with the en^loyment of women on 
the nation's farms, these agencies were not the only ones to 
offer advice to "women and girls doing farm work." As part of 
its Food Information Series, the Office of Information, USDA, 
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discussed women's safety in its media release scheduled for 31 
July 1943 . Information concerning the way that women "get 
into condition for farm work, " comprised part of the 
publication. Additionally, issues that had been addressed in 
earlier publications were also included; women were instructed 
regarding "safe working habits," acceptable work clothing, 
farm implements and machinery, care of animals, and care for 
their personal health. In most cases, women were advised to 
"conserve energy" rather than rush into every job. This 
announcement described the proper way to lift as well as the 
amoxint of weight a woman could manage. In all cases, the 
safety message urged caution rather than extreme exertion; 
women needed to lift objects properly and should not lift 
weights of thirty-five pounds or more for an extended time. 
Weight limits were established for WLA workers: an "average 
girl or woman in good condition can lift or carry 25 pounds 
without difficulty . . . 25 to 35 pounds without fear of doing 
herself injury." Further, these precautions state the 
possible damage to women if they continuously lifted more than 
thirty- five pounds. 
For its part, this Food Information Series publication 
also described both appropriate and inappropriate clothing; 
"Do not wear shorts and halters. They are unsuitable from 
every angle. " It appears that safety had not been the only 
issue discussed within USDA brochures. These phrases imply a 
much more complicated issue than safety, one that implied the 
morality and innocence of farm families and WLA participants. 
Farmers expressed a common fear that urban women would be 
successful in corrupting farm family members. However, moral 
corruption had not been the only concern expressed by the 
Office of Information, because its literature also discussed 
sunburn and sunstroke; cuts, blisters, and bites; dehydration; 
and lack of proper rest. Sunburn, one of the most frequent 
maladies associated with the WLA, was discussed in the 
following manner: "Everyone agrees that prevention of sunburn 
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should be sought rather than treatment. Women and girls 
should be wariied not to work, especially for the first few 
days, with short sleeves, or with too thin shirts, or with 
jersey shirts cut low in the neck, and not to go without hats 
even if they 'always do' in their ordinary occupation." 
Additional suggestions included the use of sunscreen and 
creams. Even so, women still sunburned. Thus, treatments for 
the bum were also included, along with care for other farm 
"injuries," such as bee stings, cuts, insect bites, and poison 
ivy. In all, while most safety pamphlets discussed the same 
conditions and protected the workers against the same 
problems, the Office of Information included more gender-
specific concerns than the other publications from the USDA.^-
The USDA not only printed brochures to safeguard the 
women's safety, but also produced publications for all groups 
under the U.S. Crop Corps. In the first months of the farm 
labor program, the USDA in conjunction with the Department of 
Labor, National Safety Council, and Office of Education, 
offered recommendations for worker safety. In the following 
examples, safety information was presented in two different 
formats. "Going to the Farm Front? : Safety Tips to the U. S. 
Crop Corps," repeated much of the survey in the WLA-focused 
pxiblication, but presented the material in a different format. 
This publication addressed issues in a manner that all workers 
could read and understand. Workers' health needed to be in 
good condition, and proper care taken in case of cuts, scraps, 
or bruises. Proper clothing, both as protection from farm 
machinery and. the sun was also recjuired. Familiarity of farm 
implements and animals would allow the worker to be secure and 
relaxed, and therefore, less likely to cause himself/herself 
injury. Above, all, it seemed that the overall message of 
this brochure was "Take no chances." Additionally, this 
publication included the "farm safety pledge," which required 
a signature to express the worker's serious intent toward 
safety 
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Signed by participants in the farm labor program, the 
farm safety pledge protected both the worker and the farmer in 
case of any problem during employment. In all instances, the 
pledge required that the farm worker be responsible for their 
own actions and safety, and to determine their ability to 
perform specific jobs. By signing his/her name to the pledge, 
the agricultural laborer acknowledged the responsibility to 
remain conscientious while performing prescribed duties. 
While much of the pledge appeared to have been general farm 
safety information, the Extension Service assumed that urban 
workers, who had no experience with agriculture, would not 
have been accustomed to conditions that farmers took for 
granted. For example, the Crop Corps participant pledged not 
to smoke in the bam or fields, and not around gasoline; also 
the worker needed to seek approval regarding his/her farm 
work. Thus, each farmer apprised his hired laborer(s) of the 
job done, all in an effort to impeded misunderstandings and 
foster cooperation between employee and employer. 
In performing my patriotic duties as a member of the 
U.S. Crop Corps, I pledge to do my work on the farm in 
the way safest to myself, to my fellow workers, and to 
the livestock and equipment I use. 
I will recognize that farm work represents the 
learning of a large number of separate skills. 
I will ask the farmer how to do try job, to demonstrate 
the exact procedure to me, and then I will do it 
immediately under his supervision. I will ask him to 
inspect my work regularly to be sure I am doing it 
properly and safely. 
I recognize that it is particularly in^iortant that I 
receive proper instruction in the handling of livestock 
and equipment. 
I will familiarize myself with the rules of safe 
tractor and equipment operation. 
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I will safeguard children. 
I will be on the lookout for accident hazards and 
help to remove them. 
I will not smoke in the bam, aroxind gasoline, or in 
ripe grain or hay fields. 
I know that serious injuries result from horseplay, 
"fooling," and so-called practical jokes, so I will not 
indulge in these forms of amusement." 
A second piiblication published by the USDA addressed 
issues more explicitly. The May 1943 pamphlet, "Safety for 
the US Crop Corps," while composed of similar topics, 
addressed safety descriptions and information in a more 
complete manner than other brochures. By expanding on each 
topic, this pamphlet discussed important issues for the farm 
worker. In "Safety for the US Crop Corps" a discussion of 
"Clothing" follows. 
Farm work calls for wearing clothing as nearly fitted for 
the job as possible. Because of the ease with which 
they're always catching in something, floppy, loose-
fitting clothes are out of order. Women, particularly, 
must be careful on this score. House dresses aren't as 
suitable for most types of farm work as special work 
slacks and coveralls. It is important that you wear a 
suitable hat or other head covering as protection against 
the svin. Wear comfortable, low-heeled shoes. Open-toed 
shoes aren't suitable for women doing farm work. Neither 
is jewelry. That caution also applies to men in the 
habit of wearing rings. 
In addition to the discussion concerning safety on the farm, 
the pxablication discussed the necessity for all to be 
patriotic in the war effort, suid to assist that effort in any 
way possible. In the first safety publication, "Going to the 
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Farm Front?: Safety Tips to the U. S. Crop Corps," the 
discussion regarding suitable clothing was brief and to the 
point. "Farm work clothes must provide freedom of action, but 
loose, floppy clothes are entirely out of order; they're 
always catching in something. Wear the right kind of hat to 
protect you from the sun." This pamphlet did not discuss 
suitable shoes or boots, nor did it include warnings regarding 
improper clothing and other safety issues.^® 
Regardless of the precautions given to wartime farm 
workers in the first year of federal operation, accidents and 
problems occurred. Reports published in 1944 reported that 
the majority of job hazards that occurred in 1943 had been 
svinbum and poison ivy. Viewed as preventable, these two 
ailments did not qualify as serious injury to the agricultural 
worker, but more of a nuisance.^® However, not all ailments in 
1943 had been as simple as sunburn and poison ivy. To cover 
against serious injury or loss of life, the USDA issued 
insurance for its agricultural workers. Ptiblications from the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE) discussed the need for 
insurance and the policy that provided coverage for farm 
workers. Just as the Emergency Farm Labor Program contained 
several organizations, insurance policies differed to cover 
each type of worker. For WLA workers, an insurance policy 
could be purchased for one- or three-month increments. For 
the 1943 crop year, insurance coverage included $250 for 
accident, $500 for loss of life, and as much as $1000 for 
"dismemberments or loss of sight." A cost of $4 for the first 
three months, with additional monthly coverage purchased for 
$1.50. The premium covered the insured twenty-four hours a 
day and was not restricted to farm accidents.^"' 
During 1943, sixty-five insurance agencies had been given 
the opportunity to sell policies to farm workers. And, while 
the government had reports from thirty of these companies, the 
number of policies written for members of the WLA was almost 
nonexistent. A lack of policies for WLA members could be a 
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result of several factors. Specifically, the cost of 
protection may have thwarted some women from purchasing the 
accident policy. With low wages paid, women found it 
difficult to continually purchase items outside their basic 
necessities. Therefore, goods and services, such as insurance 
and uniforms, were not considered essential. Also, the BAE 
report written by Ralph R. Botts included information about 
thirty of the sixty-five coTr5)anies that offered insurance to 
farm workers; the remaining did not file reports with the 
federal government regarding farm workers covered. Possibly, 
the remaining conpanies insured more WLA than VFV members. Of 
the 434 policies covered by the thirty reporting companies, 
only 2 belonged to members of the WLA. Because of this, no 
distinctions are made between the WLA and VFV in the BAE 
report for 1943.'® Consequently, it is impossible to determine 
the rate by which the WLA had accidents during 1943, or at 
least the rate by which insurance claims had been filed for 
medical expenses. 
A subsequent report from the BAE dated April 1944, 
examined the number of claims made and paid for the previous 
year. And, as stated in the report, "relatively few policies 
were written in 1943," mainly because the insurance policy had 
not been properly advertised and discussed with the workers. 
Due to the lateness of the operation in 1943, several who 
might have purchased policies or filed claims did not, and 
therefore were not protected under the insurance plan. For 
the 1944 crop year, and any future years, the federal 
government planned to be better prepared and ready for 
accidents as they occurred. In terms of coverage, they did 
not alter the policy that had been in place the previous year. 
The levels of coverage remained the same, as did the amount 
for the one- and three-month policies. Additionally, 
workmen's compensation and liability insurance were the 
responsibility of each farmer who employed workers. However, 
in many cases, farmers did not insure against compensation for 
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short-tejnn emergency workers, thus leaving themselves 
linprotected in the case of an accident. Specific coverage was 
offered for VFV workers and for those housed within work 
camps. Clearly the responsibility for each worker was 
dependent on the condition within which they lived and 
worked. 
The safety tips and insurance provided to each worker 
were consistent with other industries and defense work during 
World War II- In terms of industrial defense workers, women 
in those industries also received information regarding their 
safety on the job, and ways in which to care for themselves 
and their families. The National Safety Coiincil released in 
its pamphlet, "Women in Industry," guidelines by which defense 
workers should care for themselves. In all situations it 
became necessary "to establish good working conditions." And 
in the case of defense work, it became necessary for the women 
to understand all that would be required of their job.^° 
With the development of the Emergency Farm Labor Program, 
the USDA and the federal government faced the burden of 
providing facilities and services for its workers. Along with 
the necessity of establishing a liveable wage, uniform for 
service, and safety and insurance measures, the government 
also held the responsibility for supplying farm workers with 
suitable housing. While farm women stayed in their own homes 
to complete their WLA service, town and urban women needed 
housing. Once all available sources had been exhausted, the 
federal government established its own housing structures for 
agricultural laborers. For the most part, WLA workers 
preferred to reside within organized housing rather than their 
employer's home. According to the publication Independent 
Woman. WLA members "chose the group residence unit--probably 
because it left them free, after their day's work was done, to 
follow their own devises, whereas, in the farm home, they were 
under the necessity of conforming to the family life."^^ Due 
to these considerations, public housing became a popular way 
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to keep farm workers housed during the war. And, in 
communities where existing housing did not fulfill all 
quartering requests, local, state, and the federal government 
provided an alternative. 
Initially the WLA and other farm labor groups did not 
recjuest government housing units, but relied on local sources. 
During the course of the war, communities addressed this 
problem differently. While some housed their workers in 
private homes, others placed the women in vacant schools and 
dormitories, commxxnity facilities, and country clxibs. Still, 
these structures did not meet all housing needs in areas where 
hundreds or thousands worked, and temporary lodging was 
built.For the most part, WLA workers were housed in farm 
homes, or in a locale convenient to their work. Women who 
worked year-round on dairy and poultry farms resided with the 
farm family, and spent their time on the farm living as a 
member of the family, but these women made up only a small 
portion of the total WLA workers employed in the nation during 
the period from 1943 to 1945. For the rest, state and local 
WLA organizations, farm organizations, and farmers worked 
together to provide acceptable housing for the millions of 
short-term, seasonal laborers utilized during the war.^^ 
In the Northeast, communities and farmers were creative 
in their search for housing. In New York, communities used 
all available domiciles and community buildings to billet 
urban labor in upstate farm counties and on Long Island. 
School buildings and buses were used as housing and 
transportation during the summer months to provide adequate 
help for large truck-crop farms. Country cl\ibs, Grange halls, 
summer cottages, and other community facilities also provided 
housing for New York workers. Women transported from New York 
City had the advantage of knowing that services would be 
available to them if they traveled to upstate New York, New 
Jersey, or New England to work in vegetable and fruit fields. 
In order to acquire labor for the 1944 crop year, farmers in 
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the cotnmunity of Newburgh, New York, worked to provide better 
facilities for its female workers, everything from more 
recreational activities to varied food to improved housing.^'' 
In the Midwest, organizations worked to establish 
acceptable housing for harvest workers. In Allegan, Michigan, 
women had been hired to pick snap beans, the Red Cross and 
numerous church groups provided the women with meals, and the 
American Legion hall became their home. Additionally, a WLA 
camp had been established along Allegan Lake west of the 
community. This camp housed one hxindred workers who 
participated in bean and fruit harvests. In Illinois, hybrid 
seed com producers had been \inable to recruit sufficient 
local labor in 1944. Thus, they chose to establish four 
"camps" for the women recruited from nearby urban areas. 
Operated by the seed com producers, these camps were set up 
in a high school gymnasium, fraternity house, college 
dormitories, and a private school. In 1945, Ohio also used 
existing buildings and facilities to house its WLA labor. 
In areas of intense agricultural work, mainly the 
northeastern and western United States, communities relied on 
local, state, and federal governments to provide group housing 
for agricultural workers. Tenporary and seasonal work camps 
became one way that communities housed their influx of 
agricultural workers,- another was the construction of 
temporary or permanent housing structures. Constructed as 
single- or multiple-family homes, many of these structures 
remained in use long after the war. Relying on the precedents 
established by World War I and the New Deal, as well as 
federal legislation passed during the 1930s and early 1940s, 
the federal government had the authority to construct and 
provide housing for agricultural workers during World War II. 
In areas where existing buildings did not adequately house 
workers, temporary catr^js and housing made up the difference 
for agricultural laborers. 
World War II work camps housed a large number of women 
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(or other farm laborers) for a short period of time, 
specifically for seasonal work. Located in rural areas away 
from large population centers, these camps effectively brought 
a large group of workers to cultivate and harvest the area's 
main crop. Prior to action from the federal government, 
several states established camps as soon as the need for 
agricultural labor became apparent. Thus, in addition to 
early worker initiatives, states also established cartas to 
house these pre-WLA labor forces. In New York and West coast 
states, labor camps existed from the beginning of the war, and 
certainly before the official establishment of the federal 
farm labor program. While New York camps housed its seasonal 
labor force recruited from urban locales, western camps were 
home to the thousands of migratory farm labor used throughout 
the region to harvest various crops. Over the course of the 
war, California erected numerous work cairps for the migratory 
and seasonal workers en^Jloyed in the state. In 1943, seven 
camps had been erected for the WLA, eight in 1944, and four in 
1945. Farmers benefitted from camp housing as well. By 
billeting workers together, the grower could economically 
transport workers to the location for the day's labor. In 
addition to California and New York, fifteen other states 
established camps to house WLA workers. The camps provided 
homes not just for their own residents but for interstate 
workers as well. For example, Maine and Ohio recruited women 
from other locations. Women traveled to Maine from eighteen 
states, Washington, D.C., and several countries.^® 
The efforts by local and state governments, community 
groups, and individual farmers to provide housing for their 
farm workers did not prove to be adequate after the 
organization of the Emergency Farm Labor Program. Thus, with 
the millions of additional agricultural laborers present in 
the country during the war, the federal government also became 
involved with construction of housing for workers. In 1943, 
with the development of the national farm labor program, 
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agricultural workers became defense workers, and thus, 
entitled to federal-defense housing. Although initially-
federal housing had been requested for food and meat 
processing plant employees, by 1944 housing requests included 
locations that used the WLA and other farm labor. Guaranteed 
the same benefits that industrial workers received, farm 
laborers acquired low-cost, federally constructed housing. 
Although agricultural workers did not number the majority of 
those that received defense housing, they did, as part of the 
national defense program, warrant the aid that federally 
constructed houses provided. As agricultural laborers, these 
workers received less per month than the average industrial 
workers, subsequently much of their income would be spent on 
housing and other expenses. The benefit of defense housing 
allowed the farm laborers to reside within town and city areas 
without the need to locate adequate and affordable housing. 
The precedent for war housing can be traced to the New 
Deal. Agencies such as the Farm Home Administration, the 
Federal Housing Authority, and, in some regards, the 
Resettlement Administration provided new housing for 
Americans, either through relocation or renovation, and 
provided jobs for xinen^loyed men. During that time, 
legislation had been passed that established a national 
housing measure. The Wagner Housing Act, also known as the 
Wagner-Steagall or National Housing Act, became law on 1 
September 1937. The National Housing Act replaced an earlier 
smaller program established by the National Recovery 
Administration, which also supplied money for slum clearance 
and constructed low-income housing. This measure provided 
"Financial assistance to the States and political siibdivisions 
thereof for the elimination of unsafe and insanitary housing 
conditions, for the eradication of slums, for the provision of 
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low 
income, and for the reduction of unemployment and the 
stimulation of business activity, to create a United States 
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Housing Authority, and for other purposes." This legislation 
became the predecessor to wartime housing measures.^' 
As created by the National Housing Act, the Housing 
Authority had the ability to make loams available to public-
housing agencies that assisted in low-rent-housing and slum-
clearance projects. Thus, contributions and grants made to 
piiblic-housing agencies and individuals to maintain the "low-
rent character" of housing projects allowed for the 
construction and maintenance of projects, as well as provided 
rent subsidies. As part of the Department of Interior, the 
United States Housing Authority, with five hundred million 
dollars in fiinding, directed these activities in its efforts 
to bring about the stipulations laid down by this 
legislation. 
Following the use of low-income housing during the New 
Deal, the government used the same idea to establish low-cost 
temporary or permanent housing for war workers in the 1940s. 
Beginning in the industrial sector, the government foxind that 
it needed more housing for the increased number of workers in 
defense plants in urban areas. Individual locations could not 
meet the growing need for housing around industrial 
manufacturing centers, and, therefore, depended on the federal 
government to rectify the situation. By 1940, the federal 
government began the process that would provide low-cost 
housing, facilities, and services in communities where defense 
and war industries existed. Using the National Housing Act as 
a precedent. Congress adopted the Lanham Act. While the 
National Housing Act of 1937 had provided urban public housing 
during a time of national depression, its administrative 
structure did not prove adequate for wartime. Conducted on a 
scale acceptable to the time, the National Housing Act became 
obsolete with the arrival of war and defense measures of the 
early 1940s. Thus, Congress legislated a wartime measure that 
possessed the resources needed to adequately handle the volume 
of housing requested.^' 
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Passed 14 October 1940, the Lanham Act included 
provisions for those employed in the war industries. 
Introduced by Representative Fritz G. Lanham of Texas, this 
measure provided services to low-income families and workers 
in industry. Created to "expedite the provision of housing in 
connection with national defense, and for other purposes," the 
Lanham Act established housing that would be built in 
locations that needed additional domiciles to meet wartime 
labor demands.In 1940, the individuals who could 
participate and use the government's defense housing included 
enlisted men in military service, employees of war and navy 
departments assigned to duty at military posts and bases, and 
workers engaged in defense industries. At that time, the 
legislation did not include agricultural laborers or migratory 
farm workers. In the 21 January 1942 amendment to the Lanham 
Act, an additional class of individuals was included within 
the groups of those eligible for defense housing,- "Officers of 
the Army and Marine Corps not above the grade of captain, and 
officers of the Navy and Coast Guard, not above the grade of 
lieutenant, senior grade," who were stationed at military 
bases and posts or had assignments in defense industries could 
receive housing. Still no mention of farm workers. And while 
it is possible to argue that the federal farm labor program 
did not yet exist, the presence of migratory agricultural 
labor is not as easily dismissed.'*^ 
Additionally, limits had been placed on federal housing 
construction. In the continental United States the average 
cost per government built family dwelling unit in 1940 was 
legislated to be $3000, not to exceed $3950, elsewhere the 
median cost was set at $4000, not to exceed $4750 per family 
dwelling unit. These figures represented the cost of 
construction; fees for utilities, land purchase, and community 
facilities were not included. Within months the Lanham Act 
had been amended to change its language, as well as to 
increase the money requested for appropriations and the limits 
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of housing costs. In April 1941, the average cost of a 
housing unit in the continental United States was to be $3500, 
with measures taken to ensure that construction be economical, 
and that no "moveable equipment" installed in any units. In 
January 1942, the average cost figure was increased to $3750, 
not to exceed $4500. Outside the continental United States, 
the average cost per unit became $4250, not to exceed $4750, 
excluding the territory of Alaska. In Alaska the cost per 
family dwelling iinit should not exceed $7500. In most cases 
these structures were to be permanent, however, in areas of 
the country where the housing administrator did not deem a 
lasting need for additional housing, temporary structures were 
to be constructed. Further, the housing administrator, who 
worked through the Federal Works Agency, set appropriate and 
reasonable rents for each housing unit, as well as worked with 
federal, state and local governments to exist within 
guidelines, laws, and municipality regulations."^ 
With the administration of the housing division in place, 
the federal government went into the construction business. 
Federal housing administrator Abner H. Ferguson received from 
the president a listing of locations in need of additional 
housing. Dated 8 April 1941, locations in thirty-six states, 
as well as Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and 
Washington, D.C. required housing for war industry workers. 
Within one month additional needy locations had been 
identified, a pattern that would continue throughout the war. 
As the months passed, new locations would require additional 
housing, and thus become part of the wartime effort to provide 
affordable housing to workers." Correspondence between 
Roosevelt, Ferguson, and defense housing coordinator, C. F. 
Palmer, had discussed the number of housing units needed and 
those to be constructed, as well as the type of work done in 
various locations. During the period prior to the official 
declaration of war, Ferguson recommended numerous locations 
for the construction of housing units. This information was 
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passed onto Palmer, aind once approved, forwarded to Roosevelt. 
These early requests for defense housing were in locations 
that contained military bases and schools, as well as defense 
industry manufacturing plants. In June 1941, construction had 
been suggested for 4925 housing units in seventeen states and 
the territory of Alaska, averaging 275 units per state or 
territory. This practice continued during the early days of 
war, as both Ferguson and Palmer requested additional housing 
units for military bases and industrial manufacturing plants. 
Interstate agricultural workers needed housing as much as 
defense and war-manufacturing industrial workers who also 
worked far from home. Urban women in the WLA, depended on the 
farmer, farm community, or government to provide their 
housing. While those women employed by individual farmers, 
such as dairy and midwestem crop farmers, lived with the farm 
family, women employed by large-scale intensive-labor 
operations did not. And, while farmers in the East and West 
utilized commiinity and private buildings, as well as temporary 
work camps to house their workers, additional sources of 
housing would be necessary before the end of the war. Thus, 
while not initially available for agricultural laborers, the 
housing provision of the Lanham Act became necessary for the 
continuation of the federal Emergency Farm Labor Program. 
While agricultural laborers did not account for the 
majority of the nation's wartime work, they too participated 
in federal programs. However, not until 19 November 1942 did 
the first mention of agricultural workers appear in government 
correspondence between the president and the administrator of 
the National Housing Agency, John B. Blandford Jr. In a 
letter to the president, Blandford recommended that housing 
units be constructed in Columbus, Ohio, for dairy workers.*® 
Although it is not clear whether these are dairy-farm workers 
or dairy-processing-plant workers, this request does occur 
before the formal organization of the Emergency Farm Labor 
Program. It was not until July of the following year, 
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however, after creation of the national farm labor program, 
that the next mention of housing for agricultural-related 
labor occurred. At that time, the request recommended 
additional housing units for food processing and production 
plant workers in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and Imlay, Michigan."® 
The first mention of housing for agricultural labor 
involved solely with farming occurred on 26 August 1943. In a 
letter to the president, Blandford requested housing vuaits for 
Winchester, Virginia, to be used for those en^loyed as crop 
harvesters.""' Prom that date, the rate of additional housing 
units being constructed for agricultural workers increased. 
In 1943, housing needs were seen for workers employed in jobs 
such as crop harvesting, creamery production, food processing, 
and food and meat packing.*® As a large employer of farm 
workers, the WLA should have received an disproportionate 
amount of housing units, however, without mention of gender on 
the defense housing reports, it is not possible to assert this 
hypothesis without further ajaalysis. 
WLA workers in the Northeast, for the most part, were 
housed in private buildings and homes, commtmity facilities, 
and state catips. Their demand for defense housing had been 
small, and, therefore, the Northeast, as a region, did not 
have an overwhelming need for defense housing and thus did not 
request such. Other areas of the country, however, did not 
have the same conditions regarding housing. In the South and 
West, states requested defense housing for their farm workers, 
in part because of the number of laborers engaged in the state 
and the lack of acceptable housing present at the time. 
Arizona, Oregon, and Virginia, from September to December 
1943, requested defense housing units for farm workers. 
Virginia's request asked for housing units to be erected for 
harvest workers in the community of Timberville, in Rockingham 
County. Located between the Appalachian and Blue Ridge 
Mountains, this small town requested assistance in providing 
housing for seasonal laborers in September 1943. While women 
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had not proven successful for full-time agricultural work in 
Virginia, they did participate as seasonal harvest workers in 
Rockingham County. According to Virginia's 1943 annual report 
for the farm labor program, the WLA proved "satisfactory for 
certain types of seasonal work. Washington vacationists, 
including various departmental secretaries, helped harvest 
tomato, peach, and other crops in Rockingham county. These 
workers were housed in the Timberville farm labor camp."'*® 
Thus it is possible to conclude that at least in Timberville, 
Virginia, women farm workers lived in defense housing in 1943. 
In Oregon, the situation evolved differently. There, the 
use of women as agricultural labor had been in force since 
1942. Work programs established by the state allowed 
recruitment and training sessions to be offered in early 1943. 
In that year, 25,513 women worked as seasonal labor, and 274 
women worked in full-time positions on dairy, livestock, and 
general farms in Oregon. The request for defense housing came 
from Wasco county, where the greatest number of female 
seasonal workers had been hired in June 1943. These housing 
units would have been used for women who worked as seasonal 
labor, on general livestock farms, or in preparation for the 
next crop year.®" 
Not every request for agricultural housing in 1943 can be 
automatically linked to the WLA, nor that the orgsuiization 
would make use of the structures. Such is the case in 
Arizona. There, the situation is different, as the state made 
wide use of Mexican nationals and other male farm laborers to 
harvest cotton. Women who worked in the state's fields did so 
as part of a family unit not as members of the WLA. Without a 
viable WLA organization in the state it is difficult to 
determine the exact benefits for women war workers regarding 
defense housing. Still, Arizona requested housing for its 
cotton harvesters, and as part of family groups women stayed 
in the structures. But, for the most part, defense housing 
requested and built for Arizona in 1943 did not greatly affect 
160 
WLA workers.®^ 
While only three requests for agricultural housing 
transpired in 1943, the government did not discount the 
importance of housing for all war workers. In 1944, housing 
luiits needed for agricultural workers increased, as did the 
variety of work for which the units had been requested. 
Further, the locations of requests also varied. From the 
first report of the year to the end of 1944, agricultural 
work, including food and meat production, processing, packing, 
and canning, creamery, fruit picking, and general agriculture, 
became a standard item on most reports from the National 
Housing Agency to the president concerning defense housing. 
In California, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Texas, and 
Wyoming, housing xinits were requested for those directly 
involved in farm work. These states, as well as several 
additional states, required housing units for all agricultural 
laborers, including those employed in possessing/packing 
plants." 
With several states requesting housing for agricultural 
labor, it is possible to discover the extent by which the 
Emergency Farm Labor Program and defense housing legislation 
affected the nation's employment and housing pools. In Texas, 
the National Housing Agency made requests for housing units in 
locations engaged in "agriculture, farming, and ranching." In 
that state, Mexican nationals and Americans worked the fields. 
The reinstatement of the Bracero Program in 1942 and the use 
of Mexican nationals as farm laborers reduced the number of 
Americans utilized for agricultural work in the state. Even 
so, Texas registered more than seventy-five thousand women who 
worked in fields during 1943, and more than fifty thousand 
each year after. Thus, it is highly likely that defense 
housing constructed for "agriculture, farming, and ranching" 
would have sheltered women as well. However, without an 
organized WLA organization in Texas during World War II it is 
difficult to determine the extent of women's influence within 
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the state." 
Texas was not the only state to request federal housing 
for its agricultural workers in 1944. In Nebraska, the 
communities of Columbus and North Platte also needed housing 
xmits for its farm workers,- and like Texas it is difficult to 
assume that the WLA would have been actively engaged in 
agriculture in that state. As part of the Middle West, 
Nebraska farmers, like others in the region, had difficulty 
accepting the use of women as farm labor, and therefore, in 
most cases, did not readily use the WLA as agricultural 
workers during the war. According to the state's emergency 
farm labor program annual reports, Nebraska farmers preferred 
to use Mexican American, Mexican nationals, and prisoners of 
war as agricultural labor in 1944." Therefore, it is not 
likely that defense housing in use during 1944 would have been 
reserved solely for the WLA. 
In Thermopolis, Wyoming, housing units had been requested 
for those eir^loyed on livestock farms. According to the 
annual report for the Wyoming farm labor program in 1944, few 
women had been employed on such operations because livestock 
ranches generally, employed men. Regardless, the number of 
women etr^loyed on farms in Wyoming had been greater than the 
other emergency faun labor groups combined. In the 1945 
annual report for Wyoming's labor program, at least 6000 women 
assisted in agriculture in some aspect or another. These 
women were engaged in all types of agricultural pursuits, 
including employment on ranches and livestock establishments. 
It is conceivable that some of the WLA participants would have 
benefitted by the use of federal housing.®® 
Minnesota also requested housing in 1944. In the 
community of Marshall in Lyon county, housing units had been 
requested for its dairy and poultry farm workers. During 
1944, 96 emergency farm labor program workers (including men, 
women, and youths) had been placed in Lyon county; in 1945, 
the number of farm workers increased to 555. With the request 
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for housing xinits occurring at the end of October 1944, farm 
workers would have utilized the xinits in late 1944 and 1945. 
In full-time or year-round positions women would have been 
employed on dairy or poultry farms, and would have benefitted 
from these housing structures. However, due to women's lack 
of acceptance as farm labor by Minnesota farmers, few worked 
on dairy or poultry farms during the war. And, therefore, 
female farm laborers would not have used these units. For the 
most part, Minnesota women were acceptable for seasonal work 
such as detasseling com and picking apples. And while camps 
had been established for seasonal workers, such as WLA members 
recruited from urban areas, defense housing had not been 
constructed for those workers involved in short-term 
positions, but rather for those who worked year-roxind.^® 
In 1944, southern states also requested housing xinits for 
their farm workers. In a region that did not generally employ 
white women to work on farms, the case of Mississippi 
represents an exception for female agricultural labor in 1944. 
The state's annual report for the Emergency Farm Labor Program 
did not discuss in detail the location and placement of the 
thousands of women who participated in the WLA, as well as 
those who traveled to North Dakota and South Dakota to assist 
the harvests there. However, housing had been requested for 
agricultural workers in Natchez, Mississippi, and possibly 
served women employed in agriculture at that locale." 
Blandford made his last request for the year in December 
1944. In that month, the request came from California for 
housing to be constructed in Shafter. Although Shafter is not 
mentioned in the California annual report, clearly the state 
of California used work camps and government housing for its 
seasonal and migratory laborers; most of the WLA workers 
etr^iloyed in California worked as seasonal workers, few (less 
than one thousand) worked year-round. More than 169,000 women 
worked as agricultural labor in the state during the period 
from 1943 through 1945; these women utilized defense housing 
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in locales across the state.®® Regardless of the actual 
numbers of WLA workers placed in defense housing throughout 
the country during the war, women in several states, who did 
not join the WLA, still participated in farm labor, and in 
some cases, would have utilized defense housing at some point 
in their service. 
In 1945, the requests for additional housing units to be 
constructed by the National Housing Agency slowed 
considerably. With four requests from January to mid-March, 
only one of these requested housing units for workers engaged 
in agricultural production. In Salem, Oregon, a formal 
request had been made for additional housing xmits for those 
working in a food processing plant.®® Considered women's work, 
food processing plants or canneries hired thousands of women 
throughout the nation, and it is conceivable that this 
operation in Salem employed women who required housing in 
1945 . This last request for war housing for agricultural 
workers, which did not immediately benefit members of the WLA, 
illustrated the peripheral position that the organization held 
as part of the farm labor program. Considered not a 
significant part of the farm labor program by some within the 
federal government, the WLA and its workers found themselves 
distanced from other defense workers during the war. With its 
slow start, and reluctance by senior USDA officials to endorse 
the WLA or the use of women as agricultural laborers, the 
infrequent requests for agricultural defense housing 
demonstrated the lack of commitment by many in the government 
to further provide for the American farmer during the war. 
Although farmers met their production quotas as required by 
the federal government, it did not seem necessary for the 
government to reciprocate and provide every service desired by 
farmers and their workers. Clearly the placement of urban or 
interstate laborers required housing, and in many locales 
available housing did not exist. And, while states, coxinties, 
and individual communities constructed camps and utilized 
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civic buildings, the addition of federal dwellings would have 
supplemented housing shortages. However, throughout the 
operation of federal wartime housing construction, requests 
for farm laborer units remained few and a minority of the 
overall defense requests. Additionally, although housing 
requests had been present in several locales where women 
worked as agricultural labor, it is not possible to 
wholeheartedly propose that housing construction had been for 
the benefit of the women. Without mention of gender, the 
government does not allow a glimpse to the occupants of 
wartime defense construction utilized in the nation during 
World War II. 
However, at least one example, as presented above, did 
demonstrate that WLA laborers utilized federal defense 
structures in some manner. Timberville, Virginia illustrated 
a clear issue of WLA defense housing. As one of the early 
requests regarding defense housing for agricultural workers, 
Timbeirville eir^jhasized the manner by which the Lanham Act had 
been intended--to assist all that needed housing during the 
Second World War. It is also plausible that other locations 
around the country that constructed defense housing also 
housed women farm laborers during World War II. But, these 
instances are few compared to the housing requested for 
industrial war workers. Throughout the war years, almost 
every state and territory, as well as some overseas 
possessions received requests from administrators of the 
Defense Housing Agency, Federal Housing Administration, and 
National Housing Agency to construct additional housing units 
in locations involved in defense and war work. Of these, by 
far, the majority of units constructed benefitted those 
involved in industry, however, those eit^jloyed in agricultural 
positions were not wholly excluded. In states where farming 
and agricultural canning, packing, processing, and production 
were important those workers took part and benefitted from 
defense housing measures just as those employed in defense and 
165 
war manufacturing industries. 
As a service to war workers, federal housing xinits gave 
laborers the advantage of not worrying about locating housing 
if they relocated as a condition of their work. This benefit, 
in addition to standardized wages, safety regulations, 
accident insuraince, and a WLA uniform gave women farm workers 
a basic foundation to their war service. By providing these 
items to each worker, or at least making them available, the 
Extension Service and WLA administrations hoped to provide the 
basis for a successful program. By providing a safe and 
suitable environment for work, the WLA administration had been 
confident of the success of their program. Through this 
environment, administrators protected their workers even as 
these laborers were placed in new situations and locations. 
With the above mentioned services in place, the WLA 
administration could return to issues that had been deemed 
in^jortant for its survival--recruitment and placement. 
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CHAPTER 6. "PITCH IN AND HELP": 
THE WLA CALLS WOMEN TO THE FARMS 
The 1943 crop year became the proving groxind for the 
Women's Land Army in the United States during World War II. 
After concerns regarding wages, insurcince, and federal housing 
had been considered, the WLA began its main reason for being--
to recruit, train, and place women on the nation's farms as 
agricultural labor. However, because of the WLA's late start 
in 1943, due to administrative appointments and appropriations 
hearings, many states did not recruit their labor until late 
spring or summer 1943. Unless individual states had recruited 
their labor in the first months of 1943, programs such as the 
WLA did not place their workers early enough in the year to 
assist with farmers' plantings.'- In the case of the WLA this 
delay doubly affected its organization. In areas of farmer 
prejudice against the presence of nonfarm women on farms, a 
delay in reciniitment and placement resulted in further 
reluctance of some farmers to utilize women as agricultural 
labor in World War II. In most cases, however, the time table 
of federal recruitment did not overtly affect the status of 
the WLA. This can be seen by the number of women who 
participated each year. With initial recruitment set at 
60,000 women, the WLA increased its expectation to 300,000 by 
July, and by December had coionted more than 600,000 women who 
worked on farms during the year. To reach this point, 
however, it would be necessary for the WLA to survive its 
first year of operation with its small federal appropriation, 
a slow recruitment plan, as well as adequately meet the labor 
needs of farmers. The organization had been prepared to do 
just that.^ 
With the official organization of the WLA coirpleted, 
appointment of its administrator and her staff made, 
distribution of appropriations concluded, worker service 
established, and state organizations in place, recruitment for 
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the first WLA crop season proceeded. Almost immediately, the 
Extension Service, along with the WLA administration and 
several state supervisors, realized that the 60,000 women to 
be recruited for the WLA would not accommodate the acute labor 
shortage experienced by the nation in 1943. Clearly, the WLA 
needed to adjust its demands for the country's women, and make 
a conscious effort to recruit any and all available farm, 
rural, town, and urban women for agricultural work. These 
recruitment efforts were directed and resulted from the work 
of WLA administrator, Florence L. Hall. Hall provided support 
for state recruitment programs through conferences, 
informational programs, letters, and national propaganda 
campaigns. 
Florence Hall's experience as a senior home economist 
with the Extension Service prepared her well to recruit labor 
for the WLA, and she possessed the skill and expertise 
required to conduct the large recruitment efforts needed for 
the organization. She had the opportunity to assist farm 
women in their effort to provide for their families during the 
depression and war. In the early 1940s, Hall organized 
lectures and slide films that addressed farm women's 
activities. Hall's presentations depicted women in numerous 
farm jobs, such as preparing and processing food, constructing 
clothing, and performing wartime community activities. By 
describing women's efforts on the nation's farms. Hall 
advocated the position of women as workers to the public and 
federal government. The commitment made by farm women to 
assist the nation during the wartime crisis did much to 
further the cause for the creation of a land army in 1943. 
The main message from Hall and Extension Service demonstration 
agents was the ability of women to assist and adapt to the war 
situation.^ 
Hall was not the only USDA official to describe the 
action needed by farm women to assist the war effort prior to 
the creation of the WLA. To further enhance agricultural 
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production and bring a prosperity to American farmers, 
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Grover B. Hill also 
described "the farm women's part in war." In this speech 
given in October 1942, Hill proposed that farm women continue 
their work on farms, and assist in wartime production. 
Stating Secretairy Wickard's praise for the labor that "rural 
women" provided. Hill echoed the sentiments. In 1942, 
agriculturalists had been asked to produce additional beans, 
com, eggs, and milk to assist the nation and its allies. 
These increases in 1942 included production quotas at least 13 
percent higher for beans, 8 percent for com, and 7 percent 
for milk, as well as 472 million dozen more eggs, and 10 
million more hogs over 1941. American farmers responded by 
meeting these production goals. Even so, farmers did so at 
tremendous cost. By acknowledging that 1942 production quotas 
placed many farmers at disadvantages in terms of absent labor. 
Hill recognized the work that "farm women and girls" provided 
to harvest crops. Women left the houses and entered the 
fields to assist in terms of planting, cultivation, and 
harvest. And by doing so, as stated by Hill, women helped the 
war situation and would continue to do so, as women worked in 
the fields. 
Even so, labor performed by farm women was not the same 
as work done by urban women. While the agricultural community 
readily accepted the presence of their own in the fields, 
several issues would become evident once the WLA began to 
place urban women in fields and on farms. For the most part, 
hesitation and reluctance would develop as many states did not 
easily accept urban women as agricultural labor. However, in 
regions where state and local initiatives had been in place 
prior to 1943, states quickly recruited and placed women with 
farmers in the spring of 1943. 
States, with previous state- or local-run and/or private 
labor programs did not wait for official action from the 
federal government, but made plans to recruit their labor 
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force as early as possible. New York, anxious to continue its 
labor program begun in previous years, recruited workers for 
the crop season in the first months of 1943. With recruitment 
in January, February, and March, New York offered training 
courses for workers in April and May, with immediate placement 
on farms. This schedule allowed the state to adequately 
provide crop labor for its farmers in 1943. The presence of a 
viable labor source placed New York ahead of most states, in 
terms of recruitment and placement. In actions continued from 
previous years. New York farm labor had been recruited from 
New York City for work in the Hudson River valley. Long 
Island, and other northeastern states. New York used state 
media, schools, and personnel departments of private 
businesses to promote the WLA and recruit labor. Specialized 
training for the women took place on Long Island at the 
Farmingdale Institute of Agriculture. The institution's four-
week course offered instruction in most farming practices, to 
prepare urban women for agricultural work. Training sessions 
at Farmingdale included films that demonstrated farm work, as 
well as sessions held by state staff that discussed 
agricultural work for the inexperienced workers. In New York, 
as with most other states, training courses had been conducted 
for those women filling year-round positions; thus, in this 
case, stipulations for completing the course required that 
women make a six-month commitment to agricultural work. By 
1944 and 1945, the Farmingdale training course had been 
shortened to two weeks, and the commitment for farm work to 
three months. Even with these time commitments, the state 
organization still found it possible to adequately fill all 
labor requests.® The state's ability to fulfill its labor 
needs along with its training requirement of workers is an 
exception to most WLA programs during World War II. For the 
most part, states found it necessary to relax the time 
commitment women worked on farms, and in almost all cases, to 
remove the training program from its recjuirements. 
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Professional and full-time working women had only limited time 
to spend in agriculture, and therefore did not desire to 
fulfill their WLA service in a training session. Thus, by 
1945, few women enployed participated in classes. 
New York did not provide the only example of early action 
in 1943. On the West Coast, states had also been effective in 
labor recruitment and placement for several years. In Oregon, 
state and local officials began planning for the 1943 crop 
season in December 1942. Confident with their own state 
programs, Oregon officials did not initially welcome any 
interference from Washington, D.C. and the federal government. 
However, by mid-year, these same state officials had aligned 
their programs with that of the federal government in an 
effort to adequately provide labor for the state's farmers.® 
In California, the use of women and high school students to 
pick the state's citrus crop in the years preceding 1943, 
clearly demonstrated efforts to harvest its crop with all 
available labor. As early as Winter 1941-1942 crop season, 
growers recognized the necessity of thousands of laborers for 
the state's truck-crop fields.' The success of these 
programs, as well as other early state-run labor initiatives 
brought about a smooth transition for the in^jlementation of 
the federal Emergency Farm Labor Program. The continuation of 
these early initiatives demonstrated that it had not been 
necessary for some states to wait for federal fxanding; they 
recruited labor as needed, and for the most part, adapted 
their programs to that of the federal government. 
These states are part of the exception, however, as most 
of America, without the benefit of previous state 
organization, waited for the official creation of and 
appropriations to the Women's Land Army before recruiting a 
female labor force. Distribution of the federal monies 
assured states that they had the means to recruit farm labor. 
Never viewed as a high USDA priority, the WLA received only 
$150,000 of federal money and an initial requirement to 
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recruit 60,000 women for the 1943 crop year. Administrator 
Hall and her staff, xincertain of their success, expected to be 
flexible concerning the actual participation rates of women 
nationwide; "We are off to a good start . . . but these 
figures can be raised or lowered according to demcind." Demand 
would dictate, and by July 1943, Hall requested additional 
labor sources that would add 300,000 women to the roles of 
short-time emergency work. All told, more than 600,000 women 
would answer the government's call to agricultural labor and 
joined the WLA in 1943; 250,000 of these were placed by county 
extension agents. As part of an uncoxinted figure, thousands 
of fairtn women continued to work on their own or a neighbor's 
farm. By mid-summer 1943 thousands of women picked beans in 
Maryland, fruit in Maine, peaches in Ohio, and strawberries in 
Connecticut; pitched hay in South Dakota, detasselled com in 
Illinois, and cultivated onions and picked strawberries in 
Michigan.® 
The goal of the national WLA program had been to enroll 
as many women as possible, extracting a commitment of one 
month of service to the organization. And while the WLA and 
other labor programs had foxind it possible to recruit more 
workers than originally estimated, it had not been as easy to 
collect the commitment of one month service from each farm 
worker. For the most part, urban participants worked only 
during their one- or two-week vacation from their full-time 
jobs, and had not the means or inclination to spend a summer 
"down on the farm." Not all states, however, allowed a loose 
intearpretation of the time requirements; but instead some 
enforced the one-month enrollment period as strict criterion 
for membership within the WLA. In Michigan, the term of one 
month service guaranteed female workers an official place 
within the WLA, allowing them to wear the organization's 
insignia and uniform. Those who worked for shorter periods, 
while identified as members of the WLA, did not wear the 
insignia. For the 1944 and 1945 crop years, the one-month 
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enrollment period would be removed. Administrators had 
recognized that the required period of WLA employment in 1943 
had not been realistic for working women. For them, a period 
of "1 or even 2 weeks of the well-earned vacation," would be 
appropriate in seasonal farm labor positions. With this 
relaxation of regulations, even more store clerks, telephone 
operators, clerks, secretaries, and other women joined the WLA 
ranks in 1944, working alongside housewives, students, and 
teachers.' 
Women joined the WLA through the efforts of recruitment 
materials published and distributed by the WLA administration, 
Extension Service, and USDA. Further, federal and state 
recruitment materials had been distributed to media sources, 
county agents, and local civic boards,- local governments 
maintained a list of farmers who needed labor assistance. For 
exait^le, in Illinois, state and local agencies used the 
following methods during 1943 to guarantee an acceptable 
number of workers: educational promotional materials, 
including articles, pamphlets and reports,- movie and 
filmstrips; and weekly publicity, both in the press and on the 
radio. Each of these methods stressed the iir^jortance of the 
WLA to the general public. Feature stories in the national 
and popular presses, as well as the presence of weekly radio 
programs, assisted in the promotion of the WLA.^° 
Recruitment of WLA workers resulted from activities of 
several organizations throughout the war. The Extension 
Service made the greatest effort to recrxiit workers for farm 
labor. The Extension Service issued several types of 
promotional materials in the effort to accjuire enough labor 
for each crop year. Initially, the agency suggested that 
recruitment should be conducted "in cooperation with 
interested voluntary organizations." This statement by the 
Emergency Farm Labor Program in March 1943 continued. 
Local recruitment campaigns will be conducted to obtain a 
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desired number of enrollees to work in specified farm 
areas. Suitable procedures will be outlined by the 
cooperative Extension Service of each State for reviewing 
applications and accepting those with necessary-
qualifications for year-round or crop season work as the 
case may be. Suggested basic qualifications for women 
accepted for membership in the Women's Land Army will be 
outlined nationally. Each State will be expected to 
modify this pattern to fit State needs and conditions. 
National publicity will help in developing interest and 
otherwise facilitating recruitment by local agencies. 
In this manner the Extension Service would promote its labor 
programs and actively recruit the necessary labor. 
Extension Service recruitment efforts included writings 
by several individuals within the agency. For exati^jle, M. L. 
Wilson, at the request of Harold W. Herman, secretary for the 
national Jtinior Chamber of Commerce, expressed the 
government's position concerning recruitment and farm labor in 
"Mobilizing the Community for Emergency Farm Labor." First, 
the nation's defense position, food sources, and status of 
agriculture were important issues to Wilson's discussion, as 
well as individual participation and community action that 
provided assistance as needed to win the war. By playing on 
the nation's sense of patriotism and civic pride, Wilson 
expressed the position thus: "Everyone knows that America at 
war is not merely the Arrr^ or Navy or some other Government 
agency. . . . It is all of us together. It is every man, 
woman, and child. It is every community in the United States 
of America." His further comments related to the action that 
civic groups such as the Junior Chamber of Commerce, could 
accoir^lish by assisting in the war effort. "What can the 
leadership of the local commimity do to help farmers with 
their labor difficulties - to help the commxinity assure enough 
food next fall and winter? Opportunities are many." The 
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"opportunities" in this instance referred to civic programs, 
like the Victory Gardens, and individual volunteerism, such as 
service within one of the federal farm labor programs." 
Concentrating on the issue of individual volunteerism and 
labor service, Wilson continued to discuss the advantages of 
wartime service. As a result of his and other recruitment 
action, "millions of men, women, boys, and girls" were 
en5)loyed as agricultural laborers to assist farmers during 
World War II. Prospective workers were, according to Wilson, 
acceptable "for straight-out farm work if they are strong and 
able to do hard work; for help in harvesting fruits and 
vegetables; and in canning and processing plants." From the 
basis of Wilson's writings, the Extension Service gathered its 
resources and began an extensive recruitment campaign for the 
several labor programs under its jurisdiction, including the 
WLA." 
Extension Service recruitment piabli cat ions in 1943 needed 
to be effective to place thousands of workers in the nation's 
fields. However, few Extension Service publications reached 
the public in the first year of WLA operation, as the 
organization, instead, relied on the nation press to promote 
the program. In the brochures, however, the message urged 
women to join the WLA. By issuing circulars that described 
the labor and crop needs for the nation, the Extension Service 
illustrated the need of farms for labor from all parts of 
American society. With recruitment and placement of women 
occurring after the official organization of the WLA in April, 
by July the federal government realized the tremendous need 
for farm workers and stepped up efforts to recruit additional 
labor. More than the original 60,000 women requested would be 
required, and to improve recruitment, the Extension Service 
printed additional materials. In all, the message had been 
that any available women should join the WLA and assist in the 
nation's war effort.^* 
By the end of 1943, WLA promotional materials had become 
183 
introspective, as the national WLA adniinistration and 
Extension Service reviewed the crop year and the successes 
achieved by the organization. Regional and state-by-state 
descriptions filled these writings as each reporting agency 
stated the triumphs accomplished. Further by printing 
comments from farmers and workers, the Extension Service 
illustrated the program's success among both farmers and 
workers. In this manner, these late 1943 pxiblications 
assisted in recruitment efforts for the next year. Echoes of 
"She is the best 'hired man' I've ever had," were present in 
several states aroxind the country, as farmers congratulated 
the WLA on a job well done. And for the women, they too 
enjoyed their time spent as agricultural laborers. An 
unidentified WLA worker reported to the national office, "Work 
on a farm has afforded me the most unique, educational, and 
thoroughly worth-while summer I have ever had." Many of the 
worker comments during the first year of operation reiterated 
the above comment, concluding with "Many of us are already 
talking about returning next year." These comments are just 
san^jles of the letters and statements received from farmers 
and workers by late 1943; even so, they exeirplified the 
position of both groups as they prepared for the next year; "I 
do hope if the war does go on next year a lot of such groups 
as ours can be organized, so that others may have the grand 
experience ... I did."'-® 
As each year of the war passed, the WLA's and Extension 
Service's efforts to raise a work force became more intense. 
With the experience of the previous year, WLA administrations 
began planning for 1944 as soon as the 1943 crop season's 
harvest ended. With labor expectations and needs demanding 
more women than 1943, the Extension Service and WLA realized 
the necessity of a more forceful recruitment catrpaign and 
began planning immediately. Special attention was given to 
states in the Midwest and South that had resisted the use of 
women as farm labor in earlier years. Extension agents worked 
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with 4-H and home demonstration clubs to promote the WLA to 
farmers. Recruitment efforts expanded to reach larger and 
more diverse groups of women. A full-scale national media 
blitz was used to increase member participation, while also 
gathering nationwide acceptance of the WLA. To accomplish 
their efforts. Extension agents, state officials, and WLA 
supervisors coordinated activities and recruitment drives to 
better their venture. Extension Service and WLA 
administration planned new materials, pamphlets, and posters 
to use for recruitment. And although the basic message of the 
Extension Service brochure remained the same, the manner by 
which the information had been presented changed. The 1944 
message of these pxiblications became the women's need to 
"pitch in and help" the war effort.^® 
In the 1945 crop year the Extension Service called for 
any available time that women could spare to assist the 
nation's farmers. While the WLA administration still 
requested women for year-roxuid and months-long stints, it also 
asked urban women to work during their vacations and on the 
weekends. One Extension Service pamphlet stated it this way: 
"If you work on the swing shift perhaps you can organize a 
group to put in a few hours each day until the crop is in. 
Such an army of 'spare timers' often means the difference 
between food wasted and food saved." By appealing to all 
American women, the WLA administration hoped they could meet 
all requested agricultural labor needs in the country.^' 
State extension services also publicized the success of 
the WLA. In addition to federal brochures and information, 
states produced their own informative materials. Although not 
present in every state, many issued pxiblications through their 
own extension offices. Colorado, Maine, Maryland, and 
Minnesota, along with a host of other states, combined federal 
extension and WLA recruitment efforts with those of their 
state. In the state publications, general information 
regarding the WLA was repeated from the federal materials. In 
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the Colorado circular readers learned how women were eligible 
for the WLA, how they applied and insured themselves, how and 
where they worked and lived, and how WLA workers acquired the 
organization's uniform. In the Minnesota publication similar 
questions had been addressed. However, in Minnesota the 
greater eTi5)hasis had been placed on the women's ability to do 
the work, rather than guidelines of WLA membership.^® 
For the most part, the Extension Service provided the 
majority of promotional materials used by the state WLA 
agencies. Each year of WLA operation, the Extension Service 
gathered brochures and other materials to form "recruitment 
kits" for state and county organizations." In addition to 
promotional brochures, these kits also included examples of 
radio and media spots, presentations that could be adapted to 
any county, area, or state of the nation. Short spots that 
quickly described the farm labor situation, provided the local 
location for recruitment, and suggested that all women in 
"so\ind health" should consider their part in the war effort. 
Longer radio spots of three minutes included an interview with 
the coxinty agent. Specifically, these scripted radio spots 
passed along information that described the number of laborers 
needed, location of work, and amount of time needed for the 
job. The following exaiiples illustrate the sample spots 
included within recruitment kits. 
The shortage of farm help is much more serious than 
it was last year and their success or failure in 
meeting their record food goals will be largely 
determined by whether or not they get help at the right 
time. So, you see even if you can give just a month 
of your time the job you can do will be truly vital. 
If you're in sound health, think it over. You'll be 
trained right on the job, and paid prevailing farm 
figures. The work isn't easy, but judging by the 
experience of women who enrolled last year and are coming 
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back for more this year, you'll like it fine. 
For further information about the Women's Land Army, 
I suggest you go or write to the county extension office 
. . . There's a place for you in the Women's Land Army 
this year--a place where you can help yourself, and your 
country, too.^" 
In the scripted radio spot that ran for three minutes, the 
radio annotancer interviewed the coxinty agent. In this case, 
more information is released to the public, including a 
description of WLA administration and structure of the 
organization. 
ANNOUNCER: 750,000 of the emergency workers needed on 
farms this year will be women--many of whom enlist in the 
U.S. Crop Corps as members of the Women's Land Army. For 
an important message about the Women's Land Army, let's 
listen to , agricultural agent for Coxinty. 
Mr. . 
COUNTY AGENT: Thank you. Friends last year 
thousands of women from all walks of life--teachers, 
housewives, college girls and office workers--did 
emergency farm work on a part-time or full-time basis. 
Most of those women had never worked on a farm before. 
But, they were eager to leam. And when the story of 
last summer was written--well, they'd really done a job. 
America's farmers must have thought they were pretty 
good--because this year there's a need for 750,000 women. 
Our special farm labor problems in County this 
year include an urgent need for (insert special local 
needs here). The peak season for these crops can be 
expected around (approximate time) . When that peak 
season arrives, the farm people in Co\mty are going 
to face a major crisis. 
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Similar announcements appeared in local and county newspapers, 
in an effort to bring large-scale participation to the 
agricultural war effort. Regardless of the media used, each 
spot or article played on the reader's conscience to support 
farm labor. Patriotism, benefits of good health, and 
"monetary rewards" from their labor became the focus used by 
the federal government in their efforts to raise the desired 
farm labor force for World War II." Radio spots, along with 
educational materials p\ablished by the USDA and articles that 
appeared in national publications, greatly assisted in the 
effort by the WLA and other farm labor programs to recruit 
labor during the war. The success of these efforts can be 
determined through the labor increases seen each year after 
1943 . 
The use of radio had been an effective tool for the 
recruitment of labor in each crop year. In addition to its 
use by state WLA supervisors and county agents to promote 
female agricultural labor, others also participated. In 1944, 
it became common for women agricultural workers to describe 
their current or past experiences in an effort to bring 
greater exposure, and thus numbers, to the WLA. For example, 
the dramatization of diaries assisted in promoting and 
popularizing the WLA. In Montana, the state WLA organization 
utilized several stories/diaries in one press (radio or print) 
release rather than concentrate on one individual. By doing 
so, the WLA presented a picture of an organization that 
accepted all labor and found an assortment of positions for 
the labor. Of these dramatizations Hall wrote of the, "vivid 
presentation of the hard work and satisfactions involved in 
the life of a woman farm worker." Of their presence on radio. 
Hall noted, "that radio is proving most effective in 
recruiting. Every WLA broadcast on the network brings to this 
office a brand new crop of inquiries. 
In New York, radio stations interviewed participants 
regarding their experience and enjoyment of the WLA. A 
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continual theme had been farm and physical safety for the 
worker; an important issue for the urban women who worked as 
farm labor, for the most part, inexperienced and xmfamiliar. 
And, in 1945, in addition to the use of radio for recruitment, 
the WLA had been featured on national television. CBS and NBC 
each showed WLA workers in various job settings, as well as 
described the work coti^leted by the participants and the 
success that they reached with the WLA program.^* These 
televised promotions, along with the thousands of radio spots 
conducted during the war coordinated with Extension 
publications to provide an effective method to recruit the 
land arir^. However, even with radio and WLA brochures, the 
federal program administration realized its need to reach more 
people, thus, the use of additional media sources, such as the 
popular and national presses, assisted the WLA's efforts. 
In addition to agency pamphlets and radio, the use of the 
national media to pxiblicize the program worked well for the 
WLA. The agricultural journal. Country Hiani-T pman. has been 
cited as the preferred publication for recruitment by the 
Extension Service; other journals, however, also performed 
this function. News articles enticed Americans to show their 
patriotic spirit and participate in the war effort as state 
organizations raised labor for the nation's farms.^® 
In these publications the federal government and Florence 
Hall discussed the labor situation within the country, and the 
needs faced for 1943. Part of these recruitment efforts 
described the type of person who should consider employment 
within the WLA. To be employed, women needed to be "eighteen 
years of age and have doctor's certificate as to their 
physical fitness for hard farm work. . . . Some will be placed 
on farms for summer season and do general farm work, living 
with farm family. Others will do special jobs in cultivation 
and harvesting . . . living at home or in cartas." Throughout 
the tenure of the WLA, Hall wrote publicity articles that 
appeared in a variety of national magazines. By describing 
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the organization and its recruitment, training, and placement 
activities for each year. Hall advocated the use of women on 
the nation's farms.^® 
The use of the national press for recruitment purposes 
did not change after 1943, and the WLA continued to use these 
pxiblications through the end of the war. With the example of 
1943, and its timetable for recruitment and placement behind 
them, the WLA began recruitment efforts earlier for the 1944 
crop year. By February, the federal WLA administration had 
initiated a national recruiting campaign. Media exposure in 
several national publications brought success to the WLA's 
efforts. Publications such as House and Garden. Independent 
Woman. Ladies Home Journal, and Victory carried stories 
regarding the WLA and states' efforts in March 1944. Engaging 
stories, along with several action photos, were included in 
each article. The main focus and goal for the media campaign 
had been to inform the public, while encouraging all available 
women to volunteer and join the WLA. These articles continued 
through 1945, as recruitment efforts remained strong during 
the course of the war. Articles portrayed the WLA in a 
positive light, as well as lauded its benefits for wartime 
harvests. For the most part, these writings showed that the 
presence of women in the nation's fields had become a viable 
part of American agriculture in the early 1940s, and a 
tradition that needed to be continued, at least, through the 
end of war.^' 
In most cases, the material contained within these 
articles had been factual and described the situation in a 
given locale, state, or region of the country. However, on 
occasion, authors published promotional pieces that emphasized 
the importance of the WLA and other labor programs. In July 
1944, women's magazines published a guest editorial written by 
novelist Gladys Hasty Carroll regarding the women's 
responsibility and work in the WLA. The following is an 
excerpt from Carroll's editorial, entitled "Strength in the 
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A time comes each year, when, if we are wise, we take 
a vacation. What is a vacation for a woman who is well, 
who is tired from the year's routine, but whose 
conscience is as active as ever? It must be a change, an 
escape for the too-familiar; it should be passed as much 
as possible outdoors. But who can lie in hammocks this 
year, or sleep on beaches, or rock on porches, unless 
they are ill or ve2ry old? We want, need, must have our 
vacations, but we shall not find they have restored us 
imless these weeks are of value to others beside 
ourselves and have produced more than what we can carry 
back with us, within our own bodies, to next year's work. 
The Women's Land Army is our opportunity. The city 
woman who spends her vacation this summer on an American 
farm will find a complete change, a true escape, and a 
mental and spiritual renewal. She will go back, when it 
is over, tanned, rested in the realest sense, and with 
the invigorating knowledge that she has stored up meat 
and eggs and milk and fruit and vegetables for Americans 
at home and overseas, to see us all through the winter 
ahead. And not only this. She will have strengthened 
her own contact with the land she loves, by working in 
its earth and among its plants, and she will have come to 
know and share a way of life which is the foxuidation of 
our country, the record of its growth and history, the 
source of its literature. She will have been very close 
to our past; she will have seen the depth and strength of 
American roots; she will have put down roots of her own 
in a fertile place; she will see the future clearly and 
face it bravely. 
She will be not only a more respected and wiser but a 
better American than when she went away. 
It is so great and so personally rewarding an 
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opportunity for service that surely it will not be missed 
or sacrificed for any sort of vacation with less 
permanent results. 
Other efforts, in addition to media articles, would 
enhance recruitment programs while bringing available women to 
the WLA. In order to double the level of participation over 
the 1943 figure, the WLA did not rely solely on piiblished 
efforts. Word-of-mouth among participants, and attitude 
adjustment by states, local organizations, and farmers also 
assisted in bringing the success of the WLA to the forefront 
of the wartime emergency farm labor program. In Ohio, 
administrators discovered that one of the best sources for 
recruitment was the women themselves. Ohio labor supervisors 
advised the national WLA administration of the success that 
state experienced when participants wrote or spoke to 
colleagues, friends, and relatives and influenced women to 
join the WLA.^^ 
Recruiters in New York used the same methods for its 
recruitment efforts in 1944. Determined to provide better 
housing, varied meals, and more recreation for its women farm 
laborers, New York needed assistance in its effort to recruit 
an additional 10,000 women for a total of 30,000 women for the 
1944 crop season. Recruiting in New York City, women assisted 
the efforts of the state organization. By holding a reunion 
of 1943 workers, WLA workers encouraged new women to join the 
organization as well as invited farmers to attend and hire 
women for the crop season. In this manner, Hudson River 
valley en^loyers, such as actor Will Geer, hired WLA workers 
to harvest their crops. So, during the spring of 1944, women 
enrolled themselves, recruited friends and relatives, 
distributed promotional WLA materials at places of business, 
and addressed social and religious organizations, all in 
efforts to further the WLA's appeal for labor.With its 
plans and efforts to improve working conditions, New York 
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would prove itself successful in its endeavors to recruit more 
women in 1944 than in the year previous. On the national 
level, such efforts provided additional labor to many state 
organizations, as women rushed to further their program and 
ensure its continuation into the next crop year. 
For the 1944 crop season. Hall and the WLA administration 
had announced their intention of recruiting 800,000 women for 
the program. Following this announcement, letters and 
requests arrived from women throughout the country who 
requested recruitment information. As part of the 1944 labor 
force, the women would fill similar seasonal positions as in 
1943, as well as year-round jobs on some farms. College 
faculty and students, as well as working women and homemakers 
contacted the WLA and "expressed a patriotic desire to perform 
war service by helping to harvest food." From Michigan a 
student wrote, "I would like to be one of the 800,000 women 
needed this summer to work on our Nation's farms ... I would 
be able to work from July 15 through October." This college 
student's desire to work longer than one month illustrated 
that some women had been willing to work for more than one or 
two weeks; however, in all likelihood it proved difficult to 
locate an adequate number of women willing to do so. The 
student's further desire to join the WLA as a patriotic 
gesture is also recorded as she likened her activity to 
replacing the life lost by her fiance killed by war.^^ 
The presence of this college student in the Michigan WLA 
program emphasized the hope that college and university 
students from around the nation would rush to join the WLA in 
1944 and 1945. With summer vacation, faculty members, as well 
as students, would be free to participate in labor programs, 
and the WLA hoped to employ all those who had been eligible 
and willing. In some states, teachers had been asked to 
supervise VFV workers rather than perform actual farm work. 
With the arrival of the 1945 crop year, federal and state WLA 
administrators had planned to aggressively recruit students 
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and faculty for the suiraner crop season, but in many cases, 
these individuals approached the farm labor programs first. A 
letter from a California woman expressed her desire in the 
following way, "I am a college girl 21 years old who wants to 
work all summer on a farm. 
The desire expressed in these students' letters, as well 
as their sense of patriotic duty, is an attitude that can be 
found throughout the country in all years of operation. 
Women's participation in a "victory vacation" enabled American 
farmers to harvest their crops each year. The term, "victory 
vacation," had been used nationally to describe the service 
that Americans gave to farmers, however, in Michigan, 
agricultural service took a new connotation in 1944. Prior to 
mid-1944, Michigan officials referred to labor served as a 
"victory vacation". However, by July 1944, Michigan urged 
workers to participate, not in the "victory vacation," but in 
the "fmait furlough." In Michigan this term, "fruit 
furlough," clearly indicated the type of work to be 
completed. 
For the most part, urban women who joined the WLA did so 
solely to participate in the war effort. From University 
City, Missouri a woman wrote, "I have a knack of learning 
things like farming rather quickly. My fiance was shipped 
across, and I'm rather desperate for something to do."^* And, 
even though recruitment materials and state supervisor reports 
and letters continued to use patriotism as the means to raise 
the greatest number of workers for the WLA, it had been just a 
means to an end. Beneath all the publicity, WLA officials 
advocated WLA employment as an enjoyable and worthwhile 
experience, something every yoimg woman should try. In 
Michigan, Ruth Peck told the Consumers League, "Expect sore 
muscles and an aching back the first few days, but a grand 
feeling in the conscience department, following a vacation 
spent doing farm work . . . You will have a stimulating, 
healthful, experience in addition to making a high-ranking 
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contribution to the war effort. " WLA literature and the 
national press furthered the attitude and ideal that women 
joined the labor program for the good of the country.^® 
Speeches given before groups offered WLA supervisors and 
other members of the local, state, and federal groups a way to 
properly present their program, as well as place the 
significance of the WLA within the farm labor program. In 
addition to themes of patrioticism, discussions concerning the 
WLA, before groups, approached the topic of recruitment and 
female participation in agriculture from several angles. In 
the Middle West, WLA supervisors foiind that they needed to 
approach the use of women as farm labor from different view­
points . In that region of the coxintry it had been irrportant 
to recognize the reluctance of farmers to use nonfarm women as 
labor, as well as to describe the benefits of this labor 
source. It became necessary to describe the "valuable 
contribution" that urban and town women would provide to 
agriculture, along with the tolerance needed by farm women in 
accepting this labor. Farm women, along with WLA 
participants, needed to make attitude adjustments as the 
nation adapted its available labor source to the jobs.^® 
In addition to printed and oral recruitment pieces, slide 
presentations had also been seen as effective in the national 
effort to persuade women to join the WLA. The WLA slide 
presentation entitled, "Help Wanted!" had been available to 
state offices from the federal WLA organization. With an 
informal script, this presentation portrayed women in all 
types of farm work, and, in Hall's opinion would enhance 
recruitment, participation, and enthusiasm for the WLA. "Help 
Wanted!" demonstrated a medium that became a successful tool 
by which to present the WLA nationally.^' 
In October 1944, an exhibit of the national WLA was on 
display in New York City. As part of the New York Herald 
Tribune Forum held at New York City's Waldorf Astoria hotel, 
from 16 to 18 October 1944, this exhibit consisted of a large 
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(forty inch by sixty inch) photograph of a WLA worker. Within 
the photograph were other pictures of workers from around the 
nation, each completing a specific task and farm job. The 
exhibit remained in New York until the federal WLA 
administration transported the display around the nation to 
use as a recruitment tool. Seen in the southern and western 
United States, this display assisted in the efforts faced by 
state supervisors to recruit an adequate supply of labor for 
each crop year. Other 1944 photograph collections also 
illustrated the work conflated by WLA workers and assisted in 
future recruitment efforts. These collections were part of 
the "USDA's Extension Information Division"; photographs were 
available for state use, in any promotional effort made to 
recruit labor.'® The use of alternate recruitment materials, 
other than printed literature, became itrportant tools in areas 
where the WLA had not been wholly accepted. 
Still, even with all the recruitment and promotional 
materials available, the WLA needed a strong federal 
administration to remain viable within the federal government. 
To achieve that, as well as remain strong for its 
organization, the WLA administrators needed to understand and 
know the activities of its program. Hall and her staff 
accomplished this by keeping in touch with state supervisors 
through letters and meetings. Thus, in addition to Extension 
publications, national press, and individual experience. Hall 
and the WLA administration utilized its own organizational 
structure to keep in touch and present information to state 
supervisors. To keep state and county administrators involved 
and informed, the WLA published a newsletter which distributed 
its news across the nation. Addressed to WLA supervisors or 
assistant supeirvisors, these "letters" discussed issues that 
had been current and important in the overall successful 
operation of the WLA. 
In 1943, WLA newsletters discussed recruitment, 
placement, and training efforts in use across the nation. 
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While the general concepts of each of these activities 
remained the same, due to regional differences regarding 
agricultural production, farmer attitude, and labor needs 
situations differed from state-to-stateStates reported 
their successes, which allowed other areas to use similar 
methods to address concerns. In this way, state organizations 
passed information aroxind the country as each WLA program 
worked to establish a viable and significant wartime measure. 
Successful recruitment efforts resulted in xinprecedented 
numbers of women entering agricultural work. And, very 
quickly the question became, what to do with the thousands of 
women who volunteered for the WLA. For the most part, 
recruitment and placement procedures were the responsibility 
of each state organization; thereby assuring state action to 
be dependent on the labor program structure present. 
The WLA recruitment process included, among propaganda 
materials, an effort by state, county, and local WLA and 
Extension officials to register all available and able women 
for service. By registering through local WLA or home 
demonstration agents, farm and nonfarm women became part of a 
community of women anxious to perform their wartime duties. 
Working alone or as part of a crew, those who joined the WLA 
in 1943 had been prepared to spend one month "down on the 
farm. " Women who gave more than one month seirvice to the 
organization had been placed in different positions. With the 
flexibility of a few women who worked for the entire crop 
season or year, state WLA officials were able to fill labor 
requests from farmers who needed more than short-gap emergency 
service workers. Thus, placement followed closely behind 
recruitment efforts as labor program staff worked closely with 
local officials to place women as adequately as possible.*" 
In terms of worker placement, most WLA laborers toiled in 
seasonal positions. As seasonal or harvest labor, women lived 
at home, in work camps, or with farm families. Transportation 
to and from the field or farm had been dependent on the 
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housing situation. WLA workers used the transportation 
seirvice available to them, which included car-pools, school 
buses, or farm trucks. In communities where many workers 
participated farmers instituted car pools or utilized out-of-
session school buses to bring their laborers from urban to 
rural areas. Other farmers transported their WLA workers back 
and forth with trucks. Still, in some cases, WLA workers used 
p;iblic transportation to and from their site of work. By 
doing so, this expense would have become a necessary drain on 
already low wages. In terms of expense, WLA volunteers who 
lived with the farm family or stayed in their own homes and 
did not require transportation to and from the farm would have 
been preferred over non-local women. The necessary expense of 
transportation, paid either by the worker or farmer put 
additional strain on money received for hours worked or from 
profit 
These experiences regarding recruitment and placement 
became part of the first year of WLA operation, and for the 
most part were related through the agency's newsletters. 
These actions along with stories of the women's 
accon^lishments filled the 1943 newsletters. But, without 
previous experiences to draw from, the 1943 WLA newsletters 
relayed only common information to states, while in latter 
years, the newsletters drew on previous incidents to determine 
a new or different course of action. Specific examples 
reported by women workers and farmers were recounted and 
discussed. To that end, several issues were addressed before 
the start of the 1944 crop year, mostly concerns and problems 
that had been encoxintered during the previous season, and 
needed to be alleviated for 1944. To accomplish this, state 
WLA supervisors met throughout November and December 1943 to 
discuss the successes and failures of the first WLA crop year. 
Four regional conferences were attended by forty-one women 
from thirty-seven states. Topics iinder review included length 
of service, physical examinations, and age limits for each 
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worker. Additionally, these women described the situations 
that developed in each state, and the reaction to the 
For the most part, problems involved the recruitment of 
labor and farmer attitude. In terms of recruitment, in 1943, 
WLA state and county supervisors had found it difficult to 
recruit an acceptable number of women to work on a year-roxind 
basis. Because of this, dairy and poultry operations had not 
received their required and necessary labor. In addition to 
the organization's inability to adequately recruit an 
acceptable number of year-round workers, the WLA also made 
concessions regarding their inability to guarantee that a 
worker would commit to one-month of service. Thus, in 1944 
the national WLA administration decided that any woman, farm 
or nonfarm, who made a contribution to agriculture during the 
course of the war, for any length of time, would be considered 
a member of the WLA. To distribute this message across the 
country, Hall placed the announcement of shortened labor 
service in the agency newsletter, thus effectively 
broadcasting the information to all state and county WLA 
administrators. In some cases, such as Michigan, where women 
needed to work one month to be considered a member of the WLA, 
this new policy regarding length of service affected how 
states recorded their yearly participation." 
Other changes within the organization included the 
abandonment of a physical exam for every seasonal worker. In 
1943, a physical exam had been required of every worker. 
Because of the nature of farm work, good health was desirable 
of every WLA laborer. Thus, to assure their condition women 
provided farmers with a "doctor's certificate of physical 
fitness and freedom from communicable disease." However, due 
to the nature of seasonal, short-time, emergency work, many 
women had neither the time nor the need to receive an exam for 
the few days or weeks they would work in 1944 or 1945. Those 
employed in year-round positions, however, continued to 
receive physical examinations upon hire. Another issue 
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regarded the age of WLA workers. The minimum age established 
for a member of the WLA had been eighteen years. However, in 
some cases, women aged seventeen were accepted as WLA workers, 
decided on a case-by-case basis. The same principle applied 
to women aged eighteen years who wished to join the VFV rather 
than the WLA. These issues reflected changes made in WLA 
recruitment procedures for 1944. In terms of farmer attitude, 
several reasons can be attributed to their biases. For the 
most part, some farmers had difficulty visualizing the use of 
women as full-time farm laborers."" These farmers' reactions 
to the use of women as labor stemmed from their distrust of 
and presumed unreliability of urban women. 
In most issues of the WLA newsletter. Hall addressed 
recruitment efforts. Descriptions of successful state 
practices demonstrated the WLA's action to acquire the 
necessary and needed labor. Recruitment, however, did not 
occupy the organization's complete attention, and by early 
1944, the newsletters illustrated other issues as well. Hall 
and her staff along with the USDA and federal government 
addressed the need and expectation of farmers to meet 
production quotas. Additionally, the WLA questioned its 
ability to raise an adecjuate number of workers for farmer 
demand during each crop year. Connected to the WLA's efforts 
to recruit an acceptable labor force, governmental officials 
worried, that farmers would restrict their production to meet 
an assumed inadequate labor supply. Thus, the government 
feared that 1944 crop yields would "fall short" of government 
goals, regardless of the number of workers recruited for farm 
labor. It became the aim of the WLA, and other wartime farm-
labor programs, to assure and prepare farmers that an 
acceptable and adequate labor force would exist, so that the 
country's agriculturalists did not limit production, but 
worked to exceed production expectations."® 
The production of fruit in the nation exemplified 
American farmers' ability to exceed production quotas during 
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the war, and the ability of the WLA to provide the necessary-
labor for harvests. The national experience and placement of 
women on fruit farms and in orchards had proven to be 
advantageous for 1943 and would be for the following years. 
Hall wrote, "Our WLA experience has proved that women do 
especially good work in picking, packing, and grading fruit, 
so their work will count in this large fruit harvest. " In 
1944, several states recorded record fruit harvests. In terms 
of overall production, the crops of several fruits, including 
apples, cherries, peaches, had been expected to have been 20 
percent larger than the previous year's crop, thus more labor 
would be necessary in 1944. This assumption would be repeated 
in 1945, as fruit-producing states demanded more labor than 
previous years. Subsequently, state WLA organizers and 
recruiters actively campaigned to encourage urban and town 
women to join the WLA's fruit furlough and participate in the 
nation's war effort."® 
By the 1945 crop year federal and state WLA 
administrations had discovered several programs within the 
organizational structure that worked effectively. For the 
most part, many of the policies put into action had been 
effective. Plans for recruitment, placement, and work 
cotipleted had been discussed and those that had been the most 
successful were continued in 1945. Programs such as car 
pools, friend-to-friend recruiting, and lunch wagons returned 
in 1945. Additional plans, such as the presence of women's 
organizations as work crews and recruitment of women to cook 
for these crews, brought further success to the program. 
States reported their successes to the federal WLA 
administration, who in turn, addressed these issues in their 
monthly newsletters. By this exposure, states would benefit 
from the success reached in a few states."' 
Throughout each crop year, the WLA newsletters presented 
information that described the labor that women as members of 
the WLA had completed. Tractor-training courses and other 
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training courses offered by land-grant colleges and extension 
agents, cultivation and harvest of truck-farm crops, and types 
of seasonal positions were described in each newsletter. The 
women who participated in the WLA clearly out-performed any 
expectation assumed by farmers at the time. The success of 
the WIiA during its operation is evident from the information 
and plans found in each monthly issue of the WLA newsletter. 
Still, even as each crop year progressed. Hall and the federal 
administration continued their efforts to recruit women for 
participation by reminding the state supervisors of the 
necessity of female workers, as well as continually sending 
recruitment materials to state offices."® 
Throughout the WLA newsletters other issues regarding 
women farm workers had also been discussed. Not only had the 
federal government been interested in worker recruitment and 
experience, but the WLA had followed other concerns as well. 
The success of the WLA can be seen with the 1945 crop year. 
On the whole, the need for farm laborers had been greater in 
1945 than earlier years. Florence Hall reported that the 
number of women engaged in farm work had increased more than 
70 percent since 1940. Included within this figure had been 
the millions of farm, rural, and urban women who left their 
homes and positions to join the ranks within the country's 
fields. In addition, for each month that the women of the WLA 
worked on farms, their numbers in comparison to the previous 
year, were significantly higher. In some locations in the 
early months of 1945, the number of women participating in 
farm labor increased more than 80 percent for the same period 
in the previous year; the national average, however, had been 
recorded at about 40 percent. Each year of operation for the 
WLA led to higher and higher numbers of women participating in 
the government program. As members of a worthwhile 
organization, WLA workers recognized their value to the war 
effort. In the words of one recruit, "No matter how heavy the 
hay we pitched, how our backs ached from weeding, or how 
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Stubborn the team we were driving, we always had the secret 
joy that we were helping the war effort."*' 
None of these program successes would have been possible 
without the administrative structure established by the 
federal government. The appointment of Florence L. Hall as 
administrator, as well as the establishment of state 
organizations assisted in coiintry-wide efforts to recruit 
female labor for farm work. The national WLA administration 
created recruiting guidelines from which to operate, however, 
for the most part, state and local WLA and Extension officials 
worked independently to place as many women as possible on 
farms. Although the federal WLA administration provided 
promotional materials and was quoted extensively in 
newspapers, it was the work of the state and local officials 
who filled labor requests and recruited women. By organizing 
recruitment drives and training programs, local WLA and 
extension agents successfully met their area's labor needs. 
Recognition by the general public of the WLA had been 
important for the success of the organization, thus, 
promotional literature, piiblic forums, speeches, media 
exposure, and testimony of the women themselves all assisted 
in the national effort to raise a labor force in the period 
from 1943 to 1945. The work accomplished by the labor 
officials, as well as the women themselves, led to the 
establishment of the premier labor organization during World 
War II--the Women's Land Army. 
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CHAPTER 7. REGULAR FARM GIRLS: WOMEN IN SERVICE 
ON THE COASTS 
The official organization of the WLA established the 
required guidelines and structures needed to administer a 
successful work program. With appropriation hearings, 
creation of state WLA administrations, and recruitment 
procedures initiated, each state began its effort to assist 
its farmers and provide the necessary labor in the period from 
1943 to 1945. However, even with these structures, it had not 
been possible for anyone, WLA administration included, to 
predict the success of the labor program or the reaction of 
states and their residents to such a program. Thus, for the 
WLA to be successful after its creation, the federal 
government and the WLA needed to place great faith in the 
ability of the states to establish an effective program. And, 
for the most part, states created successful programs. In 
locales that boasted state-run labor initiatives prior to the 
WLA, the triunph of the WLA had been assured, while the rest 
of the nation needed time to adjust to the presence of women 
in its fields and on its farms. The WLA state programs that 
grew from earlier state initiatives had several advantages 
over programs that had been created at the time of the 
Emergency Farm Labor Program legislation. For the most part, 
advantages included a precedent for using women in fields, a 
working model for a successful labor program in place, and 
acceptance by farmers of the women's presence in their fields 
and on their farms. 
All in all, the states that had early state- or private-
run agricultural worker initiatives had fared well in the 
national effort to recruit labor during World War II. Eastern 
and western states such as California, New York, Oregon, and 
Vermont established models for other states, and demonstrated 
a smooth transition from private or state organization to 
federal control. Women farm workers continued in the jobs 
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that they had done for the previous years, the federal 
organization of labor did little to change job 
responsibilities. For the most part, as members of the WLA, 
with the exception of those employed year-ro\ind on dairy or 
poultry operations, women worked in seasonal farm labor 
positions. And differences in the farm experiences of the WLA. 
participants were dependent on location. 
Regardless of the jobs given to women and the region in 
which they lived and worked, female agricultural workers who 
joined the WLA spent their wartime service as members of a 
special organization. As part of wartime defense efforts, the 
WLA created a labor program that became one of the largest 
women's groups of the war. With more than three million women 
enrolled, the WLA stretched across the nation and assisted in 
producing the products necessary for victory. 
In the northeastern United States the early initiatives 
in New England and New York had set the precedent for other 
state-labor programs, as well as serving as the model for the 
WLA and federal labor programs in 1943. In the tri-state area 
of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, farmers readily 
employed women from New York City, and other urban locales for 
truck-crop field work. The New York Times published numerous 
stories to aid the placement of women for farms on Long Island 
and in upstate New York and New Jersey. In particular, 
farmers sought experienced non-Caucasian women as laborers. 
Not representing the entire New York labor force, other WLA 
members included thousands of college women, homemakers, and 
working women. In New York state, these women worked on dairy 
and poultry farms, planted and cultivated flowers, cultivated 
vegetable fields, and picked fruits and vegetables. For the 
most part, a large portion of those employed on New York's 
farms were farm women, however, 58 percent of the urban women 
who participated in the WLA in 1945 had been students, the 
remaining portion, professional and working women. In New 
Jersey, urban women employed as seasonal labor, worked on 
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fruit and vegetable farms, especially during the hairvest 
period that lasted from mid-July to early-September 
In New England, several states continued programs that 
had been in existence earlier. Vermont, Maine, and 
Connecticut had established state- and/or private-run 
organizations as early as 1941; the emergence of the federal 
labor progxam did little to change these organizations, except 
to alter the source of funding and agency control. The 
presence of women in fields before 1943 laid the ground work 
for the success of the WLA in these states. Although the 
fulfillment of each state's labor demands were met, the 
placement of enough WLA workers in year-round positions, at 
times, proved difficult. This difficulty did not hamper the 
overall recruitment of women as the number of those who worked 
on farms in year-roiind positions had been relatively small.^ 
Northeastern dairy and poultry farmers, who had year-
roimd labor positions, readily requested female farm workers 
for the jobs. In the words of one dairy farmer, women had the 
ability "to operate all the dairy machinery and their 
conscientiousness in following instructions exactly" freed the 
farmer from much responsibility and work. Confident of the 
women's ability. New England dairy farmers left much of the 
day-to-day business to the WLA workers. New England farmers 
discovered that women workers were gentler with the cows than 
male eit5)loyees, resulting in more milk and greater production. 
Poultry farms also required year-round labor. On these 
operations WLA workers completed all jobs, including, 
collection and grading of eggs, packing the eggs for sale, and 
dressing birds for market. In both cases, dairy and poultry 
operations did not have a hairvest season, but required labor 
for every day of the year.^ 
Even with women being requested for year-round work, by 
far, the greatest call for labor in New England had been for 
seasonal work. Cultivation and harvest of seasonal crops 
filled the majority of requests for this region, as 
I 
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recruitment began in the spring of 1943. In Connecticut, 
women worked on tobacco farms, harvesting and processing 
tobacco leaves for cigarette and cigar production." In Maine, 
agricultural workers dug potatoes and picked fruits and 
vegetables during World War II. The successful potato and 
other crop haorvests in Maine demonstrated a firmly entrenched 
WLA program within the state. Under the supervision of 
Katherine L. Potter, the WEFS (Women's Emergency Farm Service) 
of Maine, as part of the WLA, worked on all types of farms. 
Committed for two-weeks or one-year of service, women worked 
on "dairy, poultry, truck gardening, fruit production, [and] 
general" farms. Each prospective farm laborer had to provide 
references for employment and certification of good health. 
At which point, hired workers were "placed on individual farms 
or in can^s" and expected to provide farmers with a "maximum 
of efficiency." WEFS participants had left their full-time 
positions as artists, homemakers, professional/business women, 
students, and teachers to participate in the war effort. The 
successful placement of women in Maine the first year of WLA 
operation assured the state's farmers that the WEFS/WLA would 
be available for the next crop year as well.® 
Maine discovered, as had other states, that a successful 
recruitment effort did not necessarily provide all needed 
labor for the state's farms. The farm labor program in Maine 
recruited urban and rural women from the state, as well as 
out-of-state workers to assist with crop hairvests. Maine also 
imported labor from other nations for its harvest season. In 
1944, women arrived from California, Florida, and Kentucky to 
participate in the work program for the year. These women 
assisted in the potato and apple harvests, two crops that had 
been produced in abundance during 1944. In terms of the apple 
harvest, it had been difficult to recruit enough local labor; 
thus, a work camp had been established in Kennebec County. 
Because of the state's and county's inability to raise enough 
local labor, they looked farther afield, in this case out of 
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the state. These women arrived at their jobs via Portland, 
where they waited for their agricultural postings, and then in 
most cases were sent to individual farms or labor camps. In 
some outlying locales it had become necessary to establish 
labor caii^s that housed interstate and international workers.® 
While, the necessary labor had been present in Maine 
during the first year of WLA operation, subsequent crop years 
worried WLA planners. State organizations had been concerned 
regarding their ability to maintain high levels of recruitment 
each year. This concern transferred to farmers as they 
prepared for subsequent crop years. Fearful of an absence of 
suitable laborers in the later years of war, some farmers 
maximized their efforts and decreased their annual production 
to avoid the use of nonfarm women as agricultural laborers. 
To guard against this action by the nation's farmers. Hall and 
others within the WLA and USDA administrations worked to 
project an image of competence while requesting that farmers 
continue to utilize women as workers. To convey her message 
Hall used the 25 March 1944 issue of the WLA newsletter to 
address this issue. By informing state and local WLA and 
Extension officials. Hall and the orgcinization assured farmers 
that recruitment efforts would meet all national demands for 
labor. Thus, state WLA organizations continued their high 
levels of recruitment, and continuously operated their labor 
programs. Unfortunately in Maine, renewed and vigorous 
efforts toward 1944 recruitment only brought a labor surplus 
to the state. The year's harvests had not been as large as 
expected, due to bad weather and late killing frosts. As a 
result, surplus labor performed agricultural jobs other than 
harvesting apples and potatoes. Workers assisted farmers with 
haying and other seasonal farm jobs, while the women also 
enlisted as full-time employment on dairy and poultry farms, 
in food and dairy processing plants, as vegetable and fruit 
salespeople and delivery personnel, and as work-camp cooks.' 
In 1945, Maine continued a successful program that had 
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been present in earlier years. Efforts taken by some Maine 
farmers in 1944 to reduce production and avoid the assistance 
of female farm labor did not adversely affect the labor 
program in the state. Women continued to join the haorvest 
efforts to effectively bring in all the state's produce and 
crops.® Other New England states experienced similar success 
with their WLA programs as well. In general, women worked as 
harvest labor for specialized-agriculture operations, truck-
crop farms, and fruit orchards, while some worked full-time on 
dairy and poultry farms. Still, a few women had been etr^jloyed 
as herd testers for state dairy associations. Regardless of 
the circumstance, the employment of women as farm workers 
increased over time, as farmers replaced their initial 
resistance and reluctance with tolerance and acceptance of the 
WLA as agricultural laborers. 
In Vermont, the use of the WLA had been met with success 
due to the presence of the Volunteer Land Corps under the 
direction of Dorothy Thompson prior to 1943 . Women worked 
full-time on dairy and poultry farms, as well as picked apples 
and other seasonal crops throughout the state. The state 
reported that many of their summer workers returned to Vermont 
for sxibsequent summers to continue their farm work; one worker 
wrote "I haven't any complaints cind only wish we could all 
come back next year." Still, other laborers changed their 
course of study to include agriculture, including several out-
of-state workers. "One Brooklyn College student has returned 
for the second season and plans to do post-graduate study in 
agriculture at Cornell." Additionally, Vermont WLA members 
returned home after their farm experience and successfully 
recruited workers for the next crop year: "One Women's Land 
Army member worked for one year on a Vermont farm. She went 
back home to Stamford, Connecticut and recruited four girls 
and four boys for Vermont farms." Farmers, as well, were 
impressed with the work accomplished by the women who joined 
the WLA in Vermont. In several instances, unidentified 
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Vermont farmers continually requested women for work each 
summer, stating their ability to successfully handle the jobs 
given to them.® The Vermont WLA, like its northern New 
England neighbors, continued a long tradition of organized 
agricultural programs within the state, and at the behest of 
the state farmers established a successful labor policy for 
World War II. 
In Massachusetts, WLA workers were employed on vegetable, 
tobacco, and fruit operations as seasonal labor, as well as 
some full-time positions on dairy farms. Since, the main 
fruit industry for the state was cranberries, women joined 
other sources of labor in many of the bogs on Cape Cod. 
Another seasonal crop that employed large numbers of women was 
tobacco. Like Connecticut, Massachusetts used emergency farm 
labor for its tobacco operations. But, while Connecticut 
hired high school students for its tobacco production, 
Massachusetts preferred the work of women and college 
students. The Consolidated Cigar Company utilized high school 
students in 1943, and although their labor was acceptable, the 
coir^jany announced that it would "hire college girls next year, 
instead of girls of the high school age." The U.S. Women's 
Bureau reported that a group of Smith College workers worked 
well on farms. The administrator recognized the ability of 
older women to "outwork" the younger girls; "It is not 
probable . . . that a group of urban girls 14 to 16 could 
possibly have done the work that this whole group did. What 
has been seen of yoxinger groups working indicates that, except 
for special individuals, the younger girls are not physically 
up to nearly the same amoxint of work as the girls 18 to 21 or 
over, nor should they work such long hours. 
If Massachusetts farmers had any reservations concerning 
the use of women as farm labor at the beginning of the 1943 
season, that attitude had been changed by the end of the 
harvest. A Massachusetts dairy farmer reported that "his 
girls were the best of the lot," a statement that was repeated 
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throughout Massachusetts after the first WLA crop season. 
"Most fairmers agreed that women and especially college girls 
had done a far better job than was anticipated, and many girls 
have been asked to come back next year." The state, in an 
"experiment," chose to actively recruit college women to work 
on farms during 1943 . As a result of the state government to 
request farmers to dramatically increase food production for 
1943, the Extension Service reacted by enrolling all available 
labor within its programs. Thus, college women, and others of 
the WLA became clear choices for the state's farmers. And 
while not all farmers would have openly accepted the college 
women as labor in 1943, in 1944, that source of labor had been 
firmly entrenched in the state's fields. In many cases, 
college students had been viewed as more mature and better 
able to handle the work as given. The acceptance by state 
farmers as well as the enthusiasm of the women farm workers 
brought large number of recruits and 1943 repeats to farms in 
1944. In 1944, the types of labor that the women were 
employed in duplicated that of 1943, however, in 1945, the 
number of women employed as farm labor in the state declined, 
due to several factors. An unwillingness by some farmers 
together with the availability of better-paid industrial 
positions led many women away from agriculture in the last 
year of the war." 
Others in New England also welcomed the use of the WLA as 
farm labor. In New Han^jshire, WLA workers were employed on 
poultry farms and had "been found to be generally more 
satisfactory than men for handling chicks, grading, and 
packing eggs, and keeping records." In general, farmers 
reported the WLA workers possessed the ability to keep poultry 
facilities clean and neat, a skill that had not been present 
with male hired hands. Also, the "fact that women are apt to 
be more exacting and thorough has caused some complications on 
fainns where both men and women are eir^jloyed." However, other 
work on poultry farms, such as cleaning and moving pens, and 
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work on dairy farms had been "considered too heavy work for 
the average woman." This attitude changed quickly, as WLA, 
members demonstrated their ability to accomplish most farm 
jobs. Additional work completed by women in the first year of 
operation in New Hampshire included the feed and care of 
livestock; planting, cultivating, and harvesting of truck 
crops; milk and care of dairy cows; delivery of milk; and milk 
testing for the Dairy Herd Improvement Association (D.H.I.A.). 
New Hatt^shire farmers had initially expressed reservations 
concerning the employment of women on farms, but by the end of 
1943, they clearly recognized the necessity and in^ortance of 
this source of labor. "Women are more conscientious, do a 
more thorough piece of work, and are more dependable. . . . 
[each] farmer has greater assurance of women sticking to their 
tasks until completed." This in^roved attitude by farmers led 
to greater participation, both by New Hampshire farmers and 
WLA members, for the following crop years." 
The trend toward the use of women as seasonal and full-
time labor on New England's farms would be repeated across the 
nation with the organization of the WLA. States in the mid-
Atlantic region such as Delaware and Pennsylvania, utilized 
urban and rural women as well as college students to work on 
the states' agricultural operations." In Pennsylvania women 
worked to harvest grains. A Mount Holyoke student wrote of 
her experience on a Pennsylvania farm in August 1943. 
If you have never threshed you don't know what hard 
physical labor is! Down by the bam they had a great 
machine that looked like a hideous, eternally greedy 
insect, run with a long belt attached to a tractor. . . . 
A wagon piled with bundles of barley is drawn up beside 
the platform. Two people toss the bundles with 
pitchforks to the man who pitches them into the monster's 
gaping jaws. ... I helped load 100-pound sacks of 
barley into wagons. . . . [Later], instead of pitching, I 
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Stood on the wagon and placed the bundles as they were 
pitched up. I like that job much better. There are 
drawbacks--you have to look out for the pitchforks and it 
is the filthiest job I ever encountered. . . . But that 
job doesn't give you blisters, it isn't so muscle-
wearing. And it is a job of skill. You have to keep 
moving, and put the biindles in the right places so that 
they won't fall off when the load gets eight feet high. 
There is an art to it. On the first wagon I worked with 
Bemie. . . . Topping a load is tricky and Bemie told me 
I was smart and learning how to do it fast--regular farm 
girl I was. 
The development and placement of the WLA in the northern 
states had been affected by the attitudes expressed by the 
region's farmers concerning the use of urban women on farms, 
as well as the precedents established by earlier state- or 
private run labor initiatives. For the most part, these women 
had been accepted as farm workers by northeastern farmers, a 
situation that would be repeated across the country on the 
West Coast. There, farmers readily accepted the labor that 
women provided to their agricultural operations. As early as 
1941, western states had women for harvest labor, which 
allowed women to contribute to the war effort. Organized 
programs in California and Oregon established precedents for 
the region that demonstrated, much like the early initiatives 
in the East, the ability and suitability of women as farm 
laborers. 
Agriculture in the American West developed differently 
than that in the Northeast. With the presence of large 
corporate farms in the Far West and livestock operations on 
the western fringes of the Great Plains, western states' 
demands for labor in World War II had been different than 
other regions of the nation. In the region of western Plains 
and northern Rocky Mountain states, these operations needed 
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labor for livestock and sugar beet establishments. This fact 
did not automatically mean that states needed female labor and 
in many cases would not use the assistance of the WLA. 
However, the presence of women in agriculture in these states 
had still been a viable source toward the total labor needs of 
each state during wartime. 
In Montana, livestock ranches and large wheat and sugar 
beet operations required labor during World War II. Farm 
women and others were recruited to work on these operations. 
The WLA did not recruit urban women for its first year of 
operation in Montana. And while some positions were available 
for women to pursue, the majority of recruited farm labor in 
1943 had been males. Mexican nationals, prisoners of war, 
military troops, and migrant workers made up most of the labor 
on Montana farms and rainches in the first year of the 
Emergency Farm Labor Program. Still, WLA supervisor, Margaret 
H. Tuller observed that "Montana farms do have many jobs that 
can be done ecjually as well by women as by men." Thus, farm 
and rural town women assumed jobs "they had never done 
before." Although, urban women had not been utilized as farm 
labor, the "groundwork" had been laid that would allow them 
access to farming in 1944.^® 
While several thousand women were eirployed on Montana 
farms during 1943, only thirteen women registered as full-time 
members of the WLA. This figure of thirteen women does not 
represent the coir^lete picture of the situation in the state. 
All told, according to the 1943 WLA annual report for the 
state, almost six thousand women had been employed on farms. 
Recruited as a result of actions by the WLA or Extension 
Service these women assisted with "food production other than 
the home garden or home poultry flock." Specifically, fifty-
nine women worked as farm labor on thriving livestock and 
sugar beet operations. These women accomplished all farm 
jobs, such as, drove motorized equipment; branded, cared for, 
and herded livestock; milked cows; delivered milk to houses 
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and creameries; blocked, thinned, and topped beets,- cultivated 
and harvested fruits and vegetables; hayed; and fixed fences. 
In Richland County, Montana, women such as Mrs. Clarence 
Sather worked as a "regular hired hand wherever her help was 
needed. She shocked grain for Evan Ler, stacked hay for Alva 
Sharbono on shares, and ran tractor seeding [her] own grain." 
In Stillwater County, women also performed a variety of 
agricultural jobs. Mrs. George Wimsett "started her farm 
labor job with lambing and in helping with new calves and 
pigs. She helped plant, cultivate and harvest the potato 
crop, shocked grain and helped thresh alfalfa seed. At times 
this fall she has herded sheep." Another women in the county, 
Mrs. Robert Wegner, who also worked as farm labor commented, 
"We all helped with the farm work and as a result we'll be 
able to buy more War Bonds to help end this war." According 
to several state annual reports, the idea that farm service 
constituted women's patriotic effort to the war had never been 
far from anyone's mind.^® 
The one issue that had not been addressed fully in the 
1943 WLA report involved the reluctance of county extension 
agents to advocate the use of women as farm labor. According 
to county agent reports for 1943, "agents were not convinced 
that women should be recruited for farm labor, even in areas 
where there was a labor shortage" and "women, both urban and 
rural, were eligible for membership in the Women's Land Army 
but were not asked by the agents to enroll in the WLA. " Even 
though this had been the prevailing attitude among Montana 
agents, the program reached a certain level of success for 
1943. "Almost every agent observed during the production 
season the fine contributions made by women workers and 
reported favorably on work the women did. " How then had the 
extension agents justified their reluctance to keep women from 
the WLA? Clearly, that activity had not continued, as 
membership in the program increased dramatically in the 
remaining war years . 
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By 1944, Tuller's cotnments in the annual farm labor 
report indicated that it had been necessary during the interim 
between the 1943 and 1944 crop seasons to convince Montana 
extension agents of the benefits of using the WLA as farm 
labor. The report did not indicate any reluctance on the side 
of the state's farmers, but rather, the agents themselves 
needed to be educated concerning the use of women for 
farm/ranch work. The acceptance of women as farm labor 
brought 550 nonfarm women to the state's farms as workers in 
1944. And, while the 1943 report did not indicate whether the 
thirteen women enrolled in the WLA had been farm or nonfarm 
women, an increase of enrollees to 550 indicates a significant 
jump. Women's labor in 1944 continued in much the same vein 
as 1943, with women participating on all aspects of Montana 
agriculture. In Richland County, Mrs. Bob Seeve did "a man's 
work on their farm all the past year. She does all types of 
farm work including driving the tractor, hauling grain, 
cutting hay and general farm chores." In Flathead County, 
nonfarm women had been recruited to hairvest cherries. Still, 
however, Montana continued to recruit other sources of labor, 
therefore the number of men and youths on Montana agricultural 
operations outnumbered the few thousand farm women who 
participated as members of the WLA.^® 
One reason that men and youths outnumbered the women who 
worked on farms was related to the presence of several large 
corporate farming operations in the state. Thus, in addition 
to the reluctance of extension agents to foster the use of 
women as agricultural labor, large-scale agricultural 
con^anies, including American Crystal Sugar Company, Great 
Northern Railway, Great Western Sugar Company, Holly Sugar 
Corporation, and Northern Pacific Railway Company, did not 
place importance on the idea of women as agricultural war 
workers. These companies, along with the Montana Committee on 
Farm Labor, examined ways to alleviate the farm labor issue. 
As a state committee, this organization advocated several 
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sources of labor to be used during the war; the labor of 
women, however, did not seem important or necessary. Although 
not advocated by the state's corporate interests or labor 
committee, women's participation as part of the state's cherry 
harvest was reported at the 15 September 1944 Montana 
Committee on Farm Labor meeting. While deemed necessary to 
the successful harvest of the crop, women's presence in the 
fields was seen as superfluous by these men. The agricultural 
companies and state labor committee continued to request 
Mexican nationals, prisoners of war, and others for fajrm labor 
in Montana." 
In Wyoming, the state used both farm and nonfarm women 
for agricultural labor. However, for the most part, the type 
of agriculture present in Wyoming, like Montana, did not yield 
to town and urban female labor. As reported by the state 
labor supervisor, Ellen R. Lindstrom, "The main agricultural 
enterprises, sugar beets, hay, range cattle and sheep do not 
adapt themselves to inexperienced labor. Wyoming was 
fortunate to have had the use of Mexican nationals and Italian 
prisoners of war for these crops." Regardless of this 
attitude at the time, women still worked on farms during the 
war and offered their labor assistance to needy farmers. 
Dividing the women into two groups, Wyoming officials placed 
farm and nonfarm workers in different positions. Nonfarm 
women were utilized in potato, beet, and bean fields as well 
as placed year-round on dairy operations. These women worked 
only in areas of extreme need. The use of farm women could be 
found on several different types of farms, including, 
livestock (cattle, poultry, and sheep), grain, and truck crop 
operations. 
County extension agents and WLA labor officials described 
the work accomplished by women in Wyoming during the war 
years. In Carbon County, agent Nels Dalquist reported: "In 
many instances in the county, women worked during the haying 
season in the hay field. Two ranchers in the Elk Mountain 
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Community used a hay crew composed of women entirely and 
reported that this crew did an excellent job. Also on the 
dairy farms in the county, the women were taking the place of 
men trying to solve the labor shortage." However, the general 
attitude regarding the use of women in the Wyoming fields had 
not been totally acceptable. Suited to house or garden work, 
the use of nonfarm women in farm fields did not occur as 
regularly as nonfarm youth recruited through the VFV. 
Exceptions existed throughout the state of course, and in 
Lingle, Wyoming farm and nonfarm women joined the ranks of the 
WLA to run tractors and agricultural inplements and cultivate 
and harvest the area's crops. 
In Colorado, no attempt had been made in 1943 to organize 
a WLA program within the state. The Extension Service did, 
however, recruit four thousand women to work on farms, these 
urban women assisted in the fields of truck-crop operations, 
cultivating and picking at harvest time. In addition, farm 
women assisted on their own or another farm in the state. 
Ranchers opted for men as sources of farm labor, the majority 
being those who had been deferred for some reason from 
military duty. In the next year, however, Colorado organized 
a WLA program and set out to actively recruit and place women 
on farms. Even with the presence of the WLA within the state 
in 1944, no change occurred with the work completed in 1943 or 
1944. Women continued to work on tmck-crop farms as seasonal 
labor; a few were employed year-round on dairy farms. To a 
lesser extent, Colorado women had also been employed on 
livestock and grain operations. 
From the start of the federal farm labor program, women 
had cotr5)eted with others for their position or acceptance on 
Colorado farms and ranches. Specifically, more acceptable 
labor sources included men who had been kept from military 
service, Mexican nationals, and prisoners of war in the state; 
later, relocated Japanese American internees would be 
preferred over women. Still, regardless of this bias against 
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the use of women, state organizations worked to effectively 
recruit and place women as labor on farms. In order to 
accoti^lish this Colorado officials established farm work 
categories for the women and the requirements needed to be 
accepted. Beginning with the "farm woman," who was seen as 
the "virile robust type. . . . She is the type who assists her 
husband in taking a man's place." Expected to work in the 
fields, this woman had been widely accepted by the state's 
agriculturalists. One unidentified WLA worker in Rio Grande 
County, Colorado clearly emphasized the "virile robust" women 
described by the state's annual labor report. This woman 
"drove a tractor, raked, burned, and leveled 38 acres of land, 
drilled, irrigated, and sorted potatoes" as she assisted her 
husband on their farm. Other women included in the structure 
of Colorado's work system included: urban disadvantaged women, 
possibly of Spanish American background; Native Americans; 
migratory labor from Arkansas, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and 
Texas; professional and working women; college students; and 
homemakers.For the most part, this system of categorizing 
the women laborers is unique to Colorado. Although other 
states may have expressed efforts to recruit a type of person, 
no one state explicitly described those characteristics. 
In the manner of other states, Colorado farmers' 
attitudes regarding women in agriculture changed over time to 
an acceptance of their work and pleasure at their 
accomplishment of farm tasks. For the most part, farmers in 
Colorado did not differ from those in the East or South 
regarding their experiences with the members of the WLA and 
other female farm workers. The success of the program in 1944 
had been regarded as favorable so that in the 1945 crop year 
women continued to assist Colorado farmers.^* Other states of 
the West, however, had not been so hesitant to institute the 
WLA in their borders. In Idaho, its state organization 
established a women's program in 1943 which worked to 
recognize "all women presently employed, or who have worked or 
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who will work in some type of agricultural activity, either on 
a farm, in a food processing plant, or replacing a man for 
work in agriculture." By doing so, Idaho planned to "mobilize 
all available women for work in seasonal agricultural work . . 
. [and] for year-round work on dairy and poultry farms." The 
state accomplished this by surveying women in a "house-to-
house canvass." This survey and placement of seasonal 
workers, had been successful, while the search for year-round 
workers proved more difficult. With the local survey, state 
WLA staff canvassed prospective laborers and asked their 
preference of farm work. Agricultural jobs such as fruit and 
vegetable harvesting were the principal type of employment 
along with year-round work on dairy and poultry operations. 
Additionally, the women had been given the time frame that 
each job would occupy, allowing conscious decisions to be made 
regarding their WLA commitment. In the years following 1943, 
however, the use of women in Idaho's fields decreased. Due in 
part to the better jobs available through the industrial 
sector, women left the fields for better wages and working 
conditions. 
In Utah, although no formal WLA existed, hundreds of farm 
and nonfarm women assisted on a seasonal basis to cultivate 
and harvest the numerous crops of the state. Drawn to 
agriculture through farmer and corporate labor requests, women 
worked on farms and in canneries. Without a structured WLA 
program in Utah, women did not receive the advantages that 
other WLA workers had obtained, mainly the guarantee of 
protection and service under the auspice of the Emergency Farm 
Labor Program and United States Crop Corps. This absence of a 
WLA program in Utah is not unique in the West, as other states 
did not organize a WLA program. Texas, New Mexico, and 
Arizona did not initially, if at all, organize a WLA 
organization within their boundaries. Farmers in these 
states, with the assistance of Mexican nationals, prisoners of 
war, Japanese American internees, and other sources of male 
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labor did not consider women or the WLA for their labor needs 
during the war. That is not to say that women did not work as 
agriculture laborers in these states; some did. However, they 
were not recruited by the WLA, and instead fell into other 
demographic categories, such as Mexican nationals, Spanish 
Americans, migrant labor, or farm women. 
In Arizona, for example, the employment of white middle-
class women to harvest cotton had not occurred, due to the 
perception that picking cotton was suitable only for men or 
those families of a lower economic class. As stated in 
Arizona's annual farm labor report, "A certain percentage of 
women have always been employed in hoeing, cotton picking and 
vegetable work in Arizona. These are generally people who 
work as a family unit with income going to the support of the 
family unit." Further, the report stated that recruitment 
among these women had never been needed or necessary. It 
continued by reporting on seasonal labor and the use, or non-
use, of women. "The use of women for supplemental work in 
peak seasons was rendered difficult in several ways. In the 
first place, peak requirements were primarily in cotton 
picking and in vegetable work. Cotton picking is not 
ordinarily done by local women and stoop labor in vegetables 
is extremely hard on women and done primarily by Spanish-
American or poorer classes.Finally, the report implied 
that local white middle-class women would not have found the 
conditions for agricultural laborers in Arizona acceptable. 
Even so the WLA recognized the danger of excluding all women 
from joining the organization. As stated in 1945 by the state 
labor supervisor, "if the loss of a crop had appeared 
imminent, women would have been recruited as needed." The 
assumption being, white middle class women. However, with the 
use of other sources of labor in Arizona the presence of the 
WLA or nonfarm women had been deemed unnecessary during World 
War II. 
Several far western states developed early labor 
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programs, which allowed for successful transitions to the WLA 
in each state. In California, women picked lemons throughout 
the year, and other crops such as almonds, beans, beets, 
lettuce, oranges, tomatoes, and walnuts, seasonally. In a 
state that needed all available harvest labor, women had 
entered the fields during the 1941-1942 crop year, replacing 
relocated Japanese American laborers and men who had donned 
the war iiniform.^' After the creation of the WLA, the 
continued use of women on farms brought about successful 
harvests and large crops. Women continued to assist in 
seasonal positions, especially in areas of large vegetable and 
fruit operations. With tens of thousands of women recruited 
as seasonal labor and hundreds for year-round work, the 
California state WLA represented one of the largest eii^loyers 
of women for the Extension Service labor program. Reported in 
that state, "the placement of women workers in California 
represented 10% of the total placements of the Farm Labor 
project during this period." Unfortunately, the report did 
not indicate a time frame for this statement, although it is 
probable that "period" referred to the 1945 crop year. All 
told, California farmers enqployed more than 169,000 women in 
its agricultural operations during the emergency labor period 
(1943-1945) 
The thousands of women who entered California farm labor 
as members of the WLA had the advantage of earlier state 
programs to bridge the way for those laborers who came later. 
Farmers who used female farm labor in 1942, would do so again 
in 1943 and for the remainder of war. Those farmers who had 
not hired women as farm workers previously would find other 
sources of labor in 1943. However, by the end of the war, the 
biased farmers, as well, recruited women for farm labor. By 
the end of the 1943 crop year, many California farmers 
recognized the usefulness of female labor, as well as the 
women's ability to successfully accomplish farm tasks. In 
many cases, farmers throughout California described their 
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reluctance to use female labor in 1942 and related their loss 
in crop. In 1943, most did not take the same chance, but 
hired competent labor. From Contra Costa Cotinty, California, 
"Due to the shortage of labor last year, we lost $15,000 on 
our walnut crop. This year we will not lose any of the crop. 
The women are picking cleaner than any group that ever worked 
for us. The spirit of the women is excellent. I am sure you 
sent us the choicest women. We sincerely appreciate their 
help." And, in the state's wine region, producers lauded the 
work accon^lished by the women each year. A vineyard foreman 
when asked about the work done by women, replied, "I hate to 
admit it, but they do a better j ob than the men did." He 
continued, "They were paid exactly the same wages as men, 
given the same excellent food, lodged in comfortable quarters 
with a good camp director." Believing that the employment of 
women had been beneficial to his business, this wine-grape 
producer provided the women with the same services as male 
workers. And by doing so, he hoped for good, conscientious 
workers. 
The success that the WLA experienced in California did 
not exist within a vacuum, as other western states also 
established effective organizations. Similar to California, 
the success of the Oregon WLA hinged on the earlier program 
established by the state as well as the state's traditional 
source of seasonal farm labor. Historically, Oregon farmers 
and producers had long depended on women workers to haorvest 
seasonal crops. Therefore, in general, the attitude seen by 
Oregon farmers had been welcoming and accepting of the female 
labor, which included farm, rural, and urban women. With the 
greatest need for labor seen in the western portion of the 
state and an absence of men for full-time positions, Oregon 
farmers continued to utilize women as seasonal labor and began 
to place them in full-time/year-round jobs as well.^^ 
Thus, with the need for labor established, and the 
precedent set for the use of women as farm labor, Oregon labor 
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officials did not wait for the federal organization and 
appropriation of ftinds for the WLA in mid-1943, but began 
labor recruitment earlier that year. Due to the timing of 
Oregon crops, that state, like New York, began recruitment 
efforts in early 1943. Seasonal labor began by 1 June of each 
year, with the peak of the season in late August and early 
September. This time frame allowed xiniversity and college 
students and faculty to work during the harvest period. Jobs 
performed by those women who worked seasonally was classified 
into four categories: "Berries," "Tree Fruits," "Cultivating 
and Training, " and "Vegetables." Women were used to harvest 
fruits and vegetables, as well as labor as full-time employees 
on numerous agricultural operations. Women worked year-round 
on dairy, livestock, and general farms, with the greatest need 
during the war being dairy farms. Women were also hired to 
pick beans and other seasonal crops. In 1943, 25,513 women 
worked as seasonal labor, and 274 worked in full-time 
positions on dairy, livestock, and general farms in Oregon. 
And, while, the initial request for women workers had been 
higher, the use of Mexican nationals and youths in the VFV 
affected and deceased the number of women used as farm labor. 
For those women who needed to participate in training courses 
at the state agricultural college, the recruitment schedule 
established by Oregon officials in early 1943 became 
beneficial. Those women who attended the training course were 
then placed in their year-round dairy positions on farms in 
Tillamook and Coos counties.^^ 
During the 1943 crop year, the Oregon WLA established 
successful county programs across the state. Marion County, 
Oregon alone, demanded more than 10,000 women to assist in 
cultivation and harvest of its farm crops. Employed from Jtine 
through October, the women worked on a variety of agricultural 
operations, including fruits, vegetables, and hops. The 
service of women in Marion County continued through the war, 
as several thousand women joined the WLA each year and worked 
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as part of the "Housewife Special." This service transported 
homemakers daily from their homes to the fields, returning 
them at the end of the work day. These women routinely 
assisted in the cultivation and harvest of the county's bean 
crop. In this county, and across the state, housewives made 
up a large portion of the state's labor force. 
In the remaining years of war, farm labor in Oregon, 
continued an earlier established pattern. Because of the 
success of pre-WLA labor programs, the use of extensive 
recruitment plans had not been necessary in Oregon. In many 
locales throughout the state, farm and nonfarm women eagerly 
volunteered for service. The success of the WLA in Oregon is 
due to the tremendous need by farmers to harvest their crops 
during wartime. An unidentified Oregon grower commented on 
the work accott^jlished by his crew of thirteen women, "They are 
the best crew I've ever had but they work too hard. They are 
paid by the hour (75<:) and they just won't stop to rest." 
However, even in a state such as Oregon that welcomed female 
agricultural labor, it had been understood that if a man had 
been available for a full-time job, he would be better suited 
than a woman for the position. During the operation of the 
Emergency Farm Labor Program, the WLA would place more than 
seventy-eight thousand women on farms in the state from 1943 
through 1945. This figure, along with an uncounted number of 
farm women placed on farms, added to the number of female farm 
workers in California and Washington, indicates the success 
that western states' WLA programs had compared with other 
regions of the covuitry.^® 
The state of Washington, in definition similar to Oregon, 
had been separated into agricultural zones. Divided into 
three distinct areas, the state contained the following 
farming operations--western Washington: truck-crops and dairy 
and poultry farms; central Washington: fruit orchards; and 
eastern Washington: grains. As was common in all states, each 
of these agricultural operation would have its own labor 
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needs. Seasonal crops, mainly fruits and vegetables, would 
require labor to cultivate and pick the harvest; while, some 
year-roxind positions were present on dairy, livestock, and 
poultry operations. Recognizing the state's need for farm 
labor early in 1943, Washington officials estimated that 
approximately eighty-two thousand seasonal workers would be 
required to successfully harvest the 1943 crop; of this 
figure, at least twenty-five thousand would be women. 
Additional women would be hired for year-roxind positions.^® 
Recruitment, training, and placement efforts by 
Washington WLA and Extension staff did not deviate from 
actions taken by other states. For the most part, the state 
saw its biggest efforts devoted to raising an effective labor 
force, one that included all available women, and the need to 
overcome any farmer bias against the use of nonfarm women as 
agricultural workers. In the state's efforts to recruit all 
available women, the WLA approached women's and civic groups 
to interest local women, used the media to promote the 
program, and held informational meetings regarding the 
organization. These actions were successful for the 1943 crop 
year, as more than 25,000 women worked as farm laborers in 
that year. Training and placement followed recruitment. In 
Washington, as with most states, training courses existed for 
those women employed in year-round positions, usually on dairy 
or poultry operations. Fluctuating from one to four week 
length, courses instructed farm and nonfarm women on duties 
that were not familiar. Women employed in seasonal positions 
received "on-the-job" training. The placement of the WLA 
volunteers had been the responsibility of Extension and WLA 
staff; these officials matched prospective workers with needy 
farmers 
In the first year of the WLA in Washington, the state had 
been able to meet its quota of women. During the 1943 crop 
year, about twenty-five thousand women participated. They 
picked seasonal crops, including apples, asparagus, 
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strawberries, and a host of other fruits and vegetables. 
Farm, rural, and urban women participated, and, in general, 
worked as seasonal labor. The few women who worked on a year-
roxind basis did so on poultry and dairy operations. 
Additionally, two women worked as D.H.I.A. testers. The 
acceptance of women by Washington farmers followed the same 
patterns as other West Coast states. Farmers throughout the 
state reported on the success of the women in their fields. 
In Pierce Coxinty, Washington a farmer wrote, "The women and 
children have been a great help in harvesting my raspberry 
crop," in Mason County, "Women and children were a great help 
in harvesting loganberries. As the yoxing folks were in school 
at the time of our grape harvest, adult women were asked for 
the picking work, " and in Chelan County "The women are 
excellent workers, steady, dependable, and get the job done. 
Many teachers have helped me this year and worked along with 
the high school girls. I'll take women and girls any time in 
preference to boys." The praise continued throughout the 
state for the work accomplished by Washington women in 1943. 
The activity of the women continued through the war years as 
women were hired to cultivate and harvest seasonal crops, as 
well as work year-round on some farms. The number of women 
and placements remained somewhat consistent over the course of 
the war, with slightly fewer placed in 1945 than previous 
years. 
As the war progressed, it became common for women and 
youth to enroll in farm labor programs to assist the 
agricultural efforts in Washington. In Washington, as with 
Oregon and other states, farmers accepted the inexperienced 
nonfarm worker; however, given a choice between experience and 
novice, farmers generally chose the tested farm worker, which 
in most cases meant men. And, Washington famers, contrary to 
some states, preferred the work of women over the youths in 
most farm positions. However, over the course of the war and 
in the absence of other labor, schools closed and students 
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worked whole days to complete crop harvests. Because of this 
action, farmers became confident of the youths' potential as 
farm laborers, and continued the employment of this group 
after the war. For the post-war period, Washington indicated 
that it did not view women as necessary farm labor in non-
wartime, but did see high school students engaged in such 
work. Contrary to other locales where women proved themselves 
over time to farmers, in Washington it became the youth who 
proved themselves. While the state labor supervisor realized 
that men would return to their agricultural positions with the 
conclusion of war, this individual also stated, "It is very 
doubtful if women and youth will ever again be used as 
extensively on the farms and in the processing and packing 
plants as they have been used during the war years. They have 
made an excellent showing and their efforts have been greatly 
appreciated. But as soon as adult experienced labor is again 
available, the women and youth groups will no doubt be 
replaced. I personally think that more youth will be used in 
the fields now, because a great many farmers are satisfied 
that they can do the work." Washington State would increase 
the use of youth labor by instituting "long-time extensive 
educational and training program" for the students.^® With 
this action, Washington state officials did not advocate the 
continued use of women on farms, only the students. This 
attitude exhibited by these state officials did not become the 
model for the rest of the nation in the post-war years. For 
the most part, more women entered agriculture after the war, 
than had been present previously. 
The success of the federal WLA across the nation in its 
first year of operation, then, led to the continuation of the 
program for the remainder of World War II. During each 
growing season the WLA brought tremendous labor relief to the 
United States. And regardless of their backgroxmd, farm or 
nonfarm, America's women worked to bring in the crops during 
the war. In the East and West coast regions of the country. 
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the presence of state-rxin early initiatives led to smooth 
transitions from state or private agencies to the federal WLA. 
The ability of these states to engage the federal program 
without much conflict presented their efforts as models to the 
remainder of the coxintry in 1943. States such as Vermont, 
Maine, and California continued the efforts begun by their 
early labor initiators when the states organized state WLA 
programs in 1943. 
During 1943 the goal of the national WLA program had been 
to enroll as many women as possible, while receiving a 
commitment of one month of work from each woman. The majority 
of these WLA women filled the nation's seasonal labor 
positions, and assisted farroers during planting, cultivating, 
and harvesting activities. And while farmers in the East and 
West had gladly accepted farm and nonfarm women as their 
agricultural labor source, farmers in the Midwest and South 
had not. Midwestern and southern farmers hesitated regarding 
the employment of nonfarm women on their agricultural 
operations; in the Midwest farmers were reluctant to hire 
nonfarm urban women, while in the South farmers held back due 
to the racial issues present. Even so, 1943 WLA enrollment 
had numbered at 600,000 members. At least that many farm 
women had also been part of their farm's labor, however, not 
as members of the WLA. Regardless, those women are included 
within the influence that the WLA held throughout the nation 
for that year, an iii5)ortant part of the farm labor program, 
and necessity in recruitment efforts for 1944. By enrolling 
more farm women and by initiating greater recruitment measures 
within urban and rural communities, the federal WLA 
administration hoped to increase its membership for 1944. 
The 1944 crop year would be met with great anticipation 
for many, as several states anxiously awaited for the return 
of the female labor force. In view of larger food 
requirements for the nation, and the responsibilities of the 
federal government, the WLA made plans to recruit 800,000 
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women for agricultural service in 1944. The administrators 
counted on the success and popularity of the program among 
women, as well as the success that farmers experienced with 
their crops and harvests to bring about this higher 
recruitment figure. On the whole, farmers, nation-wide, had 
been more receptive of women as farm workers in 1944, and that 
point, alone, would assist in great recruitment figures. Some 
of this change in attitude can be attributed to the women 
themselves and their ability to competently complete the work 
assigned to them, as well as the manner in which they worked. 
Other changes represent an altering of attitude by several 
groups of farmers, for the most part, they became more 
accepting of women on their farms as the war progressed.*" 
Based on reports in the mass media and local press, it is 
apparent that the nation's farmers had come to appreciate the 
agricultural work of the WLA. In New York, fainners requested 
women to detassel com, work in nurseries, harvest fruits and 
vegetables, and hoe and transplant tobacco; in Kansas women 
plowed, harrowed, and cultivated with tractors and machinery 
for the nation's grain crops,- and in the South, women worked 
in fields chopping cotton."^ These activities continued as the 
war progressed. From 1943 through the 1945 crop year, the WLA 
recruited farm and nonfarm labor for the nation's farms. The 
presence of women as agricultural laborers changed the 
structure of American agriculture, and the years following the 
war years demonstrated these changes. 
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CHAPTER 8. WOMEN IN SERVICE, THE MIDWEST: IN THE HOUSE 
OR IN THE FIELDS, THE DEBATE REGARDING NONFARM WOMEN 
While the success achieved during the WLA's first year of 
operation was not deniable, it did not occur uniformly across 
the United States. During the 1943 crop year, several states 
demonstrated a biased opposition to the WLA. Over the course 
of the war, however, this opposition diminished and by the end 
of the war, few farmers had reservations regarding the use of 
women as farm labor. The greatest concern held by 
agriculturalists during the war resulted from the federal 
government's desire to use nonfarm urban women as labor. The 
acceptance of nonfarm women by farmers in eastern and western 
states did not overwhelmingly influence the rest of the 
country to hire a similar labor force. By far, the most 
pronounced opposition to the WLA and its source of nonfarm 
labor was present in the Midwest. 
In the Midwest, farmers had been reluctant to hire 
nonfarm urban women on their farms. Farmers and their 
families viewed these women as corrupt and immoral, thus not 
an appropriate influence or presence on their property. 
Additionally, midwestern farmers believed that nonfarm women 
were not capable of handling agricultural implements or 
machinery. During the first year of WLA operation, these 
prejudices interrupted the federal government's efforts to 
place available women on farms. For the most part, these 
attitudes existed in the years prior to the creation of the 
WLA and in 1943. However, by the 1944 harvest, even if this 
attitude had not dissipated, farmers accepted the presence of 
nontraditional labor on their farms. 
In the first year of program operation, several 
midwestern states did not recognize the importance of the WLA 
to their state's agricultural goals, and therefore did not 
establish state agencies. Without this organization women who 
wished to join the WLA, as well as local farmers who wanted to 
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hire female labor, did not have the advantage of an 
established agency to administer the program. Over time, 
states in the Midwest recognized the necessity of a state WLA 
organization, and by using program models from the East and 
West coasts, established their own agencies. However, even 
without an established program in place, farm and nonfarm 
women worked on farms throughout the war years. In many 
locales, a considerable number of women, especially farm 
women, participated in agriculture without benefit of WLA 
membership; over time farm women also joined the organization. 
Thus, when the 1944 crop season finished, membership in the 
WLA included farm and nonfarm women and most states had 
organized a state program to provide labor to farmers. By the 
end of the war, the negative feelings and concerns expressed 
by midwestem farmers in 1943 had given way to a more positive 
regard for women on fams. For farmers, the realization that 
the WLA brought advantages to their operations assisted in the 
acceptance of women as agricultural labor. 
Therefore, the WLA had not been coir^iletely unproductive 
in the Midwest during the Second World War. Although 
relatively few women were placed by the WLA or Extension 
Service in 1943, that did not preclude women from working in 
agriculture, as thousands were employed on farms, but not as 
WLA members. To rectify this imbalance of participation among 
regions, the federal and state WLA offices increased 
recruitment efforts in prejudiced locales to itrprove WLA 
enrollment. This action, although effective for furthering 
recruitment, did not bring enrollment figures for the Midwest 
to similar levels throughout the nation. In areas of great 
controversy and bias toward the WLA, it is important to note 
that farmers had different reasons for their reluctance to 
hire women as farm labor. In many instances, these reasons 
differed greatly within states, regions, and the nation. 
Compared to the truck and fruit farms of the East and 
West coasts, agriculture differed in the Middle West. Large-
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scale operations and flat treeless land brought different 
farming techniques to the prairie and plains. Com, wheat, 
and livestock dominated the region's farms. The com and 
wheat belts that had developed and then dominated the region 
remained into the 1940s. For the most part, the crops 
planted, cultivated, and harvested depended on technology and 
heavy machinery. Over time, this area had transformed from a 
region that had depended on men and man-hours to one that 
became dependent on combines and other agricultural 
in^lements. The use of machinery on the farm allowed farm 
owners to refrain from hiring full-time, or in some cases, 
part-time, help. With the assistance of family members, 
midwestem farmers were able to plant, cultivate, harvest, and 
process their crops and agricultural products accordingly. 
This ability to maintain independent production brought 
changes to the midwestem farm structure.^ 
Throughout this transformation from hand-labor to 
machinery in the early twentieth century, midwestem farm 
families endured changes in their homes and on their farms. 
Midwestem farm women became viewed as "reserve labor, " to be 
used in the fields during a time of crisis or emergency, or 
when no other source of labor had been available. While the 
men ran the machinery and worked the fields, women remained in 
the house and were not needed or used, to a great extent, in 
the fields.^ This midwestem gender division of labor is 
clearly reflected by farmer, community, and state attitudes 
that are exhibited in the first year the WLA existed. 
In the Middle West, farmers had distinct ideas regarding 
the use of women on farms. Katherine Jellison reported in her 
study, Entitled to Power: Farm Women and Technology. 1913-
1963. that "according to a Gallup poll conducted in 1943, only 
28 percent of midwestem farmers approved of women as wartime 
hired labor." Midwestem farmers had spent decades without 
women working in their fields, and at a time of crisis would 
have accepted family members before nonfarm women. 
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Additionally, Jellison theorized that midwestem farmers had 
viewed white nonfarm women as out of place on a farm. Not the 
usual female agricultural worker of the country, not African 
American, Hispanic, or Asian, white women would have 
contradicted social norms of the nation. Still, even the 
midwestem farmers who accepted nonfairm women as labor did so 
only as help to the farm woman in the home or bam. Farmers 
did not readily allow the nonfam women in the fields. 
According to Gallup, nonfarm women were "satisfactory for some 
of the smaller chores or tasks around the farm, but for the 
heavy work of harvesting, planting, or caring for livestock, 
women only 'get in the way.'"^ 
Therefore, it is not surprising that midwestem states 
had not welcomed the WLA overwhelmingly within their borders. 
Specifically, the farm population in Iowa, Minnesota, and 
Nebraska expressed reluctance to use nonfarm women as hired 
help. Nebraska represented the negative extreme of farmer 
attitude with women making up less than 4 percent of the farm 
labor force placed by the Emergency Farm Labor Program." In 
contrast, Iowa, as reported by anthropologist Deborah Fink, 
placed farm women in the fields where they assisted with farm 
work, and accoir5)lished more work than they had during peace­
time. The presence of nonfarm women on farms, however, had 
not been accepted or tolerated in the early years of war. For 
many Iowa farmers, men remained the labor force of choice; 
and, "across Iowa, war prisoners, Menomini Indians, Mexicans, 
Japanese-Americans, Haitians, and conscientious objectors" 
were the workers of choice.® At the other extreme, Michigan's 
successful labor program used both farm and nonfarm women. As 
a group, Midwestemers held presumptions regarding the 
unsuitability of nonfarm women to agricultural labor for 1943 
and part of 1944. However, by the 1944 harvest season, and 
then the crop year of 1945, these farmers had accepted women 
as agricultural labor. 
Regardless of the personal attitudes held by midwestem 
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farmers during the war, the need for labor existed. In an 
effort to determine the acceptance of nonfartn labor within the 
region in 1943, Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead surveyed 
its readership. Printing the results in the June 1943 issue, 
the journal reported on the thoughts of farmers and their 
families concerning the use of nonfarm women during World War 
II. In their survey, farmers and their wives indicated that 
they assumed that nonfarm women would be more useful in the 
kitchen than the field, but the majority of male responses 
could not visualize any use for town women on farms. Farm 
women described the anticipated urban women's inability to 
operate machinery. A Washington County, Iowa woman remarked, 
"It doesn't require any mechanical training to wash and wipe 
dishes or scrub the floors, but I think these 'land army' 
women would have had a hard time rxinning a tractor." And, in 
Jones Coxinty, Iowa, "If I have to have a woman helping me in 
the field, I want my wife, not some green city girl." A farm 
women in the same county wrote, "A farm wife naturally 
understands more about the farm and how things should be done, 
while housekeeping is done pretty much the same all over." 
The harshest comment reported by Wallaces' Farmer came from a 
farmer in Clarke County, Iowa, "Leave her in town. She'd not 
be worth a whoop in the field, and if you put her in the 
kitchen, we'd starve to death."® 
The results of the Wallaces' Farmer questionnaire 
indicated the thoughts and attitudes of Iowa and midwestem 
farmers. Clearly, this group did not advocate the use of 
nonfarm women on their farms. And, while these farmers openly 
discouraged the use of nonfarm women on their farms in 1943, 
did that attitude continue in later years? In 1943, the 
presence of nonfarm women in Iowa fields accounted for 11 
percent of the registered work force. Although not a large 
number of workers, these women, along with farm and rural 
women greatly assisted the state's effort at production in 
1943. In Iowa, the presence of agricultural implements and 
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heavy machinery had removed women from the fields, rather than 
assisting their efforts. For the most part, Iowa farm women 
had been relegated to the dairy and poultry operations within 
a farm; with the occurrence of war, however, they reentered 
mainstream agricultural production. In general, female farm 
work in Iowa duplicated the effort made in midwestem states 
during the war; women detasseled com, cultivated and 
hairvested fruits and vegetables, harvested grain, and worked 
on general farms.' 
In 1943, Iowa officials made no effort to organize a 
state WLA program, but depended on other sources for their 
farm labor. However, about one thousand women registered 
themselves as members of the organization, and worked on farms 
in that capacity. Within the state, all but twenty-three of 
the ninety-nine counties used nonfarm female agricultural 
laborers in 1943. For the 1944 crop year, recruitment efforts 
by comity extension agents and WLA officials occurred as the 
need for farm labor exceeded previous levels. In order to 
recruit an acceptable number of women for the state's farms, 
it became necessary for Iowa WLA and extension officials to 
present the use of nonfarm women in a favorable light, and to 
use the media to further their labor goals for the year. 
Radio and local print sources were utilized regularly in an 
effort to enhance the Iowa WLA. Articles regarding the WLA 
and the role of women in agriculture appeared in college 
newspapers to encourage students to join the organization for 
the summer months. Additionally, radio spots included 
discussions regarding the work completed, and the position 
that women held as members of the WLA. To reach their 
recruitment goals, WLA and Extension Service propaganda 
illustrated the reliability and usefulness of women as farm 
labor. Officials deemed this approach necessary to combat the 
previous practice of Iowa farmers who preferred the state's 
youth as agricultural workers.® 
Much of the attitude expressed in Iowa had been present 
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in other states as well. Iowa's northern neighbor, Minnesota, 
expressed a similar opinion regarding female farm laborers. 
Before the official organization of the WLA, the agricultural 
structure within Minnesota did not openly accept the presence 
of women in the state's agricultural community. In 1942, E. 
M. Freeman, dean of the College of Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Home Economics at the University of Minnesota, answered a 
letter from Dorothy Walton Binder, of Highland Park, Illinois. 
In his response Freeman relayed his views concerning the 
employment possibilities for women in agriculture. As a 
concerned parent. Binder inquired about her daughter 
continuing her studies in the field of agriculture at the 
University of Minnesota. Binder explained that her daughter, 
while a student at Mt. Holyoke College, had discovered an 
interest in "agricultural pursuits other than Home Economics," 
and wished to explore her career options. Additionally, the 
younger Binder had organized a "Farmer's Aid Committee" of her 
fellow Mt. Holyoke students in 1942, and offered labor 
assistance to local farmers by harvesting crops, painting 
buildings, and caring for poultry. Her mother wrote, "she is 
working on a farm in Massachusetts, milking cows, harvesting 
asparagus etc. She had practically decided to enter Nursing 
School at Minnesota next semester. . . . But this was a 
desperate sort of decision after she had looked into the field 
for women at the Massachusetts State Agricultural College. . . 
. She originally wanted to take up animal husbandry but was 
told that it was closed to women. ... I would appreciate 
very much your personal thought on this matter and your best 
advice. 
Freeman's response indicated the college's reluctance to 
accept women in agriculture. He wrote to persuade the younger 
Binder to consider a field of study other than agriculture. 
Freeman stated that other choices were available for Binder, 
including extension work, home economics, nursing, and 
physical education. However, employment within the 
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agricultural field, including farming, livestock breeding, and 
science, as well as academic teaching and research positions 
were closed to her as a woman. In reference to Binder's 
fondness for the outdoors and her attempt to choose a 
profession that fit her preferences. Freeman wrote, "Many of 
us who have had the same idea have discovered as we get older 
that our hobbies and our--so to speak--extracurricular 
activities in our professions enable us to get plenty of the 
outdoor contacts ... to satisfy our desires for the out of 
doors." Thus, Binder should view her fondness for outside 
work as a hobby or an extracurricular activity and not a 
career choice. That statement, as well as his letter to the 
elder Binder, presented Freeman's views regarding the 
inappropriateness of women in the field of agriculture. In 
general, much of Minnesota's agricultural cotraminity agreed 
with Freeman, which hampered the organization of the WLA 
within the state. Thus, the Minnesota WLA did not enjoy the 
same success that it did in other regions of the country 
during the war. Most of the Minnesota farmers in need of 
labor in World War II agreed that women as agricultural 
workers would be better placed in other areas of the country.^® 
And although this correspondence between Binder and 
Freeman occurred in 1942, Minnesota's attitude regarding the 
use of women on the state's farms persisted throughout the 
war. In 1943, Minnesota farmers had been hesitant to use any 
inexperienced labor source for its farms, including men, 
women, and youths. However, in almost all cases, men and 
youths would be used for labor before farmers hired the 
state's women. Still, women did work on farms, but for the 
most part, these were farm women, and their experience did not 
stretch past their own properties. The use of rural and 
urban, farm and nonfarm high school students, however, proved 
favorable and popular with Minnesota farmers, and these 
individuals made up the majority of the emergency labor force 
in place during the war years. To place these workers, the 
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Minnesota Extension Service actively recruited and planned 
programs for its youth, while they neglected the WLA and 
considered it only an "experimental" program--one that would 
not be in existence the next year.^^ 
Even though the state had not openly embraced the 
formation of the WLA or the employment of women on farms, 
nonetheless women did work in agriculture during the war. 
Granted, the number who worked on farms and other agricultural 
jobs in the war years had been few, Minnesota women filled 
positions as seasonal labor and dairy herd testers. Even 
though these women "proved their worth" after the first year 
of WLA operation, in general the state preferred the labor of 
youths rather than women. As members of the WLA, the 
Extension Service placed a few thousand women each year as 
seasonal or year-round labor, while, in terms of the VFV, tens 
of thousands of youths participated in the Extension labor 
programs in the years from 1943 to 1945. These figures 
represent a greater acceptance of high school students and 
other youths in agriculture, than the use of women in the same 
positions 
By the end of the war, it is not possible to cite an 
overwhelmingly reversal of farmer attitude regarding the 
presence of nonfarm women in Minnesota's fields; however, 
those farmers who had hired women had been pleased with their 
work. "Louise has been with us for a year and a half now and 
we like her so well we want another girl to assist with the 
bam work." This comment came from a farmer with more than 
fifty cows, with whose care the women assisted. Other cases 
involved women who, having been hired for house-labor, worked 
much better in the fields and bams. "The homemaker said she 
couldn't keep Elvi in the house to help her for some of the 
men were always calling, 'Where's Elvi?' She drove all 
machinery from tractor to hay baler." Regardless of these 
favorable examples, the role that nonfairtn women played in 
Minnesota agriculture was minimal and did not continue after 
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the war. According to the farm labor supervisor's annual 
report for 1945, "there will be no great need . . . for the 
recruitment and placement of women," on Minnesota farms." 
Contrary to other states that used female labor after World 
War II, Minnesota officials decided against the practice. Due 
to the biased attitude present in Minnesota, farmers had not 
hired nonfarm female agricultural labor to any great extent 
during World War II. This reluctance to use nonfarm women as 
farm laborers emphasized the exan^Jle of a midwestem state 
that clearly did not need nor desire its female population to 
assist its farmers. 
Additional information regarding the preference for 
youth, and mainly male, labor in the state is illustrated by 
the type of labor and training programs established by the 
Minnesota agricultural colleges, experiment stations, and 
extension agents. In February 1943, several training sessions 
for "farm workers, " had been established. Created for the 
training of youths, these courses attracted mostly high 
school-aged men. The importance and concern that Minnesota 
officials expressed regarding the status of the VFV and other 
youth-labor programs implied the significance that the state 
placed on the use of men and boys on farms. Over time, 
however, and regardless of the state's desire to use men for 
its labor, Minnesota also trained its female farm workers. 
Although not as prominent or popular, these courses were 
established to provide instruction for women who worked with 
heavy farm machinery. Tractor-driving and -training courses 
were conducted to provide safe working environments for all 
farm laborers during the war, women included.^* 
Other midwestem farmers also had negative feelings 
regarding the use of women in their fields. In Illinois, 
nonfarm women had not been expected to be useful or beneficial 
to the farm operation in 1943. Because of this, no separate 
WLA committee was formed in the state; rather the WLA 
supervisor split her time between that organization and home 
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economics extension. Still, Illinois farmers utilized female 
labor during the war. These farm and nonfarm women had been 
hired for full-time and seasonal work, in some areas of the 
state at rates greater than the available men. The sporadic 
regional demand for women farm workers was due to the work 
accomplished in the early years of the federal WLA 
organization. According to the state's 1944 labor report, 
"The superior work done by women the preceding season was 
responsible for this demand" in several coxinties. For the 
most part, however, the use of women in that state's 
agriculture had not been widely accepted by Illinois farmers.^® 
In Illinois, even though the prevailing attitude 
concerning the use of women as farm workers had been negative, 
the state still counted almost eight thousand female 
agricultural laborers in full-time and seasonal positions in 
1943. As part of the farm labor program and the WLA, the 
women employed in seasonal positions picked and packed fruit, 
detasseled com, and picked and packed vegetables. In 1943, 
and later years, the number of women employed on farms in 
Illinois had been greater than the WLA figure reported, due to 
farm women and others who had located their own employment. 
The state had instituted a training course for college 
students its first year of WLA operation,- due to poor 
attendance, however, the course was deemed unsuccessful. Of 
those who participated in farm labor in 1943, only ten women 
enrolled for the course, mostly those women who worked year-
roiind on farms. Seasonal workers found their training on the 
j ob. 
Farmers in Illinois had not immediately rushed to use 
nonfarm women on their operations. Farmers relayed the 
difficulties involved with training inexperienced women and 
dealing with the social and personal attitudes encoxintered 
with the enployment of nonfarm women to other midwestem 
farmers.^' Thus, although thousands of women participated in 
seasonal crop harvests farmers had not radically changed their 
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opinion regarding the use of women on farms. While some 
farmers had been pleasantly surprised regarding the expertise 
and skill demonstrated by Illinois women in terms of their 
ability to con5)lete agricultural chores, most farmers in the 
state did not view the women as acceptable labor. 
Illinois had not been alone. Other states had also 
resisted the presence of the WLA within their boundaries. In 
Nebraska, farmers had been "reluctant to hire town women, 
except in crews." Comfortable with other sources of labor, 
mainly prisoners of war, Mexican nationals, and "Texas-
mexicans," Nebraska farmers did not routinely hire nonfarm 
women for field work. Farm daughters and wives were 
acceptable for any labor needed on Nebraska farms, but farmers 
did not consider nonfarm women to be enamored of farm life. 
Extension home agent Helen Suchy Nelson wrote. 
The women of Dodge Coianty did a remarkable job in helping 
to produce one of the largest crops in the county's 
history. While the actual enrollment in the Women's Land 
Army did not indicate a great deal of participation by 
the women, this figure can not be used as a guide. . . . 
[The farm women] in addition to her regular chores of 
taking care of the chickens and doing the milking, drove 
the tractor, drove the stacker team, drove the truck load 
of grain to the elevators, weeded soybean patches, 
detasseled hybrid com, and finally put a finishing touch 
to her million jobs by picking com. The farm woman is 
versatile--she can adapt herself to any kind of a job. . 
. . The program of enrolling town women and girls for 
farm work is not satisfactory, for the lights of the city 
and the higher wages obtainable have much more appeal 
than nature's great out of doors. 
In most cases, farmers thought that the defense industry would 
be much more attractive to nonfarm women--better wages and 
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more "patriotic appeal." And for their part, the defense 
industries were blamed for drawing a large potential labor 
force away from the state's fields. Thus, recruitment for the 
Nebraska WLA had been difficult, both in securing workers and 
enployment for the laborers. Further the lack of a full-time 
WLA supervisor indicates the state's inability to promote the 
necessity of a female labor force. 
The absence of a full-time WLA staff person hampered the 
state's ability to effectively recruit a female labor force 
for its farmers. Although such action might not have been 
realistic in Nebraska because its farmers would not have 
accepted such a labor force, it is impossible to totally 
accept the absence of female farm labor in the state. While 
some women did work on Nebraska farms, they were not in the 
majority of the state's domestic war effort. The women who 
worked on Nebraska farms had been employed by hybrid seed 
companies to detassel com, and by farmers to cultivate and 
harvest seasonal crops. Homemakers, teachers, and students 
worked on farms "to save the day, " especially in terms of the 
following crops: beans, beets, com, fruits, grains, potatoes, 
and truck crops. While the use of women had not been common 
or in great numbers, fairmers who used the labor had praise for 
the women. Albert Ames of Green Acres Hybrid Seed Com 
Company described his 1943 experience with women workers. "I 
had a crew of 38 women and 4 boys detasseling com. The women 
did the best job any crew has ever done for me." Clearly, in 
some cases, Nebraska farmers recognized and appreciated the 
work con^leted by women laborers. 
County agents also supported the employment of women on 
the state's farms, and advertised their usefulness to their 
constituents. Buffalo County home agent Louise Epp reported, 
"Twenty-five women in Buffalo County enrolled in the Women's 
Land Army. . . . These women irrigated, cultivated crops, 
worked in potatoes and beets, did the chores besides feeding 
and clothing their families and doing a fine job of food 
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preservation and storage. About 10 of these women were town 
women who helped with peak labor in potato and sugar beets." 
Still, the reluctance of Nebraska farmers to use nonfarm women 
as agricultural labor can be determined from the state reports 
as county agents discussed the continued reluctance to hire 
the women. 
In South Dakota, the attitudes among farmers and other 
rural peoples were similar to those of its neighbors, 
Nebraska, Minnesota, and Iowa. The state's farmers used farm 
women as labor, but did not initially recruit other women for 
the WLA. Following the 1942 crop harvest. South Dakota 
farmers recognized the extent of their labor problem, and 
without an acceptable source of labor seen available for 1943, 
farmers voluntarily reduced their production and acreage. By 
doing so. South Dakota fell inco a situation that the federal 
government had hoped to avoid. By not feeling secure and 
confident with the labor available, South Dakota farmers did 
not take advantage of wartime measures to provide themselves 
with workers; instead they chose to reduce their production 
levels. Because many South Dakota farmers reduced their 
production in 1944, more women applied for wartime farm labor 
service than jobs existed. 
During the 1944 crop year, state and local officials 
hoped for a change in South Dakota farmer attitude and 
advocated an increase in the number of women employed on 
farms. Through improved and larger recruitment efforts. South 
Dakota WLA used women's and civic groups to expose more women 
to the goals of the labor program. By doing so, greater 
participation from nonfarm women occurred in 1944 than 
previous years. Homemakers, college and university students 
and faculty, and working women joined farm women to 
participate in the war effort. Women worked in grain fields, 
on livestock, dairy, and poultry farms, and on truck crop 
farms across the state. By 1945, the number of women who 
worked on South Dakota farms would further increase. And, 
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while their work would not change, the demand for and attitude 
toward the ert^jloyed women had altered dramatically over the 
course of the war. Still, the presence of farm women 
accoiinted for the maj ority of those who labored in the state' s 
fields. And, even with increased recruitment efforts South 
Dakota did not contain enough labor to effectively harvest its 
crops; additional labor was brought to South Dakota from 
Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee.By the end of the war, 
the attitude among South Dakota farmers mirrored those other 
midwestem states; farmers accepted urban labor once women 
demonstrated their ability for agricultural work. 
Other states within the Middle West had similar problems 
regarding the placement of nonfarm women on their farms. 
Although Kansas had a WLA operation in all counties and 
training courses were established at Kansas State Agricultural 
College and other state colleges, farmers did not readily 
accept nonfarm women as workers in 1943 . Over the course of 
World War II and WLA operation in Kansas, the number of 
nonfarm women employed on farms steadily increased. 
Accounting for only 10 percent of the women involved in the 
WLA and local labor programs in 1943, nonfajnn women's 
participation in farm labor increased to about 20 percent in 
1945. Of these employed on the state's farms, 85 percent of 
the farm and nonfarm women operated heavy machinery during the 
first year of WLA organization. Scholar Caron Smith found in 
her study of Kansas that, for the most part, farmers used only 
farm women to operate heavy equipment, as farmers did not want 
nonfarm women to "handle their expensive machinery." Thus, 
the majority of farm work fell to the farm women. In this 
regard, women worked on grain, livestock, and other crop 
farms; they drove combines, tractors and trucks, fed 
livestock, milked cows, raked hay, and detasseled com. As 
the years of war progressed, more farmers sought labor-saving 
devices to quicken their production time as well as save on 
hired labor. In addition, farm women exchanged labor with 
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neighbors to assist each other's farm and labor needs." 
During the war, the most frequent farm job performed by-
Kansas women had been hauling grain. Almost 30 percent of the 
women engaged in agricultural labor in the state accomplished 
this task for their employer or family member. The advantage 
that farm women possessed had been a knowledge of farm 
operations and equipment. Although the women would have been 
relegated to house and bam chores prior to 1940, they were 
not completely ignorant of farm operations. Mrs. Ray Sayler 
performed many male gender-specific jobs on her family's 200-
acre farm near Manhattan after her son enlisted in the 
military in 1943. In addition to "her usual chores of 
gathering eggs and feeding and milking the cows, " Mrs. Sayler 
also drove a "tractor and a horse-pulled mowing machine. . . . 
Besides those tasks, she had meals to prepare and a small 
child to care for." Mrs. Sayler's experience on her own farm 
is representative of most of Kansas's female farm labor during 
the war. While about 20 percent were nonfarm women by the end 
of 1945, clearly, most of the heavy farm work had been 
performed by farm women. The 1944 Kansas annual WLA report 
described the women who worked in the state's agriculture 
during the war as "first, the farmer's wife; second, the 
farmer's daughter; third, the daughter who 'is in business but 
who can get two weeks off to help her dad with the job she is 
somewhat familiar with'; fourth, the relative who 'likes to 
spend a short vacation on the farm' ; fifth, friends of the 
family eager to help; and finally, those urban women who 
'desire to help if they are accepted into the farm family.'"^* 
Still, not all midwestem states had been opposed to the 
use of nonfarm women as agricultural labor during World War 
II. In Oklahoma, farmers hired farm and nonfarm women without 
benefit of a WLA recruitment effort in 1943. County agents 
and labor supervisors organized recruitment drives through 
local media, letters, brochures, and civic organizations. 
Even without the structure of the WLA and its recruitment 
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procedures, Oklahoma placed more than eight thousand farm and 
nonfarm women in agriculture in 1943; almost twice that figure 
in 1944, and almost twenty thousand women in 1945.^® In terms 
of service, farm and nonfarm women performed different chores 
during their employment. Nonfarm women drove tractors and 
cultivated and harvested several truck crops. Farm women 
drove tractors, trucks, and other vehicles, cared for 
livestock, harvested hay, and operated farm equipment. 
Although individual thoughts from farmers and workers were not 
included in this state's reports, WLA supervisor Venie Ann 
McDuffie commented on the acceptance of Oklahoma farmers 
regarding women farm workers, "Interviews with farmers in 
regard to the satisfaction of women's work on the farm reveals 
that they have worked conscientiously and efficiently in 
performing their duties." Conditions in Oklahoma continued 
through the end of World War II as farm and nonfarm remained 
in positions established in 1943.^® 
In Ohio, initial problems developed with the use of 
nonfarm and urban women as farm laborers in 1943. There, 
farmers assumed that nonfarm women would not be able to manage 
and complete strenuous work, other farmers would "ridicule 
them for employing women," and farm women would object "to 
having town women around for fear they might try to patronize 
them because of their mode of living on the farm or for other 
fancied reasons." Because of these and other reasons, most 
Ohio farmers in 1943 "wanted to exhaust all other sources of 
labor" before they used women for agricultural work. Thus 
Ohio farmers hired men, youths, and immigrant-urban women for 
field work. As part of a yearly trend, immigrant women picked 
beans and other truck crops.In this instance, it is 
apparent that the place for urban immigrant women in Ohio had 
been much the same as the African American women in the South. 
This distinction of class and nativity echoed southern 
sentiment regarding the presence of urban white women in the 
fields there. In Ohio the presence of immigrant women on the 
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farm and in the fields had been accepted, while that of the 
urban, professional, white (native) women had not. 
In 1943, the state used radio, Cleveland Plain Dealer and 
other newspapers, civic organizations, and universities to 
promote the WLA. This effort, regardless of farmer attitude 
concerning nonfarm women, resulted in more than 118,000 farm 
and nonfarm women employed during the 1943 Ohio harvest 
season. And while most of these had been farm women, almost 
4,000 nonfarm women had also participated. These women 
cultivated and harvested truck crops, detasseled com, and 
cared for poultry. While the state's farmers had not been 
widely receptive of nonfarm women as agricultural labor 
initially, state and extension officials convinced farmers of 
the women's benefits by the time of the first harvest. By 
that time, however, "town and city women were not particularly 
interested in working on farms," because they found suitable 
wartime employment elsewhere. In response to this lack of 
interest concerning farm work, extension and state officials 
in preparation for the 1944 crop season, worked to get a 
better start in labor recruitment of nonfarm women. By 
coordinating with home demonstration agents, the WLA and 
Extension Service within Ohio hoped to broaden their efforts 
to recruit women from a larger source of labor for 1944.^® 
In that regard, the state organization had been 
successful as recruiting brochures were distributed, feature 
stories printed in local and county newspapers, and radio 
addresses across Ohio publicized the wartime effort of women 
as farm workers. Promotion of the women's usefulness, 
availability, and ability as agricultural labor overcame 
previous bias held by farmers and the general piiblic, and 
thus, as a result, Ohio farmers requested women to participate 
in work that demanded skill rather than brute strength. 
Recruitment efforts proved successful in 1944, as the state 
placed farm and nonfarm women in its fields. Regardless of 
state efforts and farmer acceptance, the number of women 
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en5)loyed in Ohio during the latter years of war decreased from 
1943. In the last year of the war, the unpredictability of 
the weather caused several crop damages and therefore reduced 
the need for farm labor. 
Still, regardless of the year or situation, women who 
joined the WLA and worked on farms foxind the experience 
enjoyable and exciting. One worker, identified only as "P.J." 
expressed her thoughts about the WLA this way, "this has been 
the most enjoyable summer I've spent. Maybe it's because the 
great out-of-doors and the joy of working with the soil and 
growing things seemed to cast such a spell of happiness over 
me." P.J.'s positive experience within the WLA is repeated by 
other 1943 recruits, including "D.J.E." who commented, "There 
was never a dull moment from dawn to dark. Our work made us 
gay and gave us a good feeling inside which is indescribable." 
These cheerful illustrations of the Ohio WLA program assisted 
later recruitment efforts to entice other women to join the 
organization. 
Additionally, farmer reaction to the women and their 
ability to accomplish farm chores further enhanced the image 
of the WLA. A farmer in Erie Coiinty, Ohio, who hired WLA and 
foreign laborers had greater success with his female 
employees. "You can depend on them not running away, getting 
drunk, or smashing up the machinery." Many Ohio farmers 
described similar situations comparing WLA workers to other 
labor groups. In 1944, a cherry faimer lauded the work 
accon^lished by women, placing their expertise and commitment 
above other workers, including "prisoners-of-war, Jamaicans 
and transients." Farmers across Ohio expressed satisfaction 
with the labor provided by the WLA participants. In Erie 
County farmers commented, "I could use a lot more like that 
group I used this summer"; "Mighty good for green hands"; and 
"If you can guarantee twice as much help as the kind of help 
you gave last summer, I'll put in more crops." Additionally, 
Erie County farmers reported that the women "had fewer 
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problems and took less of the [county] agents time than any 
other labor group." This attitude concerning women's labor in 
1944 ettphasized farmers' abilities to accept workers who 
previously had been viewed as iinsuitable for agricultural 
labor. An unidentified farmer from Huron, Ohio put it best, 
"I thought the girls you provided last summer couldn't be 
beat, but watch those girls pile off that truck coming in and 
go to work preparing the vegetables they have picked for the 
market. Never a wasted motion! 
This Huron, Ohio, farmer represented a view seldom seen 
in the Midwest during the war. His acceptance of the 
placement of nonfarm women on farms was contrary to public 
sentiment at the time. However, he was not alone in Ohio in 
World War II. There were farmers in the region who readily 
used female farm labor from the beginning of the WLA. 
Regarded by the general agricultural pxiblic as desperate and 
as people who would welcome any and all available sources of 
labor for their truck-crop operations, they were not 
considered "real" farmers. Whatever the reason behind the use 
of nonfarm female labor for farms brought some locales in 
direct favor with the national WLA organization. For exatr^le, 
Michigan and North Dakota farmers routinely hired nonfarm 
women for harvest labor. Their endorsement of women as 
agricultural workers from the start of the WLA allowed for 
successful harvests within each state without the danger of 
destroying crops or recruiting labor elsewhere. 
In Michigan, for the 1943 crop harvest, all available 
women (farm and nonfarm) had been used. This feat of active 
recruitment occurred in a region that did not readily accept 
nonfarm labor, accomplished in a state that became an 
exception to the rest of the Midwest. The importance of the 
WLA to the state of Michigan and its harvests became known as 
farmers openly accepted the labor that the women provided. 
Recruitment efforts included the use of radio, lectures, 
letters, and meetings to promote the WLA organization to the 
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piiblic. Local and state media efforts brought thousands of 
women to the labor-needy areas of the state, as women 
volunteered for any length of seorvice. Farm, rural, town, and 
urban women participated in all field and farm activities. 
More than 8500 farm women signed up as WLA members,- however, 
this represented only a small portion of the actual number of 
farm women at work in 1943 due to the fact that most did not 
see the immediate need to register as members of the WLA. For 
the most part, urban professionals and working women, college 
students, and housewives volunteered for the WLA in Michigan. 
Urban women were hired to pick cherries, strawberries, and 
other fruits, as well as vegetables and other crops. Their 
feelings for such actions can be explained by the desire to be 
patriotic, "out-of-doors," or a change from regular work.^^ 
In 1943, the "first WLA crew to be placed [in Michigan] 
was a group of five women in Kalamazoo County who helped cut 
asparagus." And as worded in the state report, "not exactly 
an army but it's a start." And clearly it had been a start, 
as more than thirteen thousand women registered with the WLA 
and Extension Service for ett^loyment in 1943. This successful 
practice of recruitment would continue in 1944 and reach 
several thousand farm and nonfarm women as they joined the 
WLA. The women again harvested fruits and vegetables, as well 
as assisted on dairy and general farms. In some regions of 
the state, specific requests for the WLA occurred over the 
VFV. Ruth Peck, in her report for the WLA, explained why, 
"Women, being more mature, are more responsible and do not 
engage in so much horseplay in the fields. This was the 
reason why requests for camps this year were directed to the 
Women's Land Army section." The women's maturity brought 
another dimension to their employment as farmers found they 
worked more conscientiously than yoxonger laborers. 
Through the war years, Michigan WLA organizers continued 
their efforts to provide an effective and worthy program to 
the federal labor program. Several county WLA administrators 
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were in place, and assisted with recruitment and placement 
efforts. The state organization utilized all sources of media 
available to them as recruitment spots appeared in local and 
county newspapers and radio stations. Angeline Gale, WLA 
county supervisor for Berrien County, Michigan, presented the 
WLA message over Chicago radio stations. Her discussion of 
the labor program and necessity for women volunteers covered 
the type of work to be con^leted in Michigan, in this case--
"fruit pickers", and "the need for workers not vacationists." 
By far, one of the greatest fears held by WLA administrators 
and farmers would be that women would join the WLA with the 
impression that they were on vacation. These fears were not 
unfoxinded, because early WLA publicity had advertised the 
labor program as a "vacation down on the farm. 
However, it is clear from the Michigan annual labor 
reports, that few, if any, WLA workers in that state treated 
their farm experience as a romantic vacation. Many workers 
termed their time on the farm as a "vacation, " but it is 
obvious that they meant "working vacation." This sentiment is 
present in letters sent from WLA participants to Angeline 
Gale, WLA county supervisor for Berrien Cotinty, Michigan. 
Betty J. Coleman wrote, "After my safe arrival home in 
Minneapolis I still feel thrilled when I think of my eventful 
experience at cherry picking. Although the wind did blow and 
the trees rocked and the ladders wabbled on their legs while I 
stood on tiptoe to reach that biggest and reddest cherry of 
all away on top, I wouldn't have trade the adventure for 
anything. ... As our good 'boss,' Mr. Teichmann would say, 
'a good way to spend a patriotic vacation.'" This letter and 
others to the state WLA organization further illustrate the 
sentiments of workers as they completed their labor 
assignment, and to some received a "paid vacation."^® 
In North Dakota, farm and nonfarm women had been employed 
on farms from the start of the Emergency Farm Labor Program. 
Their presence had been accepted and used almost from the 
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beginning, due in part to the projected labor needs during the 
1943 crop season. A severe labor shortage, along with a 
"bunker crop of grain", brought about arrangements to use any 
and all available labor. Due to these reasons, the use of 
women on the state's fields proved to be less of an issue than 
in other states of the Middle West. Women assisted in all 
aspects of grain production,- in some cases as "one of several 
'all female' harvest crews" present throughout the state. 
Women had also been employed on livestock and truck-crop 
operations. In Cass County, North Dakota, female work crews 
harvested potatoes. In one instance, six women picked almost 
775,000 pounds of potatoes in 1944. In addition to harvesting 
truck crops, women also drove and operated farm machinery. 
Reminiscent of southern states where women had been welcomed 
for their ability to operate heavy machinery, or in the 
Northeast where women had worked well on poultry farms, in 
North Dakota, farmers favored the use of women in preference 
over men for most farm jobs. With the heavy state demand for 
labor, WIiA and Extension Service officials did not spend their 
efforts on recruitment, but instead provided education and 
information for farm laborers and farm employers.^® 
The Midwest represented a region during the war that did 
not immediately accept nonfarm female agricultural labor. And 
while exceptions to this preconceived idea exist, for the most 
part, farmers held biased opinions regarding nonfarm women's 
ability to perform fainti work. The following comments by a 
midwestem farmer in 1944, as reported by Frances Valentine, 
clearly noted the biases and prejudices of the region 
regarding the use of urban women as labor, as well as their 
changes of opinion regarding that labor. 
Received your inquiry today about my experience with the 
Women's Land Army and decided to answer right away. If I 
delayed perhaps I would never get at it again. First I 
was in an awful jam or I would never have tried them. 
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Then I saw the article in the newspaper and decided to 
try anything once. Now I will say that they were 
eminently successful, and helped me get the job done. If 
I could have had them a month earlier, it would have 
helped a lot more as they could had harrowed or disked 
and I would have gotten my crop in earlier. . . . They 
drove tractors for me on side rake, pick-up baler, rotary 
hoe . . . and trucks to pick up hay in the field. One 
girl had never driven a car, but before she left she had 
driven all four tractors and three trucks of various 
manufacture. . . . The biggest factor to their success 
was their patriotic attitude. They came to help-rather 
than make a lot of money. ... Of course there were many 
days when there was no tractor work, and they cut weeds, 
hoed weeds in the com, helped in the garden, lawn, and 
house, etc. I imagine the novelty of the work was an aid 
to them too. 
This passage emphasized the thoughts and ideas held by most 
midwestem farmers during the war regarding the use of the WLA 
as a labor source. And, as the passage indicates, farmers 
altered their attitude concerning nonfarm women as laborers as 
the war progressed.^' 
Midwestem farmers found as the war continued that they 
did not have a choice in their search for acceptable farm 
labor. They had to accept the use of women in the fields, as 
well as the presence of the WLA. And, for the most part, 
midwestem farmers had been able to do that. By 1945, several 
thousand members of state WLA organizations worked to bring in 
the crops. The acceptance of nonfarm women as agricultural 
labor in the Midwest mirrored the attitude held by other 
regions regarding the ability of women to perform farm work. 
Thus, by the end of the war, midwestem farmers, as well as 
others across the country, grudgingly accepted female farm 
labor. While midwestem farmers and their families had been 
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reluctant to hire urban women for farm work in 1943, their 
reluctance is ten^jered in latter years. Demands made by the 
federal government for crop and food production, as well as 
the popularity that developed regarding the WLA program, 
assisted in raising the participation levels of the WLA after 
1943. Thus, by the 1944 and 1945 crop years, WLA volunteers 
in the midwestem United States included farm and nonfarm 
women as thousands took part in agricultural activities each 
crop year. 
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CHAPTER 9. WOMEN IN SERVICE, THE SOUTH: 
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN RACE AND CLASS GET IN THE WAY 
The WLA existed throughout the country during World War 
II. In the South, however, the presence and acceptance of the 
labor program did not occur immediately. While the East and 
West coasts had readily accepted nonfarm female labor and the 
WLA, regions like the Midwest and South opposed the use of 
nonfarm women on farms. In the Midwest, farmer biases had 
been a result of the belief that nonfarm urban women were 
unsuitable for agriculture. Over time, midwestem farmers 
accepted the WLA and its labor. In the South other conditions 
controlled the presence, or lack, of the WLA. Although that 
region's fazroers also held a negative attitude regarding the 
use of nonfarm women on farms, the justification and reasoning 
concerning nonfam women was racially motivated. 
The South consisted of two distinct societies based on 
race. Within each separate society other characteristics, 
mainly economics, affected the region's ability to promote the 
WLA and recruit nonfarm women for work. Because of these 
issues the WLA did not organize in any manner similar to the 
remainder of the country. For the most part, the racial 
component of southern society affected the operation of 
federal programs during World War II. The southern WLA 
organizations encountered racial problems upon establishment. 
Many states did not officially organize a WLA program due to 
racial discord, while other states excluded African Americans 
from joining. Southern farmers had concerns about urban white 
women in cotton, tobacco, and other crop fields, especially in 
terms of their position within society. These issues 
confronted southern farmers and hindered progress of the 
federal labor plan in the region. In the South, the issues 
regarding acceptance of nonfarm women as agricultural labor 
result more from racial and economic distinctions than social. 
In a region where racial discrimination was part of society. 
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it. is not surprising that its characteristics becatne part of 
wartime labor measures as well. 
Throughout the southern states, a specific labor system 
developed among African American farmers and field workers. 
In addition to their work on their own farm, African Americans 
spent time on other farms participating in a system of labor 
exchange. In a study of North Carolina, Dolores E. Janiewski 
described the situation that developed in the agricultural 
fields. Tenants and sharecroppers performed many different 
jobs each day. In addition to caring for the home and 
children, processing food, making clothing, and caring for the 
garden, home, and livestock, married women assisted in the 
fields and, at times, held wage-earning positions. These 
women would have conqpleted wage work at home, or hired out as 
farm workers for neighboring farms. In her analysis, 
Janiewski recognized that studies regarding tenant and 
sharecropping women indicated their willingness to shift from 
the women's sphere to the men's sphere on their own or 
another's farm without difficulty. Contemporary studies of 
the early twentieth century related that women expressed pride 
in their ability to accomplish any type of farm work, thus 
making the African American system of labor exchange 
acceptable in the region.^ 
Historically in southern states, the development of an 
African American exchange of labor system had not been unique. 
As described by Melissa Walker, and her work regarding 
extension agents, "black farm women worked side-by-side in the 
fields with their husbands and ... as domestics or 
agricultural day laborers." This tradition of labor exchange 
did not extend to all southern farmers. Walker further 
discussed that it had not been common for white women to 
participate in an exchange of labor system. While the white 
farm women would have worked occasionally on their own farm, 
they rarely provided assistance to other farms.^ And, while 
these issues concerning the work completed by African American 
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women are important to xinderstanding the agricultural 
structure in the South, they do not conceal more important 
southern concerns, mainly those of race and class. 
For the most part, a southern state's inability to accept 
female labor had been a result of the position that race and 
class placed on people in the region. Connected by the 
southern experience, these characteristics of southern society 
are further strengthened in ways that can be described as 
"gender-specific." Feminist Karen Sacks has addressed these 
issues as she examined ties between three characteristics of 
society: class, gender, and race. Sack's Marxist examination 
of society analyzed the work expended by families, as well as 
those members of families that did not provide viable 
assistance.' From this it is possible to extrapolate the 
presence of women on the farm, and dependent on the location 
within the country, and decide whether their labor was 
considered beneficial. In those locations where women had 
been viewed as "reserve labor, " as in the Midwest, their 
contribution to farm labor had not been great, however in 
locations where all members of the family worked the farm, the 
women's participation would have been necessary and expected. 
The issues of class and race in relation to gender are 
also important in studying the WLA. Race and class greatly 
affected the work attitude of individuals and effectively 
divided the social system. While services and businesses had 
been segregated by race, in agriculture a distinction by class 
also existed. For the most part, men and women of the lower 
economic class, black and white, had worked in the fields and 
homes for decades. Additionally, southern society grouped all 
African Americans into a lower economic and social class 
regardless of their position within that society.* The 
presence of women and children in the fields had occurred as 
southern tenants and sharecroppers eked out a living. Because 
of these labor traditions, the presence of middle-class 
southerners in agriculture had not been common by the end of 
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the Depression, and therefore, as evidenced in WLA annual 
state reports, the recruited presence of urban middle-class 
white women in southern fields had been difficult to promote.® 
Southern states required agricultural labor during World 
War II just as much as other regions of the country, and they 
worked to provide this labor to their farmers. Compounded by 
initial farmer reluctance to accept female farm workers 
(Caucasian), as well as the absence of state WLA 
organizations, labor had not always been easy to secure for 
each year's harvest. Although according to a 1943 Gallup 
poll, 49 percent of southern farmers "agreed with the idea of 
women as field workers," they had not been as eager to accept 
white, middle-class, urban women. Additionally, states had 
the problem of enticing residents to remain in rural areas and 
work on farms instead of leaving for the urban locales and 
entering the defense industry. During World War II, some 3 
million people left the rural South, decreasing that region's 
population by 22 percent. As part of this group, rural 
African Americans left their tenancy and sharecropping 
lifestyles to enter the urban, industrial sector. This out-
migration of rural southern African Americans had started 
early in the twentieth century and continued through World War 
II. In the period from 1915 to 1960 nine million blacks left 
the rural South in search of better conditions in the nation's 
cities. In the period from 1940 to 1960, the rural black 
population of the South decreased from 51 to 25 percent of the 
total, or roughly half of the total black population.® During 
the course of the war, thousands of African Americans left the 
region for urban areas and a chance at a better life. 
This concern, population out-migration from the South, 
along with the added issues of race and class, caused southern 
farm owners additional problems in securing adequate labor 
during World War II. Societal biases had to be addressed in 
order to effectively hire harvest workers. Thus, southern 
agriculturalists and state farm organizers needed to put aside 
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their racial prejudices and work to create an effective 
program for farm labor. For the most part, the placement of 
African American and white farm women in fields had been 
wholly acceptable, as was the use of nonfarm black women, 
however, as a source of labor nonfanti urban white women had 
not been acceptable to southern farroers or labor programs. 
In the Southeast, the presence of the WLA within the 
state labor structure had been tolerated at best. In many-
cases, the main concern had not been a racial bias alone, but 
one that combined the issues of race and class. This attitude 
did not exist across the entire region, however, as several 
states operated successful WLA programs, as well as recruited 
thousands of women to participate in harvests. At the time of 
congressional appropriation hearings the one positive 
statement concerning the use of women as agricultural labor 
had been made by T. 0. Davis, director of the Alabama 
Extension Service in Auburn. Expecting initial farmer 
resistance, Davis described methods used by Alabama extension 
agents to educate farmers regarding the best possible use of 
female labor and ways to utilize unused school buildings and 
buses for housing and transportation. These efforts in 1943 
brought acceptance of the WLA to Alabama, while convincing 
farmers of the viability of the program.'' 
Davis' statements before Congress did not accurately 
summarize the WLA program in his state, but instead 
illustrated Davis' and Hall's perception of a perfect farm 
labor program in Alabama and the nation. In terms of Alabama, 
however, the question remained. Had Alabama farmers readily 
accepted WLA forces in their fields? The answer lies in the 
annual reports of the Emergency Farm Labor Program issued 
after each crop year. For the most part, the state 
organization reported that the previous presence of women on 
Alabama farms had not been considered unique but common 
because "in Alabama farm women have always worked. In 
addition to their house work they work at the same field jobs 
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as the men." Because of this, it had not been necessary for 
the Extension Service and the WLA to recruit farm women for 
assistance in the fields they were already there. These 
agencies would, however, recruit nonfarm women for field work; 
in most cases, these women were African Americans. Women 
employed on Alabama farms in 1945 harvested fruits and 
vegetables, "stacked" peanuts, and picked cotton.® 
The situation that developed in Alabama with the use of 
African American women as seasonal labor was a South-wide 
occurrence. For the most part, it is difficult to determine 
the extent racism existed within the WLA because the annual 
reports did not explicitly state the problem. In most cases, 
states hinted at issues that emerged regarding race and/or 
class in the WLA, its workers, and among area farmers. In the 
case of South Carolina, however, these concerns were discussed 
in the state's report. 
While it had not been common for states to explicitly 
state their biases and reservations in relation to the 
reciniitment and placement of women in their fields, South 
Carolina had explicitly done so within its annual labor 
reports. In a state where the traditional farm labor source, 
African Americans, had been lured away from agriculture as a 
result of high-paying jobs elsewhere, or the security of 
military pay, action needed to be taken to return the labor to 
the land. To provide farmers with necessary labor, the state 
recognized its need for strong recruitment measures to bring 
African American women back to farm work. However, South 
Carolina labor officials, in 1943, did not want to appear to 
have created an organization that recruited only African 
American farm workers, and therefore the WLA recruited only 
white farm women for that year. State officials assumed that 
it would be easier to bring African Americans into the 
organization at a later date, rather than the addition of 
Caucasian women to the organization if they had initially 
recruited only African American women for labor positions.® 
276 
South Carolina's 1943 labor recruitment policy does not seem 
to be well thought out or beneficial to the state's 
agricultural sector. After admitting the need for black women 
to return to farming, South Carolina WLA' s then recruited only 
white farm women. Clearly, these actions indicate an attitude 
of discrimination against the membership of African American 
women in the state WLA labor program. 
The practice by the South Carolina WLA to recruit only 
white farm women during its first year of operation had been a 
result of the racism present within southern society at the 
time. Concerned with the image and reputation to be gained if 
it recruited African American women in 1943, the South 
Carolina WLA excluded black women from its organization. This 
action by the WLA did not remove African American women from 
South Carolina's fields, it just did not allow them entry in 
their state labor program. Additionally, South Carolina 
farmers had not been keen on the acceptance of urban white 
women as labor either, and therefore, barred their 
participation as well. The agency's approval of white farm 
women as agricultural laborers hinged mostly on their status 
as farm women, therefore, they were already farm workers. By 
including only white farm women within their organization, WLA 
state officials did not expect to upset the main political and 
social attitudes present in South Carolina at the time. Even 
so, however, this recruitment action by the WLA did not 
immediately benefit their cause. White farm women, their 
participation in the government program notwithstanding, had 
not seen it necessary to participate in agriculture as a 
members of the WLA. While almost eleven thousand women worked 
as agricultural laborers in 1943, only 1046 women enrolled in 
the WLA. For the most part, these eleven thousand women had 
been African American, and although not actively recruited by 
the WLA, they provided the needed farm labor. South Carolina 
farmers who were anxious to harvest their cotton had not been 
particular regarding the source of their labor. 
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The first South Carolina WLA unit was established in 
Chesterfield County for the 1943 crop year. Seltna Lisenby was 
recorded as the first enrollee within the county, and she 
assisted on her family farm. Following the recruitment 
practice in place in 1943 in South Carolina, it is probable 
that Lisenby was a white farm woman who joined the WLA for the 
sole purpose of working on her family's farm. By taking her 
brothers' place on the farm, Lisenby along with her father 
worked their acreage. As reported by her father, H. C. 
Lisenby, "we had about the best and cleanest crop we have ever 
had, and more acreage than usual . . . Selma worked regularly 
at all sorts of faim work, was happier than ever, and was a 
mighty good worker, too." The stories continued, and for 
1943, it is obvious from the statements recorded in the WLA 
annual report, that WLA members for the year had been farm 
women. It is not so obvious about their race, however, from 
the recruitment policy in place, assumptions are that these 
were white farm women. 
Regardless of the racial policy in place in South 
Carolina in 1943, more than one thousand farm women joined the 
WLA. These recruits worked thirty days on South Carolina 
farms, either as the main source of farm labor or as seasonal 
help for farming operations. During the first year of 
operation, participants of the WLA labor program had four 
responsibilities to the organization: to assist in all efforts 
to assure that crops were harvested for war production; to 
work closely with county agents in their efforts to provide 
labor to farmers; to recruit and place nonfarm urban women on 
farms where needed; and to interest South Carolinian farmers 
in the use of women as farm workers." 
In the later years of the WLA program (1944 and 1945) , a 
sxibtle change of language occurred in the annual labor reports 
of the WLA in South Carolina. African American women were 
mentioned in regard to tobacco cultivation and harvest, as 
well as the seasonal harvest of several crops. "Two meetings 
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with, colored people were held by the WLA supervisor in Dillon 
county in an effort to secure additional workers for the 
tobacco harvest. As a result . . . some non-farm workers 
helped out during the tobacco harvest. . . . Mr. C. H. Watson, 
Dorchester county, made this comment: 'The harvesting is 
largely done by colored women who are, at present, inclined to 
"take it easy" because they are drawing dependency allotments, 
or have husbands in high-paying war jobs.'" In either 
instance, the presence of these women in the state's fields 
did not appear to have been widely accepted by farmers or 
state officials. But, no blatant comments regarding the use 
of African American women or Caucasian women are discussed in 
1944 or 1945. Still, the use of African Americans in the 
fields, even though they are the acknowledged previous labor 
force, did not seem to have been widely accepted across South 
Carolina." 
In the remaining years of war, changes occurred in South 
Carolina's WLA organization. Acknowledging the ability of 
women to accomplish most farm jobs, due to the presence of 
technology and mechanization, the WLA did not foresee any 
problems in their efforts to gain acceptable labor. With a 
much more structured labor campaign than the previous year. 
South Carolina officials worked to establish a successful 
program for 1944. Therefore, the state WLA no longer 
recruited only white farm women, but recognized the need to 
accept all women into its organization to meet farmers' labor 
demands. To accomplish this, farm women who worked in 1943 
became a large part of the recruitment force that influenced 
women to join the WLA in 1944.^" 
Not only did the WLA work to recruit the largest group of 
women for 1944, but its staff also wanted to reach more 
farmers than the previous year and provide them with labor. 
To accomplish this, the WLA surveyed South Carolina farmers 
and questioned them regarding their needs. The answers 
received established the need for thousands of women to join 
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the state WLA organization. WLA work in South Carolina during 
the war years included labor on truck-crop, tobacco, and 
cotton farms. More than twenty-one thousand women in 1944 and 
sixteen thousand women in 1945 made the program in that state 
successful during the last years of war. College students and 
faculty, as well as working women and homemakers worked as 
part of the South Carolina WLA in 1944 and 1945." 
In South Carolina, the WLA met with teachers, principals, 
and superintendents at the annual Education Association 
meeting held Spring 1944. There, WLA staff discussed the 
recruitment of labor and the need and necessity for students 
and faculty to become involved in the war effort. At meetings 
held at numerous South Carolina can^uses, WLA staff or school 
personnel addressed the farm labor program and the role that 
women played in the WLA and war effort. Encouraging college 
and viniversity women to join the WLA resulted in thousands of 
new volunteers. Mary Lou Nelson, a college student and WLA 
worker in 1944, remarked, "I can't tell you the satisfaction I 
have derived from being a member of the Women's Land Army. 
College officials are always reminding us that the best way 
that we can serve now is to continue our education. Still, we 
often feel that we are so far from doing all that we can do 
for the war effort. Hence, we are so happy to find that there 
is a real need for us during our summer vacation." Her 
comments are representative of college and university students 
in the South and the rest of the country who volunteered for 
the WLA. And although this example seemed to tell students to 
remain in school, the opposite is true. Women continued their 
studies during the academic year, but then joined the WLA 
during the summer months. Subsequently, college and 
university students proved invaluable to the overall wartime 
agricultural labor effort.^® 
Sara Cauthen, a student at Columbia College joined the 
WLA to harvest peaches in 1944. With two friends, "Sara . . . 
did outstanding work in the packing shed at the Femwood Farm. 
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Her en^loyer said that she did the best inspecting job of any 
person he had ever employed. He gave her a fifty-dollar bonus 
at the end of the season." Sara herself enjoyed the 
experience and realized the importance that her and other 
women's work brought to the war effort. "I would not have 
been happy had I not done this work or something like it. I 
thoroughly enjoyed my work. We had long hours to work, but I 
was glad of that because it made me feel like I was helping 
the war effort that much more. I am willing to assist next 
year. ... If I don't get to help with the actual peach 
harvest, I shall be glad to help with the recruitment 
program." In 1945, Cauthen assisted with WLA recruitment in 
the state. Efforts by students such as Nelson and Cauthen 
assisted in bringing the importance of the WLA to most areas 
of South Carolina. By involving college and university 
students during their semester vacations, commxinities realized 
the importance that the women had on area farming.^"' 
Across the South, farmer biases toward the employment of 
women on farms had hankered the efforts of the WLA in 1943 . 
But, for the most part, the negative attitude held by farmers 
regarding the placement of women on farms changed over the 
course of the war, in some cases becoming overwhelmingly 
supportive. Richland County, South Carolina labor assistant 
wrote in 1944: 
Farmers in Richland county, who have used women emergency 
workers on their farms this year, are high in praise of 
the fine work that women have done. While the kinds of 
labor required of women have not been as diversified as 
in some coxinties of the state, their efforts have played 
a large part in conserving the boxintiful crops produced 
in Richland coxmty. In doing farm jobs, such as, grading 
sweet potatoes, peaches, and truck crops, women have 
learned the details involved and have followed them more 
closely than men, according to farmers with whom these 
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women were placed.^® 
South Carolina had not been the only southern state in 1944 to 
laud the work accomplished by members of the WLA. In 
Mississippi, the state report noted, "The present farm labor 
shortage has changed materially all past procedures, customs, 
and thinking of farm people. . . . there is a decided 
difference in the types of work women are doing. Practically 
every county has expressed pride in the contribution women are 
making. . . . Women laborers are found to be dependable, 
require little supervision, given to punctuality and details, 
work systematically and with little or no confusion, all of 
which tend to please the fancy of the farmer." And, while. 
South Carolina had been preoccupied with the race of its WLA 
workers, Mississippi had no such concern--more than forty 
thousand African American and Caucasian women joined the WLA 
in 1943 and 1944. Further limitations regarding the women's 
ability to work as men had been eliminated with the presence 
of "motor-driven machinery" on farms. And in most cases, as 
with the national attitude for the year, farmers, who had been 
leery of the use of women as farm labor in 1943, readily 
accepted those same workers in 1944." 
For the WLA workers in Mississippi, their main labor had 
been conpleted on truck-crop and cotton farms as seasonal 
labor, with a few year-roxznd positions within the state. The 
women who worked as agricultural laborers in Mississippi in 
1944 had overwhelmingly been homemakers, accounting for 75 
percent of the more than forty thousand women employed in 
Mississippi. In contrast to other locales around the country, 
professional and business women coiinted for less than 5 
percent of the total group of women working in Mississippi. 
In 1945, Mississippi recruited a larger labor force than it 
utilized, thus, southern women traveled to South Dakota to 
work on farms in that state.This practice of interstate 
exchange of labor was not unique for Mississippi, it occurred 
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in most areas of the country as labor was transported from one 
state to another where the need for workers was great. States 
in border areas of regions traded labor throughout the war as 
men and women worked on farms and in factories. 
While farm women remained on their farms and provided 
labor, large-scale seasonal operations utilized all nonfarm 
labor available. In North Carolina, the formal organization 
of the WLA did not occur, but women still worked on farms. In 
most cases, rural and farm women had actively worked as 
agricultural labor before the war. The absence of a formal 
WLA organization in North Carolina did not hinder farm and 
nonfarm women from "pitching in" and helping to raise and 
harvest the state's agricultural products.^^ 
In Florida, the presence of women in agriculture had been 
a common occurrence prior to World War II. With the 
importance of the state's citrus crop, all available labor had 
been used each year at harvest. The years of war would prove 
no different. In Florida, custom dictated that farm families 
work in the fields, a practice upheld by the majority of the 
state in the 1940s. And, regardless of race, men, women, and 
children worked in the fields "producing, harvesting, and 
storing" the year's crops and food products. In 1942, Florida 
discovered that "exchanging labor was about the only means 
that many of the farmers had for harvesting their crops." 
Within the tradition of labor exchange, African American 
families had been more inclined to participate than white farm 
families. "Many entire white families work on their own 
farms, and negro families work on their own places and also 
hire out to work on other farms. Exchange of labor is also a 
custom."" 
In 1943, Bonnie J. Carter, assistant state supervisor for 
the farm labor program, recognized the importance that labor 
exchange made to Florida farming and noted, "Exchange of labor 
was practiced among white families to a greater extent this 
year than has heretofore been the custom." Still, regardless 
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of labor exchange systems in place, women remained involved in 
Florida agriculture. In 1943, women produced, harvested, and 
stored a variety of crops, including fruits and vegetables, 
cotton, peanuts, and tobacco. Without a structured WLA 
recruitment program, Florida women were placed on farms by 
those farmers who desired labor to harvest their season's 
crops. Even without a recruitment plan in place in 1943, some 
women volxintarily joined the WLA to participate in its 
program." 
In this way, thousands of farm and nonfarm women worked 
in Florida's fields to harvest crops. These women fulfilled 
the labor need seasonally, mostly on their own, or neighbor's 
farm. Work exchange, used each year, made the presence of a 
formal WLA recruitment plan unnecessary. By 1945, most 
Florida farm families participated in "labor exchanges" with 
neighbors in order to harvest crops in a timely manner. In 
most cases, women joined the agricultural labor force and WLA 
on their own, in answer to the farmers' need and the country's 
patriotic request for war workers. Consequently, more than 
eight thousand women worked on Florida farms in 1943. In the 
following war years, the number of women employed on Florida 
farms numbered more than thirty thousand each year. While, 
some of these women were members of the WLA or placed through 
Extension labor programs, the majority had been African 
American and Caucasian farm and rural women who secured their 
own employment. Although the WLA did not actively recruit 
labor in Florida women were not prohibited from joining the 
organization. Regardless of recruitment efforts or lack 
thereof, Florida women joined the WLA to participate in the 
American war effort.^* 
The success of labor exchange programs in Florida during 
the war, caused other southern issues to be down played. In 
terms of race and class, blatant racism in the state's annual 
reports cannot be found; but, implications did exist. In 
1943, Carter reported, that, while African American women 
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worked in fields, white women had been hired for "packing 
houses and canneries." Further discussion included statements 
that reported that African American women had been used in 
citrus groves and vegetable fields, without mention of 
employment of white women in the same locations. In an effort 
to downplay the presence of racism. Carter described the work 
placements in the following manner. "Due to the 
unsatisfactory living conditions and to the customs of long­
standing in regard to not employing white women alongside 
negro men and women in the fields, it has been the policy of 
the Emergency Farm Labor Staff to refer applications from 
members of the Woman's Land Army from other states to the 
United States Employment Service for placement in citrus and 
vegetable packing houses and/or citorus canneries."^® 
With the passage of time, the attitude regarding the 
placement of white female farm labor might have changed in 
Florida. However, without mention of race in the remaining 
WLA annual reports, a clear conclusion cannot be drawn. 
Still, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the remaining 
years of war would follow the example illustrated in 1943. In 
1945, Florida packing houses and canneries utilized a large 
labor force of local and out-of-state women. Based on 
statements made in the 1943 report, these women would have 
been placed by the U.S. Employment Service or through local 
efforts, and, if the procedures continued from year-to-year, 
would have been white.The situation that developed in 
Florida fields, groves, and packing houses is not peculiar to 
the South. And, although the practice of labor exchange is a 
positive action taken during the war, the discrimination 
toward and exclusion of African American women from some 
positions is disheartening in the face of domestic defense. 
Other states experienced situations much like that in 
Florida during the war. Georgia farmers also exchanged labor; 
additionally, farm and rural women continued to work in 
agriculture, joined in most cases by urban women hired 
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specifically for seasonal labor. And, while Florida's citrus 
importance is replaced by peaches in Georgia, the pattern of 
Georgia agriculture is similar to Florida. A major 
agricultural difference between the two states during World 
War II regarded the role that the WLA played. While, 
Florida's WLA organization did not possess an active 
recruitment plan, the Georgia state program had approached the 
labor situation differently. Georgia WLA officials recruited 
women for the WLA, and although slow to organize, once 
established, the organization placed thousands of women on 
Georgia cotton, peach, peanut, tobacco, and other crop farms. 
Like Georgia, the state of Kentucky also utilized the WLA 
in its recruitment for farm labor; in contrast, however, 
Kentucky's WLA worked to recruit female labor almost 
immediately. However, race- and gender-related issues became 
major considerations in proposed labor recruitment. The 1943 
annual labor report stated the situation as, "The larger 
proportion of farm workers in Kentucky have been negroes. It 
is not in keeping with the Southern tradition to think of 
women replacing negroes. There is a decided sentiment against 
the employment of women for general farm work and year-round 
help." Kentucky, as a "general farming" state, did not 
possess the tradition of women in its fields, thus with the 
absence of men, the necessity of early recruitment and 
placement of women had been deemed imperative for agricultural 
survival. In that regard, the registration of women for the 
WLA included farm and rural women who had been previously 
and/or continuously engaged in agricultural work, and nonfarm 
women. 
In terms of general farming, the state had not expected 
to change its labor practices. Historically, Kentucky had 
used African American and white men for farm labor, and for 
the most part, did not visualize a great change during the 
period from 1943 to 1945. Kentucky farmers expected to 
continue the use of men on farms, and, while state officials 
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and WLA staff worked to recruit female agricultural labor, 
farmers did not welcome the presence of nonfarm women as 
workers in exchange for men. In terms of year-round, full-
time positions, Kentucky labor officials filled these jobs 
with men, because general "farming enterprises in Kentucky are 
not the type for which women workers are particularly 
adapted." Because of this attitude, Kentucky farmers accepted 
farm and irural women, black or white, but not the white urban 
lady who arrived to assist farmers. "Our best and finest farm 
women are working on their own farms. A pretty high type of 
woman is willing to work in such pressure crops as strawberry 
picking. Custom has given approval to that, but tradition 
does not tolerate the employment of women for usual farm work. 
In the main, women who seek employment on farms for heavier 
work are negro women and white women of rather low type."^' 
Clearly, Kentucky farmers had not been comfortable with urban, 
middle-class, white women in any farm positions. Out of 
necessity, however, they would tolerate such a labor force in 
seasonal crop harvests. 
In peace time, Kentucky farming had not used women as 
its premier labor source. Subsequently, the prevailing 
attitude among Kentucky farmers during the labor shortage of 
the Second World War kept farm women on their own farms and 
the use of nonfarm women as labor acceptable only for seasonal 
crops. Kentucky seasonal crops included strawberries, 
tomatoes, and peaches. Successful placement of nonfarm women 
in seasonal farm labor positions in 1943, allowed the 
continual use of women in more positions during later years. 
The placement of farm and nonfarm women on agricultural 
operations during the war was an important concession for 
Kentucky farmers, especially in regard to their attitude 
concerning the use of women in a "general farming" state. 
With the first WLA crop year, policy regarding labor 
recruitment had been initiated. In Kentucky, the WLA 
recruited the following people to assist in agriculture in 
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1943. Again, Myrtle Weldon, WLA supervisor noted the action 
taken in the state. 
Farm women have made their greatest contribution by doing 
agricultural work on their own farms; . . . and non-farm 
women have made their greatest contribution to seasonal 
farm work, particularly work concerned with such pressure 
crops as strawberry picking, tomato picking, peach 
picking and grading, etc. Emphasis will be placed on 
registration of women for work on their own farms and for 
seasonal work. So long as year-round workers can be 
supplied from men and boys, we will not worry too much 
about placing women in these jobs. If the need 
increases, the attitude which now prevails against the 
employment of women for year-round workers may change. 
However, in 1943 the need did not arise, and for the most 
part, women remained in seasonal labor positions. In general, 
KentucJcy farmers accepted female farm labor for seasonal and 
specialized crops, at the same time acknowledging that 
general-style farming did not particularly adapt itself to 
women workers.The attitude present in Kentucky is one that 
is more common in the states of the Middle West rather than 
the South. Midwestern farmers accepted the necessity of 
nonfarm female labor for seasonal and specialty crops, but not 
for their own or a general-agriculture farm. Recognized as 
being short-sighted, this biased view regarding nonfarm women 
would be adjusted by the end of the war as farmers, regardless 
of location or farm type, accepted women agricultural workers 
without complaint. 
In Virginia, the reczruitment of women for the WLA 
continued much like other southern states. In 1943, the use 
of nonfarm women was unsuccessful. Attempts to recruit, 
train, place, and keep nonfarm women on the state's farms 
resulted in disappointment. Initial 1943 labor estimates 
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requested fifty nonfarm women for state agricultural labor. 
Eight applied, were trained, and by the end of six months, 
only one remained "on the job." Thus, ended Virginia's 
efforts to recruit nonfarm women for year-round agricultural 
labor. However, while nonfarm women had proved xinsatisfactory 
for year-round labor, that was not the case in the placement 
of nonfarm women in seasonal positions. Reported in the 
state's annual labor report, "Washington vacationists, 
including various departmental secretaries, helped harvest 
tomato, peach, and other crops in Rockingham county. . . . 
Farmers state that for certain selected jobs these women 
proved satisfactory." And, except for one statement, "Negro 
women recruited in Norfolk have not been considered a part of 
the Women's Land Army," race appeared not to have been an 
issue or to affect the operation of the WLA in Virginia. 
However, like most southern states, that was not the case. 
This statement, from Virginia's labor report, reflected the 
situation that developed because states did not wish to use 
both black and white women for labor, but attempted to 
segregate and separate the women. Again, African American 
women were kept from the WLA organization.^^ 
The exclusion of Virginia's African American women from 
the WLA demonstrated the South's continual determination to 
keep black women from the wartime agency. While historically 
it had been acceptable for black women to work in the fields 
and on the farms to harvest foodstuffs and crops, it had not 
been possible to be a member of the federal organization 
involved in the same occupation. In Virginia as the war 
progressed, the state WLA organization did not acknowledge the 
presence of African American women within their group. 
Additionally, the 1944 and 1945 annual labor reports indicated 
a reluctance to utilize white women as farm labor in some 
areas of the state, due in part to the "high negro population" 
and poor weather that existed. The WLA supervisor reported 
that few women had worked in agriculture prior to the war, 
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thus their presence during war would not be required. Due to 
the number of African Americans present in the population, one 
might assume that the absence of women in farming referred to 
Caucasian women and not all Virginia women. 
In teiTOs of seasonal labor, especially apple production, 
however, women were called in great numbers to participate. 
And, in Virginia, as with other states, homemakers made up the 
largest proportion of women employed during the war; 
additionally working women, students, teachers, and service 
men's wives worked in Virginia fields cultivating and 
harvesting seasonal crops. The annual labor reports did not 
indicate whether these "women" included all available women, 
only Caucasian women, or only African American women. 
Regardless, it is evident from the reports that the state's 
fruit harvests required thousands of laborers each year. The 
impression that women workers leave with skeptical farmers 
each year assist in the next recruitment efforts. And 
Virginia had been no different. Farmers lauded the 
accomplishments of the WLA and its workers. From Hugh Wiley, 
"All our WLA girls are fine. I never had any better help. 
They are quick to leam, have dogged perseverance, and are 
conscientious in their work. I would like to have them back 
next year." And, from Gardner Lum, "They are quick to catch 
on to what has to be done. They realize that packing a good 
peach is more in^ortant than just packing, like local labor 
usually does." The accolades continued through the 1944 and 
1945 crop years.The language expressed in the 1944 or 1945 
annual state reports did not explicitly describe race or class 
differences, as they had in 1943, but the situation still 
existed among the female agricultural workers in the South. 
In comparison to other states throughout the nation 
the biases against the employment of nonfanti and urban white 
women had been greatest in 1943. By the end of the war, 
states had attempted to put their prejudices aside and 
concentrate on the recruitment and placement of any and all 
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available labor. Even so, the situation that developed in 
each southern state illustrated the position that the WLA 
held, as well as demonstrated the attitudes of farmers and 
workers. For the most part, these deep-seated traditions and 
biases had been based on work conditions that had existed for 
decades. With these issues in mind, it is not difficult to 
understand the problems faced by southern state labor 
organizations to effectively promote the use of all available 
women for agricultural work. In several states, the formal 
organization of the WLA did not occur in a timely manner, in 
some cases, more than one year after its federal 
establishment. Thus, in several states, such as Florida, 
Mississippi, and North Carolina, other state agencies handled 
the recruitment of female faim labor for farms. Still, the 
persistence of the WLA remained, so that by the end of the 
war, its presence in the southern United States represented an 
attempt to register all women for farm work and to participate 
in the war effort. 
Regardless of their situations or the work that farm 
women conducted in the southern United States, issues such as 
race and class clearly divided these women. In the South, the 
issues regarding acceptance of nonfarm women as agricultural 
labor result more from racial and economic distinctions than 
social. In a region where racial discrimination was part of 
society, it is not surprising that its characteristics 
transcended to wartime labor measures as well. Be they either 
black or white, rich or poor, southern farm women differed in 
several aspects. Race and class brought division regarding 
the proper place in society for southern women, as well as the 
acceptability and suitability for these women to be engaged in 
agricultural labor. In that regard, southern women faced a 
greater challenge in their efforts to join the WLA than women 
of other areas of the nation. Southern women combatted 
society's attitudes and biases regarding their position in 
society, and their participation in the national farm labor 
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effort. While midwestem farmers had not been eager to employ 
nonfarm women as agricultural laborers due to their suspected 
xinsuitability for farm work, southern farmers had employed 
racial and economic prejudices to keep certain women out of 
their fields. However, federal government crop and food 
production goals, brought the issue of female recruitment to 
the forefront of farm labor policy. In the years of WLA 
operation it had been necessary for the highest level of 
participation possible. Accomplished through extensive media 
releases and education programs, the southern WLA state 
programs found success and importance as part of the Emergency 
Farm Labor Program in spite of the prejudices against women as 
agricultural workers. 
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CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSIONS 
The success of the WLA as a wartime agricultural labor 
measure is demonstrated by the fact that the organization did 
not reach an early demise, but continued through the end of 
the war. Additionally, the enrollment, participation, and 
eti5)loyment of more than three million women by the WLA, 
Extension Se2rvice, and/or farmers represented one of the 
largest farm labor programs organized during World War II. 
Regardless of the attitudes held by several individuals within 
the USDA and national farm organizations, the presence of 
women workers on the country's farms continued from the first 
year of operation through 1945. At that point, however, the 
WLA placement of women in the fields decreased and then ceased 
as farmers and farm laborers returned home. Similar to the 
situation that occurred in the industrial sector of society, 
female farm workers recruited and placed by the WLA, who had 
been considered temporary labor assistance during the war, did 
not, for the most part, continue their agricultural employment 
into 1946.^ 
Thus, the termination of the WLA after the 1945 crop 
season allows the scholar the ability to analyze the 
historical significance of the WLA within a specific time 
frame, i.e. World War II. Confined to this limited period, 
the success of the WLA program, as well as the greater 
organization of the Emergency Farm Labor Program, can be 
measured by the number of participants and efforts put forth 
by the federal government and farm workers. Additionally, the 
continual placement of women in agriculture implies that the 
WLA influenced farmers and others within the field that women 
had been suitable as laborers. Although the program met its 
demise in 1945, women remained in the fields, either as 
private hirees or as members of the Emergency Farm Labor 
Program. 
Undoubtedly the WLA changed the role that women played in 
J 
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agriculture during the early 1940s. By bringing women back to 
the fields in some regions and expanding the work force in 
others, the WLA altered the structure of farm labor. And 
these changes had not been restricted to agriculture as women 
reentered or joined the work force in all areas of the 
economic sector of society. In some cases, women returned to 
work during World War II, while other women acquired jobs for 
the first time. The result of this wartime employment brought 
the presence of the WLA and other wartime labor programs and 
their efforts to the forefront of study. How had these 
programs affected women's place within the economic sector of 
society? And, did wartime programs establish a trend that 
allowed women to remain in the labor force after the war or 
did these programs create a valuable precedent for women to 
begin working after the war? In terms of the WLA, it is 
important to address the means by which the organization 
provided farmers with agricultural workers in the absence of 
men during the national emergency. But, did its eventual 
demise at the end of 1945 affect female employment in 
agriculture. 
Long before the federal government had initiated 
legislation to establish the WLA, several states organized 
their own programs. With examples in place in California, 
Maine, Oregon, and Verroont, for example, the federal 
government considered these states viable models for its own 
program. By the time of actual federal involvement in early 
1943, the administration and Congress had discussed the issue 
of wartime farm labor and the role of women. Drawing on these 
examples, as well as foreign counterparts, the federal 
government organized an agricultural labor program. With 
limited fxinding the first year of its operation, the WLA 
commanded only 150,000 dollars of the total 26 million dollar 
USDA budget. Seen as only an experimental program, the USDA 
and Congress had not placed much of their resources in the 
organization, but instead waited for the WLA to prove itself. 
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Although some states had early state- or private-run 
organizations in place as early as 1941, it was not until the 
official creation of the WLA in 1943 that the work women 
accomplished on farms was legitimized by the federal 
government. With the passing of governmental legislation, 
women's contribution to the war effort and to farm life became 
an iit5)ortant component of the domestic defense effort. 
Although in some states women had worked as seasonal labor for 
decades, the 1940s represented a time when the federal 
government made a concerted effort to organize and recognize 
female farm labor on a national scale. In addition to the use 
of women as seasonal labor in the East and West, farm women 
had actively participated in agriculture as well. Although in 
the decades immediately prior to World War II, for the most 
part, farm women had been removed from the daily activity 
within the fields, they remained tied to the land in much the 
same manner as their husbands, fathers, and brothers. Due to 
mechanization, new crops, and overall improvements in farming 
practices, the use and need of farm women and girls in the 
fields had diminished. Although women still held several 
agricultural jobs that occupied their time, field work had not 
been one of them. Because of this, farmers easily disavowed 
the use of women as faim and field labor during the early 
1940s. 
In the Midwest, farmers discouraged the use of women to 
assist in the region's fields, citing their inability to 
operate heavy farm equipment. Prejudiced against the use of 
nonfarm urban women as labor, farmers stated their belief that 
these women would not be appropriate for field work or possess 
the knowledge to operate machinery. This assumption by 
midwestem farmers that women could not handle large farm 
implements is unique as other locales around the country-
allowed women access to machinery, as well as trained women to 
operate the equipment. 
In the South, the prejudice that existed had been 
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different and more confining to the total female population of 
the region. Steeped in racial issues, southern farmers did 
not immediately accept nonfarm, middle-class, white ladies as 
agricultural labor. Wrapped within issues of race, gender, 
and class, some southern WLA organizations attempted to 
survive by adhering to these social restrictions. By keeping 
African Americans from the WLA, confining urban white women to 
select jobs, or refusing to even organize a WLA in some 
states, southern farmers sometimes faced difficultly in 
securing adequate labor. In 1943, to acquire its needed labor 
southern farmers recruited farm and nonfarm women for service, 
in many cases without benefit of WLA membership. Tens of 
thousands of women participated in efforts to harvest state 
crops, while state WLA annual reports recorded WLA 
participation fewer than ten thousand. For example, Florida, 
South Carolina, and Texas registered few if any women WLA 
workers; however, tens of thousands of women worked on each 
state's farms during crop years. As an example. South 
Carolina illustrated the racial attitude present in the region 
during the 1940s. At that time, the WLA did not advocate the 
recruitment of black women for fear that their presence within 
the organization would keep white farm and nonfarm women from 
participating. 
Southern state officials believed that the association of 
African Americans with the WLA would affect the position of 
the WLA within southern society. To bypass these problems, 
and forego the possibility of recruitment of labor, many 
southern states resisted establishment of the WLA within their 
borders. Thus, if southern states or farmers needed labor in 
1943, they skipped the WLA totally and recruited labor from 
other sources. Either the farmers themselves recruited their 
labor, or the state enrolled fairm women within their labor 
program. These actions by southern farmers, the federal WLA 
organization, and state officials restricted female presence 
in agriculture in 1943. In 1944 and 1945, the state WLA 
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organizations relaxed these restrictions and accepted most 
women who wanted to join their group and work on farms. By 
that time, however, it was sometimes too late to recruit 
African American and urban women as they had located alternate 
employment. 
In the Southwest, other conditions dictated the 
reluctance by regional farmers to utilize a female labor 
force. For the most part, fanners' hesitancy is a result of 
the region's use of Mexican nationals and farm women as a 
labor force. In 1943, Texas did not officially organize a WLA 
organization, even though more than seventy-five thousand 
women worked on farms. The situation remained constant in 
Texas for each year of war, and roughly consistent for the 
other states of the region as well. These actions taken by 
southern, midwestem and southwestern farmers to ignore 
nonfarm WLA members and to employ non-WLA workers as 
agricultural laborers did little to deter the federal program. 
The WLA, on a national scale, managed to recruit and place 
more workers than any other labor program during the war, and 
clearly, it is the presence of this organization that assisted 
in the nation's efforts to combat its enemies during the war 
years. 
The first year of WLA operation, 1943, served as a 
proving groxind for the federal organization as state agencies 
provided farmers with necessary labor. Farm and nonfarm 
women, African American, Asian American, and Caucasian women 
worked on farms to assist in meeting the wartime agricultural 
production quotas established by the federal government. 
These production quotas would provide not only food and 
supplies for the United States, but also for its allies. 
Although the Extension Service recorded less than five hundred 
thousand women as part of their labor programs in 1943, at 
least twice as many women worked on farms during that year.^ 
The difference consisted of farm and nonfarm women not 
recruited by the Extension Seirvice or WLA. It was the inexact 
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number of farm and nonfarm women who worked without being 
members of the WLA that made it difficult for the federal 
government to accurately state the number of participating 
women.^ Still, we can theorize that the participation for 
1943 had been about one million members, which suggested to 
the WLA administration. Extension Service and USDA that the 
labor program had been successful for its first year of 
operation. Based on this premise, the federal government 
continued its fiinding and support for future crop years. 
As the organization continued, the use of women, farm and 
nonfarm, expanded. Following 1943, and the first official 
year for the organization of the WLA, the federal agency had 
been determined to keep the momentum that the agency created 
in place. To do this, the federal WLA administration needed 
strong recruitment efforts for 1944 and a deep determination 
to continue the program. Florence Hall and her staff created 
brochures and newsletters, held public forums, and met workers 
to further instill the need for agricultural workers. 
Distributed to state agencies, WLA recruitment materials 
continued to entice women to join the war effort and perform 
their patriotic duty. Each year of operation, the WLA enjoyed 
greater farmer demand and greater recruitment of nonfarm 
women. By giving up their yearly vacations, working and 
professional women and college and university students and 
faculty joined the ranks of the WLA. 
In 1944, Hall and her administration hoped to recruit 
800,000 women. The WLA's actions and eventual results can be 
determined from state annual reports, WLA newsletters, and 
national publicity. Articles in the popular press assisted in 
drawing attention to the WLA and its "successes." During that 
crop year, the WLA's new recruitment materials brought more 
women to participate in agriculture across the nation. Due in 
part to the greater demand for agricultural products 
established by the federal government, as well as requests 
from farmers for laborers and women for placement, states 
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enjoyed greater participation and activity. A cigar company, 
state unnamed, asked for women specifically to provide labor 
in 1944/ farmers requested women "to drive tractor, do 
plowing, harrow and general work--to go to work now [May] and 
xintil fall."" For the most part, farm and nonfarm women 
worked in similar positions as in 1943. 
In the two regions of the nation that had protested the 
placement of nonfarm women in its agricultural structure the 
previous year, the Midwest and South grew more accepting in 
1944. These regions placed more women on their farms each 
succeeding year. Nonfarm women were employed on a greater 
scale than had been previously, as midwestem farmers utilized 
this labor for more general farm work in relation to those who 
had been employed in seasonal positions, such as detasseling 
com. In the South, farmers initiated recruitment efforts to 
include African Americans and other minorities within their 
structure, all in attempts to disregard the exclusionary 
practices used in 1943. Clearly, the efforts put forth by the 
federal WLA agency accomplished the recruitment goals as more 
women participated in the WLA and worked on farms than the 
previous year,- this trend continued in 1945. Throughout the 
1944 crop year, WLA administrators and other USDA officials 
created a good public image of the WLA and its work program. 
Additionally, women themselves assisted in recruitment 
measures by bringing others to j oin the WLA ranks. Farmers 
who had been opposed to the labor program in 1943, utilized 
more women in their efforts to meet wartime-production quotas. 
Across the country women joined forces to harvest crops. 
As a result of WLA performance in 1943 and 1944, Hall and 
her staff expected great efforts in 1945. With that year's 
crop year to a good start, state programs actively recruited 
female farm labor. During the first half of the 1945 crop 
year, the country remained posed for wartime-production, which 
included agricultural production. However, in the second half 
of the year, following V-E and V-J days and prior to most crop 
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harvests, some WLA volunteers foxind themselves displaced from 
their farm labor positions as returning farmers and 
agricultural workers went back to work. Even so, the 
increased wartime production needed to be harvested, and in 
many cases WLA participants continued in their wartime 
positions. War-level agricultural production required more 
labor than returning servicemen provided, thus, the presence 
of faiiti and nonfarm women in the nation's fields was still 
necessary. And even though the number of enrollees in the WLA 
had been lower in 1945 than expected, participation remained 
high. 
Between 1943 and 1945, the number of WLA participants 
continued to climb. All told, the WLA had been able to credit 
more than three million farm and nonfarm women to work in 
agriculture during World War II. Although Wayne D. Rasmussen 
in "The History of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program, 
1943-1947," reported fewer women in the Extension Service 
program, the validity of these reporting services have been 
questioned. Several reporting agencies within the federal 
government "counted" the number of women who participated in 
the WLA, and the figure of three million accounted for farm 
and nonf arm women.® However, regardless of the number of 
women "coiinted" by each agency, the WLA recorded greater 
participation levels with each passing year. Thus, the WLA 
obtained the greatest number of participation than other farm-
labor programs. Farm and nonfarm women aged eighteen years 
and older worked in year-round, month-long, week-long, or 
days-long positions. For the most part, nonf arm women were 
placed in seasonal-labor positions. Women who worked in 
northeastern, southern, and western states commonly planted, 
cultivated, and har-vested seasonal crops,- still, some women 
worked year-round on dairy and livestock operations. In the 
Midwest, women worked on crop, dairy, and livestock farms. 
Thus, the success of the WLA should be measured by its ability 
to retain labor, as well as the recruitment and placement of 
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great numbers of women during each succeeding year, even in 
locations unfavorable to the WLA previously. 
The rate of success of the WLA can be defined by the 
positive response received by the workers and farmers who 
participated. And, except for the opposition encountered by 
those farmers in the Midwest and South, in general, public 
sentiment regarding the WLA appeared positive. But, how 
accurate was that sentiment? For the most part, information 
obtained from WLA annual reports and newsletters, media 
releases. Extension Service and USDA publications, and feature 
articles portrayed the WLA favorably. It would have been 
detrimental to the future of the WLA to present the 
organization and its efforts to raise an effective labor force 
in an unfavorable light. The few negative comments that are 
part of the public record reflect the opinion of midwestem 
and southern faormers during the first year of WLA operation. 
Concerned with the inclusion of nonfarm women in the program, 
midwestem and southern state reports and media articles did 
not depict the use of nonfarm women as laborers in a 
completely negative manner, but rather as a labor force that 
worked best elsewhere. However, in general, biased prejudices 
disappeared by the end of the first crop year. 
In contrast, the reaction by female members of the WLA 
had been overwhelmingly positive. For the most part, it is 
difficult to locate strong negative comments from the 
participants. For most of the same reasons as described 
above, it would not have been beneficial for the program to 
publicize a worker's unhappiness regarding their experience in 
the WLA. Therefore, most state reports. Extension Service 
publications, medial releases, and feature stories portrayed 
women as they enjoyed their wartime service. It is unusual to 
discover women who had not enjoyed their service and piiblicly 
stated that dislike. However, some do occur. The following 
statement made by a 1944 WLA worker in Michigan is not 
completely negative regarding the program and farm work, but 
304 
it is far from positive. "It was really an experience. The 
hours were long, the food bad and as good as no bathing 
facilities. I can begin to appreciate what my son who is a 
bombardier in Italy may be having to put up with."® While not 
a common sentiment, some women expressed their service in that 
manner, thereby discoiinting any benefits that they provided to 
the overall harvest. Thus, due to this statement, one 
concludes that not all WLA workers embraced their farm labor 
with the exuberance exhibited by program and Extension Service 
propaganda. 
Still, for the most part, women seemed enthusiastic about 
their patriotic service during the early 1940s. As mentioned, 
the arrival of war brought several changes to the structure of 
the female labor force, least of which being age and marital 
status. These characteristics transcended themselves not just 
in the urban areas of defense work, but to the farm fields as 
well. Married women, of all races, entered domestic and 
defense industries and agriculture at rates unseen, and 
"constituted a significantly larger proportion of the wartime 
increase in female ettployment than did single women. . . . 
married women outnumbered single women in the female work 
force." And of these women, white married women accounted for 
significant numbers. Additionally, the presence of older 
women in the defense labor force represented another wartime 
trend. Statistics have shown that women over the age of 
thirty-five had been more inclined to work than those who had 
been between twenty-five and thirty-four or of traditional 
childbearing age. Additionally, single women aged fourteen to 
nineteen also entered the labor force in record numbers."' 
Although women had been part of the working world for 
centuries, married women accounted for less than 5 percent of 
that paid force by the tum-of-the-century. By 1940, the 
number of married women in the work force had crept up to 
slightly more than 15 percent of total workers. World War II 
would greatly alter the married women's contribution to paid 
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work. During the height of the war, the presence of married 
women in the labor force has been quantified two ways. The 
United States Bureau of the Census recorded working married 
women in terms of the military status of their husbands; 
therefore, table 3 compares the percentages of women working 
in terms of husbands who remained at home and husbands who 
were in the military. Among married white women the greatest 
number of women who joined the work force during the war had 
been older homemakers. And they, like their compatriots 
remained in the work force at greater figures in 1950 than ten 
years previous.® 
Table 3. Married women's participation in the work force 
Women Husband 1940 1944 1947 1950 
All ages present 15 .6 21.7 20 .0 23 .8 
military 52 .5 
25-44 years present 17.7 24 .7 22 .4 26.0 
military 55 .0 
45-64 years present 10 .3 20 .0 18 .4 21.8 
military 41.7 
source: Claudia D. Goldin, "The Role of World War II in the 
Rise of Women's Employment," American Economic 
Review 81 (September 1991): 742. 
The assumption that the end of World War II also signaled 
the end of women's employment in the country is false. 
Although women had been viewed as temporary workers during 
wartime and they had been displaced from some positions by 
returning servicemen, they remained in the work force. 
Comparison between the rate of married working women for 1944, 
1947, and 1950 indicates that although women returned to the 
home immediately following the end of the war, many accepted 
paid employment before 1950. Therefore, the importance of 
World War II on the number of women working in the country in 
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the late 1940s and into the 1950s has been debated by several 
scholars. While historian William Chafe described World War 
II as the "watershed" that redefined economic and social roles 
within the coxintry, others disagree. Scholarship in the 1980s 
revised this image of World War II and "discoxinted the 
importance of World War II in altering the lives of American 
women." While women participated in the labor force, they had 
not become permanent employees nor given lasting positions. 
Scholars reiterated women's desires to only participate in the 
war as part of their patriotic duty with the intent to quit 
once the war had finished. Karen Anderson recounted such 
sentiment in her work, particularly through the comments made 
by Genevieve Trofanowski when she was dismissed from her 
wartime job. "I think a woman's place is in the home--except 
when there's a war on."' 
Still, large numbers of women had not been content to 
return to their homes and resume a full-time home life. Many 
wanted to remain in their industrial and agricultural jobs 
following the war. That proved difficult when returning 
servicemen filled those positions and displaced women. Not 
all women had been removed from their wartime positions, and 
those women remained as the years passed. In the 1950s, more 
married women remained in the work force than had been present 
during the height of World War II. Chafe reported that more 
than ten million married women were employed in 1952, two 
million more than during World War II and almost three times 
as many employed married women in 1940. In the 1950s, married 
women comprised a majority of working women, 52 percent in 
1950 compared to slightly more than 36 percent in 1940.'-° 
Chafe saw these increases as evidence that World War II 
dramatically changed the position of women in society, but 
others, such as Anderson, Campbell, and Goldin had difficulty 
agreeing with his analysis. According to Claudia Goldin in 
her analysis of women's employment role in society, World War 
II "had several significant indirect impacts on women's 
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employment, but its direct influence appears to have been more 
modest." Therefore, it is possible to hypothesize that the 
presence of labor programs during World War II, and the WLA in 
particular, provided women with the legitimization needed to 
justify their presence in the work force rather than the push 
to enter it. Thus, women remained working following the war, 
and in the case of married women their numbers only increased 
as the years passed. By 1960, married women's participation 
in the labor force had doiibled over the rate recorded in 1940; 
the greatest number of which being white women who had worked 
in 1940 and 1944 and continued to work through the 1950s. 
The success of the WLA placed the organization in an 
unique position within the federal government. This labor 
program recruited a large number of women workers to 
participate in a war effort not related to industry. Aside 
from the work performed, hours kept, and wages paid did female 
farm laborers differ greatly from female industrial workers? 
In terms of the overall women's labor force during World War 
II several characteristics have been identified as typical. 
Of these, age and marital status, are as important to this 
agricultural labor study as studies that focused on female 
industrial laborers. While it had not been possible to track 
the age of most WLA workers, general conclusions were drawn. 
For the most part, state annual reports did not record their 
members on the basis of age. Reports did indicate, however, 
the person who volunteered for service. Thus, generalizations 
can be made regarding those students who participated in the 
WLA. Common assumption was that these students were between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-two during their time of WLA 
service. Therefore, it was possible to find eighteen year-old 
women working along side women sixty years of age in seasonal 
labor positions. 
Also, with an older female labor force and higher 
instance of married women working in the country, the WLA 
boasted a similar trend. While university and college 
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students worked in some regions of the country, in many cases, 
married homemakers and farm and working women accounted for a 
large proportion of the WLA participants. Again, assumptions 
are made concerning the presence of both groups of women in 
the fields. In the WLA annual reports, two terms were 
regularly used to describe the state's workers. Generally, 
the term "girls" related to the presence of students within 
the organization, while "women" accounted for married women. 
Not every state, of course, used this terminology. Some 
officials discussed participants by their position in society, 
either as married or single women, or by their primary 
employment or occupation. In that regard, states recorded the 
number of students, homemakers, professionals, and others 
present each year in the fields. Regardless, it is not 
possible to xinequivocally state the ages or marital status of 
women who participated in the labor program except to relay 
that WLA workers were over the age of eighteen and able to 
perform hard physical labor. 
Regardless of their age or marital status, women who 
joined the WLA expressed their desire to be patriotic and help 
the war effort as their reason to engage in agricultural 
labor. State WLA annual reports and national media articles 
furthered this perception of the women's motivation. Clearly, 
money had not been their main concern. Farm workers earned 
less money and worked longer hours than most industrial 
laborers. Most women who worked as agricultural laborers had 
not been dependent on that income for their support. 
Professional women, university and public school faculty, and 
homemakers met their patriotic duty without regard to the 
wages paid. A college student reported that her farm salary 
did not sustain her and she relied on her parents for basic 
expenses." Professional/working women and homemakers treated 
the WLA as a service to the nation, as the money they earned 
only subsidized their income. This acceptance by WLA members 
of low-paying wages was contrary to women who worked in the 
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industrial sector of society. Women employed in defense 
industries had, in many cases, relocated and worked full-time 
to provide better conditions for their families. In terms of 
farming, however, the women's role and attitude has been 
defined as one of patriotism and concern for the ability of 
American farmers to adequately provide the needed foodstuffs 
for the nation and world. 
Given the success of the WLA's three years of operation, 
its administrators assumed that the labor program would 
continue past the end of World War II. This, however, did not 
occur. For many the completion of the WLA and eventual ending 
of this labor program echoed the actions of the industrial 
sector of society at the end of the war. Industrial managers 
and owners also released the women working in defense plants 
and other factories once seorvicemen returned home. With men 
returning to the home front, wartime jobs went to pre-war 
employees without thought of the women who had worked as 
replacements or teir^jorary labor. Women were displaced from 
jobs they had held for years. In light of this action by 
private and public agencies, the question must be asked 
whether the use of women in the war had brought any benefits 
to each respective sector of society. Women who had been 
employed in industry and manufacturing visualized their 
contribution to the war effort in the form of defense 
supplies. 
In agriculture, however, the quantification of women's 
efforts to defense are different. In the case of farming, 
each year production began again as farmers started with a new 
crop. While crop yield per acre and quotas were recorded, 
visual evidence of production, such as tanks and weapons, did 
not remain from year-to-year. Thus, how did society and the 
WLA view the women's participation in agriculture? If a 
positive experience occurred, should women remain in farming 
following World War II. Or, had it been necessary as in 
industry, to displace female farm workers in the same manner. 
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Thus, in action similar to industry, with the end of war, the 
WLA met its own demise. Women who joined the agricultural 
front as members of the WLA were removed from farms as 
servicemen return home. 
First, it is important to note that although the 
Emergency Farm Labor Program remained in place through the 
1947 crop year, the WLA did not. And, while women remained in 
agriculture past 1945, their participation did not reach 
wartime levels. In the post-war period agricultural labor 
traditions returned to pre-war situations as men and boys 
returned home, and then to the fields. Women, for the most 
part, moved back into their homes and kitchens. Confined in 
this manner, women needed to redefine their lives and prepare 
for their livelihoods as homemakers. For farmers who had 
accepted the presence of women, nonfarm women especially, in 
the fields, it is incredulous that American fairmers would 
immediately remove these women from their fields and farming 
operations. In the days following war, women were perceived 
as "throw-away" labor, an image epitomized by the temporary 
nature of wartime labor and the hazards that develop once the 
war ended. The removal of women from wartime labor positions 
occurred throughout the nation and within any industry that 
had employed women as temporary employees. 
Conditions existed in agriculture after 1945 that imply 
that the federal government had been hasty in dissolving the 
WLA in 1945. But, at that time, the WLA represented only 
another temporary agency used to guarantee successful harvests 
while men performed their patriotic duty. As a short-term 
emergency labor program, the WLA became another casualty of 
war and was disbanded by the end of 1945. The end of the WLA 
did not automatically signal the end of women in agriculture 
or as agricultural laborers, instead the demise of the WLA 
signalled only the end of a successful federal labor program. 
Women working in agriculture would continue into the next 
decade and beyond. 
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Thus, did farmers immediately return to the use of men as 
farm labor in 1946? As part of the Emergency Farm Labor 
Program which remained in place through 1947, women continued 
to work in agriculture after the demise of the WLA. Under the 
jurisdiction of the Recruitment and Placement Division of the 
Emergency Fartn Labor Program women participated in crop 
harvests after World War II. The Recruitment and Placement 
Division had been responsible for the development and 
implementation of "plans, policies, and procedures to be 
followed in the mobilization and recruitment of both 
interstate and intrastate sources of labor, in the placement 
of all labor and maintenance of farm-placement centers, on the 
transportation of domestic workers within States and between 
States, and in the housing and medical care of workers." 
Although no longer part of a separate organization, female 
farm workers still possessed protection within the larger 
federal labor program." 
While women still participated as part of the Emergency 
Fairm Labor Program, had that only delayed the inevitable? Did 
post-war agriculture have room for women or had the WLA only 
represented a crisis-derived organization? Over time, the 
role and presence of women in agriculture, especially nonfarm 
women, decreased, so that in the 1950s, their numbers were 
"proportional" to pre-war levels." With the return to pre-war 
levels, it would be easy to argue that World War II and the 
WLA did not affect the long-term employment of women in 
agriculture at all, but only served as an emergency effort to 
provide labor. However, that is not entirely true. 
In terms of agriculture, the presence of women had been 
proportional to earlier decades; however, the actual numbers 
of women were higher in the 1950s than the 1930s. This 
combined with a steady decrease of men in agriculture, to 
levels half of pre-war years, allows the conclusion that the 
position that women found in agriculture, as a result of 
wartime participation, had not ended with peace. In other 
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words, in the 1950s, the number of women engaged in 
agriculture had been on the rise, while the number of men 
continued to decline." 
With the continuation of women in agriculture it is 
possible to conclude that World War II assisted in the efforts 
by women to remain in farming, and/or enter the national work 
force. When women reported, on average, that they had been 
employed in agriculture longer than women in other positions 
in January 1951, they included their stint in World War II as 
part of their experience. Those employed as "farmers and farm 
managers" stated their average length of time in the position 
as more than 7 years, while those employed as "farm laborers 
and foremen" reported an average of 4.8 years for continuous 
employment. Additionally, not every woman employed in 
agriculture worked on a full-time bases. In 1951, many worked 
part-time, especially those women who had been classified as 
"farm laborers and foremen." Among that group, about 36 
percent of the women employed worked in full-time positions, 
the remainder worked part-time. Within the category "farmers 
and farm managers," those figures are reversed. About 63 
percent of the women worked in full-time positions in 1951, 
with the remaining women employed part-time.^® Again, these 
figures represent a trend from World War II, where it had been 
difficult to arrange for the placement of women in year-round 
positions, generally, because professional women had no desire 
to give up their main source of income for farm work. Thus, 
in most states, the number of women employed in year-round 
positions had been relatively few and not statistically 
significant to the total women employed as reported by the 
Extension Service. The Extension Service covuited 32,314 women 
employed year-round on farms, a figure less than 3 percent of 
their total 1.3 million female participation. Without the 
figures for farm women en:5)loyment, it is impossible to draw a 
more concise picture regarding the significance of year-round 
employment for women on farms. Understandably, however, farm 
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women who remained on their own farms, and did not register as 
members of the WLA would increase the percentage of year-ro\ind 
labor, possibly as high as 50 percent of total women 
participation in World War II. In 1951, about one-third of 
the women employed as farm laborers and foreman in 1951 worked 
full-time, considerably fewer than the women who worked part-
time . 
Thus, even though the war had ended, women continued to 
work in various jobs in the 1950s and beyond- The war had not 
ended their part in the economy, only the specific program in 
place during the national emergency. In most industries, 
women's presence in the labor force, especially that of 
married women, had been greater after the war than the decades 
that preceded World War II. In the example of farming, the 
success of the WLA and other farm labor programs brought women 
back to the farms and to the experience of field work. Pushed 
to the sidelines by the advent of technology in the first part 
of the twentieth century, women found themselves back in the 
fields during the 1940s. With more women involved in 
agriculture in the 1950s than in earlier decades, their 
presence involved a change in attitude by many American 
farmers. Clearly, women had become more involved as society 
accepted their place in agriculture and their position in the 
fields and bams. And while the majority of these involved 
had been farm women, they still represented a larger portion 
of the population than earlier decades. The use of women as 
agricultural labor during World War II strengthened the 
perception of the necessity and ability of women on the 
nation's farms. In contrast to earlier decades, when the use 
of women on farms had been minimized due to new technology and 
societal norms, the post-war period continued the image of 
World War II that illustrated the nation's need for female 
farm labor. Additionally, the use of women in all areas of 
industry during the war also kept the women's presence active 
in society. The number of working women in the nation 
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continued to increase as the decades passed. 
The success of the WLA as an agency within the Emergency 
Farm Labor Program and Extension Service can be measured by 
the number of women counted by federal agencies regarding 
their participation within this program. The millions of farm 
and nonfairm women who worked during the 1943, 1944, and 1945 
crop years brought a strength and exuberance to farming that 
had not been present prior. The women's ability to conform to 
any situation, to be able to work expeditiously and 
competently brought much support from American farmers 
regarding the women's ability. In every state it is possible 
to discover farmers who had been enthusiastic regarding the 
use of women on their farms. Farmers from the North, South, 
East, and West regions of the nation lauded the benefits and 
successes that employing women had brought to their 
agricultural production. 
With recruitment efforts and statements from WLA and USDA 
officials, women flocked to the war labor program in an effort 
to assist American farmers. National media efforts summarized 
successes in the nation's fields and advocated all women to 
become involved. Working women, university faculty and 
students, and homemakers all answered the call for labor by 
joining the WLA. Thus nonfarm and farm women assisted in the 
production of agricultural crops required during wartime. As 
part of the Emergency Farm Labor Program, the WLA accounted 
for the largest group of wartime agricultural workers, with 
the Victory Farm Volunteers closing behind. Numbering close 
to 2.5 million members from 1943 to 1945, the VFV supplied 
farmers with seasonal labor as well. The utilization of both 
the WLA and the VFV placed American farmers in a comfortable 
position as they relied on sources of more than 5.5 million 
laborers during the war. Additionally, the Bracero Program 
supplied contractual Mexican nationals to the labor market, 
and as the war progressed conscientious objectors, convicts, 
and prisoners of war all participated in faming. Still, the 
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number of women who participated in farm labor as part of the 
United States Crop Corps and Emergency Farm Labor Program 
granted the WLA a significance that is missed in the larger 
study of World War II labor. 
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17. States had problems with year-roxind placement and 
employment eash year. While most states placed fewer than 5 
percent of their WLA force in year-round positions, a few 
recorded a high percentage of year-roiind positions. In 1943, 
only Nevada had year-roxind or full-time positions similar to 
the rate recorded for 1951. Subsequent years, however, such 
as 1944 and 1945, saw higher figures of women employed year-
rotmd. (These figures are approximate, and represent the best 
estimate by the Extension Service regarding women hired for 
farm labor. Rasmussen, "A History of the Emergency Farm Labor 
Supply Program," 148-49.) 
1943 
Montana 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
North Dakota 
Utah 
Wyoming 
Year-rotmd 
81 
53 
16 
58 
672 
522 
47 
Total 
1,472 
158 
222 
591 
4, 879 
4, 531 
288 
of total 
5.5 
33.5 
7 
9, 
2 
8 
13 .8 
11.5 
16.3 
1944 
Alabama 
Arizona 
Colorado 
Florida 
Indiana 
Montana 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
Tennessee 
West Virginia 
Wyoming 
1945 
Alabama 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Mississippi 
Montana 
Nevada 
New Hair^shire 
New Mexico 
Rhode Island 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Vermont 
Wyoming 
728 
50 
379 
1,328 
95 
41 
67 
11 
73 
165 
843 
65 
82 
442 
86 
198 
78 
22 
4, 863 
62 
98 
27 
124 
4 
1,386 
2, 780 
6 
55 
9,180 
484 
3,891 
4,654 
1, 022 
602 
148 
176 
1,166 
2,234 
14,301 
211 
268 
7, 217 
996 
2, 884 
765 
432 
37,351 
713 
262 
330 
1, 047 
18 
18,214 
53,868 
56 
171 
7.9 
10.3 
9.7 
28.5 
9.3 
6 . 8  
45.3 
6.3 
6.3 
7.4 
5.9 
30.8 
30.6 
6.1 
8 . 6  
6.9 
10.2 
5.1 
13 .0 
8.7 
37.4 
8 . 2  
11.8 
2 2 . 2  
7.6 
5.2 
10 .7 
32 .2 
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APPENDIX. 
Table 4. Number of women placed by Extension Service programs 
in 1943 
State Seasonal Year-round Total 
Alabama 5,924 122 6, 046 
Arizona 1, 018 4 1, 022 
Arkansas 74,447 345 74,792 
California 27,307 690 27,997 
Colorado 4, 024 51 4, 075 
Connecticut 1,516 14 1, 530 
Delaware 84 84 
Florida 4, 678 13 0 4, 808 
Georgia 38,701 205 38,906 
Idaho 3,344 65 3, 409 
Illinois 5,373 13 5, 386 
Indiana 1,403 2 1, 405 
Iowa 2, 698 47 2, 745 
Kansas 640 23 663 
Kentucky 2,733 5 2, 738 
Louisiana 16,156 65 16,221 
Maine 962 8 970 
Maryland 2,585 6 2, 591 
Massachusetts 1,276 11 1, 287 
Michigan 12,679 12,679 
Minnesota 5,454 162 5, 616 
Mississippi 42,531 617 43,148 
Missouri 4,003 95 4, 098 
Montana 1,391 81 1, 472 
Nebraska 1,564 28 1, 592 
Nevada 105 53 158 
New Hampshire 206 16 222 
New Jersey 533 58 591 
New Mexico 1,192 57 1, 249 
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Table 4. (continued) 
State Seasonal Year-round Total 
New York 6,168 91 6,259 
North Carolina 17,503 365 17,868 
North Dakota 4, 207 672 4, 879 
Ohio 3, 605 9 3, 614 
Oklahoma 8,185 46 8, 231 
Oregon 15,284 91 15,375 
Pennsylvania 3,184 15 3,199 
Rhode Island 95 3 98 
South Carolina 14,630 303 14,933 
South Dakota 747 8 755 
Tennessee 10,979 141 11,120 
Texas 74,949 758 75,707 
Utah 4, 009 522 4, 531 
Vermont 761 5 766 
Virginia 1, 631 26 1, 657 
Washington 15,338 252 15,590 
West Virginia 31 - - 31 
Wisconsin 2, 626 22 2, 648 
Wyoming 241 47 288 
TOTAL 448,700 6, 349 455,049 
source: Rasmussen, "History of the Emergency Farm Labor 
Supply Program," 148 . 
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Table 5. Number of women placed by Extension Service programs 
in 1944 
States Seasonal Year-round Total 
Alabama 8,452 728 9,180 
Arizona 434 50 484 
Arkansas 38,851 224 39,075 
California 45,880 704 46,584 
Colorado 3,512 379 3, 891 
Connecticut 1,184 21 1,205 
Delaware 60 60 
Florida 3,326 1,328 4, 654 
Georgia 13,777 667 14,444 
Idaho 1,570 70 1, 640 
Illinois 4,254 37 4, 291 
Indiana 927 95 1, 022 
Iowa 2, 160 43 2,203 
Kansas 1, 391 17 1,408 
Kentucky 1, 544 20 1, 564 
Louisiana 12,188 111 12,299 
Maine 1, 101 35 1,136 
Maryland 1, 940 41 1, 981 
Massachusetts 1, 431 67 1,498 
Michigan 13,751 446 14,197 
Minnesota 5, 009 98 5,107 
Mississippi 40,765 996 41,761 
Missouri 2, 699 18 2, 717 
Montana 561 41 602 
Nebraska 1, 008 35 1, 043 
Nevada 81 67 148 
New Hampshire 165 11 176 
New Jersey 1, 093 73 1, 166 
New Mexico 2, 069 165 2, 234 
New York 11,545 155 11,700 
North Carolina 15,087 383 15,470 
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Table 5. (continued) 
State Seasonal Year-round Total 
North Dakota 5, 600 5, 600 
Ohio 3,105 30 3,135 
Oklahoma 15,886 75 15,961 
Oregon 15,246 204 15,450 
Pennsylvania 4,408 29 4,437 
Rhode Island 51 2 53 
South Carolina 21,878 814 22,692 
South Dakota 1,155 23 1, 178 
Tennessee 13,458 843 14,301 
Texas 49,912 1,288 51,200 
Utah 1, 632 31 1, 663 
Vermont 475 9 484 
Virginia 4, 026 99 4, 125 
Washington 23,898 389 24,287 
West Virginia 146 65 211 
Wisconsin 3,022 76 3, 098 
Wyoming 186 82 268 
TOTAL 401,899 11,184 413,083 
source: Rasmussen, "History of the Emergency Farm Labor 
Supply Program," 148 
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Table 6. Number of women placed by Extension Service programs 
in 1945 
States Seasonal Year-roiind Total 
Alabama 6, 775 442 7, 217 
Arizona 135 3 138 
Arkansas 28,667 593 29,260 
California 41,904 713 42,617 
Colorado 2,378 106 2, 484 
Connecticut 593 19 612 
Delaware 160 160 
Florida 5,336 241 5,577 
Georgia 15,448 359 15,807 
Idaho 2,498 32 2, 530 
Illinois 3, 756 19 3, 775 
Indiana 910 86 996 
Iowa 1,465 7 1,472 
Kansas 381 11 392 
Kentucky 2, 686 198 2, 884 
Louisiana 13,121 100 13,221 
Maine 1,156 26 1, 182 
Maryland 687 78 765 
Massachusetts 410 22 432 
Michigan 8,556 51 8, 607 
Minnesota 3,549 151 3, 700 
Mississippi 32,488 4, 863 37,351 
Missouri 545 4 549 
Montana 651 62 713 
Nebraska 443 18 461 
Nevada 164 98 262 
New Hampshire 303 27 330 
New Jersey 1,436 69 1, 505 
New Mexico 923 124 1, 047 
New York 11,102 84 11,186 
North Carolina 12,780 453 13,233 
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Table 6. (continued) 
State Seasonal Year-round Total 
North Dakota 6, 620 148 6, 768 
Ohio 1, 869 95 1, 964 
Oklahoma 18,102 397 18,499 
Oregon 14,713 193 14,906 
Pennsylvania 1, 895 66 1, 961 
Rhode Island 14 4 18 
South Carolina 16,463 104 16,567 
South Dakota 759 19 778 
Tennessee 16,828 1, 386 18,214 
Texas 51,088 2, 780 53,868 
Utah 911 5 916 
Vermont 50 6 56 
Virginia 2,585 7 2,592 
Washington 10,191 411 10,602 
West Virginia 146 6 152 
Wisconsin 1, 999 40 2, 039 
Wyoming 116 55 171 
TOTAL 345,755 14,781 360,536 
source: Rasmussen, "History of the Emergency Farm Labor 
Supply Program," 149 • 
326 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
Government publications 
Backcrroiinds of the War Farm Labor Problem. Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics and Farm Security Administration, 
USDA, May 1942. 
Botts, Ralph R. "Experience of 30 Reporting Companies with the 
Victory Farm Volunteers and Women's Land Army Accident 
Policy in 1943." Bureau of Agricultural Economics, USDA, 
9 March 1944. 
A Call to Farms for Women of America. Extension Service, USDA, 
March 1945. 
Ducoff, Louis J. "Wages of Agricultural Labor in the United 
States." Technical Bulletin No. 895. Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, USDA, 1945. 
"Fighting the Battle on the Land." Extension Service Review. 
December 1942, 182. 
"Faorm Labor Needs." Circular No. 406. Extension Service, USDA, 
April 1943. 
Food Information Series. pan^hlets and reports. Office of 
Information, USDA. 
Going Our Way? To Work for Victory on the Farm Front. 
Extension Seorvice, USDA, March 1945. 
Going to the Farin Front?: Safety Tips to the U. S. Crop Corp. 
USDA, May 1943. 
"Here's Your Girl . . .Mr. and Mrs. Farmer." 1944 Food 
Production Program Series. Agricultural Extension 
Service, University of Minnesota, 1944. 
House. Committee on Agriculture. Farm Labor and Production: 
Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture. 77th Cong., 
2d sess,, 1942. 
. Committee on Appropriations. Farm Labor Program. 1943: 
Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations. 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1943. 
327 
. Committee on Appropriations. Farm Labor Program. 1944: 
Hearings before the Siibcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations. 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1943. 
. Committee on Pxiblic Buildings and Grounds. Amending the 
Act to Expedite the Provision of Housing in Connection 
with National Defense: No. 2. Hearings before the 
Committee on Pnhl i r Buildings and Grounds. 77th Cong., 2d 
sess., 1942. 
. Committee on Pxiblic Buildings and Groiinds. Amending the 
Act to Expedite the Provision of Housing in Connection 
with National Defense: No. 4. Supplemental Hearings 
before the Committee nn Pnhi i n Buildings and Groxmds. 
77th Cong., 2d sess., 1942. 
. Committee on Pxiblic Buildings and Grounds. Amendment of 
Title II Housing in Connection with National Defense: No. 
4. Hearings before the Committee nn Pnhiiic Buildings and 
Grounds. 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1943. 
. Committee on Pviblic Buildings and Grounds. War Housing: 
No. 6. Hearings before the Committee on Public Buildings 
and Grounds. 77th Cong., 2d sess., 1942. 
"Insurance: Emergency Farm Labor Program." Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, USDA, April 1944. 
Join us on the Farm Front. Extension Service, USDA, March 
1944. 
Lovewell, Reinette. "A Woman Who Needs You." In A City Woman 
Who Found her War Job on a Farm. USDA, 1918. 
A Message to Employpr-g about the Need for Vacation Harvest 
Workers. WLA, Extension Service, USDA, 1945. 
"Need for Farm Labor." Agriculture and National Defense. 
Office of Information, USDA, 27 September 1941. 
"OADR Shaping Up Farm Labor Program." Agriculture and National 
Defense. Office of Information, USDA, 22 November 1941. 
Pitch In and Help: The Women^s Land Armv Calls 800.000 Women 
to the Farm in 1944. Extension Service, USDA, May 1944. 
328 
"Potato-Harvest Labor in Aroostook County, Maine, 1941." 
Miscellaneous Publication No. 568. Maine Agricultural 
Experiment Station, Orono, March 1942, 9, 17. 
Rasmussen, Wayne D. "A History of the Emergency Farm Labor 
Supply Program, 1942-1947." Agricultural Monograph No. 
13. 1951. 
"Report of Progress for the Year Ending Jxine 30, 1942." 
Bulletin No. 411. Maine Agricultural Experiment Station, 
Orono, University of Maine, June 1942. 
Safety Check List for Women and Girls Doing Farm Work. 
Extension Service, USDA, March 1943. 
Safety for the US Crop Corps. USDA, May 1943. 
Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Farm Lahn-r P-rpgram. 1943, 
Hearings before the Snhf^nmmittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations. 78th Cong., 1st. sess., 1943. 
. Committee of Appropriations. Farm Lai-m-r p-rpgram. 1944: 
Hearings before the gnhrommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations. 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944. 
. Committee on Appropriations. War Housing and War Piiblic 
Works in and Near the District of Columbia xinder the Act 
of April. 1942 fPiii-iiic Law 522): Hearings before a 
gnhrnmniittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 77th 
Cong., 2d sess., 1942. 
. Committee on Banking and Currency. Amending National 
Housing Act: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Banking and Currency. 77th Cong., 1st sess., 
1941. 
. Committee on Banking and Currency. To Amend the 
National Housing Act: Hearing before the Committee on 
Banking and Currency. 78th Cong., 1st. sess., 1943. 
. Committee on Banking and Currency. National Housing Act 
Amendments of 1942: Hearing before the Committee on 
Banking and Currency. 77th Cong., 2d sess., 1942. 
. Committee on Education and Labor. Defense Housing and 
Community Facilities: Hearings before a Sxibcommittee of 
329 
the Committee on Education and Labor. 77th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1941. 
. Committee on Education and Labor. Defense Housing and 
Community Facilities for the District of Columbia: 
Hearings before the Committee on Education and Labor. 
77th Cong., 2d sess., 1942. 
. Committee on Education and Labor. To Amend the Defense 
Housing Act: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Education and Labor. 78th Cong., 1st sess., 
1943 . 
Sound the Call to Farms 1 : Helps for Recruiting Local Farm 
Workers in 1945. War Advising Council, USDA, n.d. 
U.S. Statutes at Large. Vol. 50, 888. 
U.S. Women's Bureau. "Guidelines for Wartime Use of Women on 
Farms." Special Bulletin No. 8. Department of Labor, 
1942 . 
. Women as Workers: A Statistical Guide. Washington, 
D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1953. 
Valentine, Frances W. "Successful Practices in the Employment 
of Nonfarm Women on Farms in the Northeastern States, 
1943." Bulletin No. 199. U.S. Women's Bureau, Department 
of Labor, 1944. 
. Women and Wartime Work: A Study of Eight Midwest States 
in 1944. USDA, 1944. 
. "Women's Emergency Farm Service on the Pacific Coast 
in 1943." Bulletin No. 204. U.S. Women's Bureau, 
Department of Labor, 1945. 
VFV on the Farm Front. Extension Service, USDA, May 1944. 
Wiener, Minnie, comp. War Public Works: A Compilation of 
Statutes. Executive Orders. Regulations, and Other 
Documents Relating to the Construction. Financing. 
Operation, and Maintenance of Community Facilities Under 
the Lanham Act, as Amended. Federal Works Agency, Office 
of General Coxxnsel, 1943. 
330 
Women Farm Workers: The 1943 Story of the Women's Land Army of 
the U.S. Crop Corps. War Food Administration, Extension 
Service, USDA, October 1943. 
"Women Prove their Mettle." Extension Service Review. November 
1943. 
Women's Land Army: Extension Farm Labor Program. 1943-1944-
1945• Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945. 
The Women's Land Armv of the U.S. Crop Coirps. 1944. Ext ens i on 
Seirvice, USDA, May 1944. 
Women's Land Army of the U.S. Crop Corps Needs Workers. 
Extension Service, USDA, July 1943. 
Books 
Ayling, Keith. Calling All Women. New York: Harper, 1942. 
Blatch, Harriot Stanton. Mobilizing Woman-Powpt New York: The 
Womans Press, 1918. 
Fraser, Helen. Women and War Work. New York: G. Armold Shaw, 
1918 . 
Help for the Farmer. New York: Advisory Coxincil of the Women's 
Land Army of America, 1918. 
Knoeppel, C. E. Women in Industry. New York: C. E. Knoeppel, 
1918. 
Ross, Mary Steele. American Women in Uniform. Garden City, 
N.J.: Garden City Publishing, 1943. 
Shewell-Cooper, W. E. Land Girl: A Manual for Volunteers in 
the Women's Land Army. London: English Universities 
Press, 1941. 
Tolley, Howard R. The Farmer Citizen at War. New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1943. 
What Women Can Do to Win the War. Chicago: Consolidated Book 
Pxiblishers, 1942. 
Wickard, Claude R. Farmers and Defense. Washington, D.C.: 
American Council on Public Affairs, n.d. 
Women on the Land. New York: Advisory Council of the Women's 
Land Army of America, 1918. 
331 
JoTimal articles 
"800,000 Women Farm Workers Needed This Year." Labor 
Information Bulletin 11 (March 1944): 5. 
"Advisory Coxincil of the Women's Land Army of America." 
Women's National Farm and Garden Association Monthly 
Bulletin 4 (February 1918): 6. 
Bakke, Mrs. Arthur. "Look Out!: Girls at Work." Successful 
Farming 41 (April 1943): 96-97. 
Bird, John. "New Hands for Our Farms." Coiintry Gentleman 112 
(September 1942): 9, 43-44, 77-78, 80. 
Bryan, Elizabeth, and Katherine Bonnell. "Farm Jobs for City 
Girls." Liberty, n.d., 20, 22. 
Case, Victoria. "Oregon Checks Womanpower." Independent Woman 
21 (March 1942): 78, 91. 
"City Girl Answers Call to Farms." Country Gentleman 113 (June 
1943) : 73 . 
Cockerell, T. D. A. "War Work of College Women in the West." 
School and Society 6 (15 December 1917) : 699-705. 
Colvin, Esther M. "Another Women's Land Army?" Independent 
Woman 21 (April 1942) : 102-04, 126. 
Cook, Catherine. "National Service and the Women's National 
Farm and Garden Association: Join the Land Army, A Call 
to the Women of America." Women's National Farm and 
Garden Association Monthly Bulletin 4 (October 1917) : 1-
2 . 
Denman, Lady. Foreword to Land Girl: A Manual for Volunteers 
in the Women' s Land Army. by W. E. Shewell-Cooper. 
London: English Universities Press, 1941. 
"Employment of Womanpower to Fill Places of Men Who Have Gone 
on Active War Duty." Milk Plant Monthly 32 (September 
1943): 20. 
"Farm Women Help." Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead. 17 
April 1943, 237, 255. 
Gavrilova, Claudia. "Woman Does Nearly All Milk Plant Work." 
Milk Plant Monthly 32 (September 1943) : 28. 
332 
Hall, Florence L. "The Nation's Crops Need You." Independent 
Woman 24 (July 1945): 187, 203. 
. "They're Getting in the Crops." Independent Woman 22 
(July 1943): 194-96, 216. 
. "Yes, Town Women Can Help." Farm Journal and Farmer's 
Wife. August 1944, 33. 
Harding, T. Swann. "Womanpower Vs. Manpower." Independent 
Woman 23 (May 1944): 132. 
Harmon, Dudley. "Is the Woman Needed on the Farm?: What the 
United States Government has to Say About Farm Work for 
Women this Summer." Ladies' Home Journal 35 (May 1918) : 
105-06. 
Hogeland, Ruth. "The Girl Who Stayed." Country Gentleman 113 
(June 1943): 72. 
. "They Don't Know How to Say Quit!" Country Gentleman 
113 (November 1943): 74, 76. 
Landman, M. V. "Women Farmers." Cornell Countryman (Spring 
1918): 479-81, 500, 502, 504, 508. 
"More Womanpower: Your Answer to the Manpower Shortage." Ice 
Cream Review 27 (September 1943) : 62-63. 
Ogilvie, Ida H. "Agriculture, Labor and Woman." Columbia 
University Quarterly (October 1918): 293-300. 
"Oregon Trains Women Farm Dairy Workers." Milk Plant Monthly 
33 (July 1944): 46. 
O'Shea, Bernard G. "Volunteer Farmers: The City to Country 
Farm Plan Enters its Tenth Summer in Vermont. " Vermont 
Life, September 1951, 44-49. 
Patterson, Jean. "Hayseed in My Hair." Country Gentleman 113 
(September 1943): 77, 84-85. 
"Placing Women on the Land: Experiments in the Eastern United 
States." Women's National Farm and Garden Association 
Monthly Bulletin 4 (February 1918) : 1-6. 
Policastro, Charles. "Etr^lyoment of Women in Ice Cream 
Plants." Ice Cream Review 27 (March 1944) : 27, 56, 58. 
333 
Powell, Hickman. "Sister Pitches In." Country pman 112 
(July 1942): 14, 59. 
Reid, Margaret G. "Food Strategy." Pamphlet No. l. Wartime 
Farm and Food Policy Series. Ames: Iowa State University 
Press, 1943. 
Schickele, Rainer. "Manpower in Agriculture." Pamphlet Mo. 3. 
Wartime Farm and Farm Policy Series. Ames: Iowa State 
University Press, 1943. 
Schlup, Lester A. "Recruiting the 'Land Army.'" The Nation's 
Agriculture 19 {May 1944) : 4, 18-19. 
"She Makes Idle Acres Feed the Hungry." Literary Digest. 8 
March 1919, 98-102. 
"Sighted Goals; Met Same." Farm Journal and Farmer's Wife. 
September 1942, 13-17. 
Spence, Elizabeth. "Vacation Down on the Farm." Independent 
Woman 22 (April 1943): 110-11. 
. "War Time Harvest." Independent Woman 21 (September 
1942): 270-71. 
Streeter, Carroll P. "Can Town and City Women Help?" Farm 
Journal and Farmer's Wife. July 1942, 32-33, 43. 
Talbot, Dame Meriel. "The Women's Land Army in the Great War, 
1914-18." In Land Girl: A Manual for Volunteers in the 
Women's Land Army. London: English Universities Press, 
1941, iii-iv. 
Taylor, Toni. "Women on the Home Front." McCall' s. May 1942, 
64-65. 
"They Give the Farmer a Hand." Woman's Home Companion. May 
1943, 74-75. 
"To the Land-Ladies!: A Toast to Members of the Women's Land 
Army, and a Call to Others to Join their Ranks." House 
and Garden 85 (April 1944): 66, 81. 
"To the Rescue of the Crops." Indepenrfpnt Woman 23 (May 1944): 
130-31, 154-55. 
334 
Turmell, Charles N. "Experience of Texas Dairymen with 
Womanpower." Milk Plant Monthly 32 (September 1943): 30-
31. 
"Use of Women in Milk Plants." Milk Plant Monthly 32 (February 
1943): 34-36. 
Van Delden, E. H. "Solution of Manpower Problems will be 
Womanpower." Milk Plant Monthly 32 (September 1943): 26. 
Warren, T. R. "A Victory Dairy Maid." Hoard' s Da t T-yman 88 (25 
September 1943): 534. 
"When Town Girls Help." Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead. 
19 Jxine 1943, 1. 
"Wo-Manpower for the Ice Cream Industry." Ice Cream Review 26 
(March 1943): 18-19, 37. 
"Womanpower: 'Any Job a Woman Takes Which Releases a Man for 
Military Service or Heavy Industrial Work is a War Job.'" 
Milk Plant Monthly 32 (September 1943): 22-24. 
"Women: Without Fuss or Feathers." Time, 12 January 1942, 16. 
"Women Drivers at One Milk Plant." Milk Plant Monthly 32 
(September 1943): 29. 
"Women Drivers in Milk Delivery." Milk Plant Monthly 32 
(February 1943): 38. 
"Women Play Vital Role in Milk Plant." Milk Plant Monthly 32 
(September 1943): 27. 
"Women Prove Helpful in Meeting Nation's Food Crisis." Labor 
Information Bulletin 11 (March 1944): 3. 
"Women Workers Help in Harvesting Crops." Labor Information 
Bulletin 9 (October 1942). 
"Women's Role in Wartime Economy Will Grow." Milk Plant 
Monthly 32 (September 1943): 24-25. 
Wyatt, Edith Franklin. "The Illinois Training Farm for Women." 
Kimball's Dairy Farmer. 15 April 1918, 18, 33, 36. 
335 
Manuscript collections 
National Agricultural Library 
Diehl, Edith. "Report of the Wellesley College Training Camp 
and Experiment Station for the Women's Land Army of 
America." 2d ed., 1919. 
Hall, Florence L. to Assistant State Supervisor, WLA. 1944. 
Extension Service, USDA. 
Hall, Florence L. to Women's Land Army Supervisor. 1943-1945. 
Extension Service, USDA. 
"Insurance: Emergency Farm Labor Program." BAE, USDA, April 
1944. 
Ogilvie, Ida H. "Women's Agricultural Camp, Bedford, New York, 
Second Annual Report." 1918. 
Ousley, Clarence. "Women on the Farm." Address before Woman's 
Committee, Coiincil of National Defense. Washington, D.C. : 
USDA, 1918. 
"Outline of Suggestions for Developing a County Plan." 
Emergency Farm Labor Program, Extension Service, USDA. 
"Some of the Responsibilities of a State Women's Land Army 
Supervisor." January 1944. 
"Vacation Work with the Shade Tobacco Growers Agricultural 
Association, Inc. and Connecticut Agricultural Extension 
Service." Report. Shade Tobacco Growers Agricultural 
Association, Inc., 1945. 
Wetmore, Edith. "Report of the Newport Farmerette Unit, 1918, 
First Annual Report. " 
Women's National Farm and Garden Association Monthly Bulletin, 
vol. 4 (1917/1918). 
National Archives 
Annual Narrative and Statistical Reports of Extension and 
Other Workers under the Farm Labor Program, 1943-1947. 
Records of the U.S. Extension Service. National Archives 
Record Group 33, College Park, Maryland. 
336 
Divisional Histories said Other Records Summarizing the 
Program, 1943-48. Records Concerning the Farm Labor 
Program, Extension Service. National Archives Record 
Group 33, College Park, Maryland. 
General and other Correspondence and Related Records, 1943-
1948. Records concerning the Farm Labor Program, Records 
of the U.S. Extension Service. NARG 33. National 
Archives, College Park, Maryland. 
M. L. Wilson, director. Records of the Extension Service, 
National Archives Record Group 287, College Park, 
Maryland. 
Publicity, General and other Correspondence and Related 
Records, 1943-1948. Records Concerning the Farm Labor 
Program, Extension Service. National Archives Record 
Group 33, College Park, Maryland. 
Women Workers in World War II, 1940-1945. Division of 
Research. Records of the U.S. Women's Bureau. National 
Archives Record Group 86, College Park, Maryland. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library 
Official File--227a (Farm Matters). Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New 
York. 
Official File--1 (Agriculture). Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. 
Official File--Housing, 1941-1945. Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Papers. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New 
York. 
Official File--Mexico, 1941. Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. 
Bailey/Howe Library. University of Vermont 
Root, Arthur. Report on the Volunteer Land Corps. Summer 1942. 
n.d. Special Collections, Bailey/Howe Library, 
University of Vermont, Burlington. 
337 
Walter Library. University of Minnesota 
College of Agriculture, Forestry, and Home Economics Papers. 
University Archives, Walter Library, University of 
Minnesota, Minneapolis. 
Section G, Historical. ALD6.1. Agricultural Extension Service 
Papers, 1914-1976/1977, University of Minnesota. 
University Archives, Walter Libraiy, University of 
Miianesota, Minneapolis. 
Specialists Annual Reports. ALD6.1. Agricultural Extension 
Service Papers, 1914-1976/1977, University of Minnesota. 
University Archives, Walter Library, University of 
Minnesota, Minneapolis. 
Minnesota Archives 
Harold E. Stassen Records. Minnesota State Archives. Minnesota 
Historical Society, St. Paul. 
Great Northern Railway Company Records. Minnesota State 
Archives. Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul. 
Newpapers 
Christian Science Monitor. 9 January 1943. 
Denver Post. 1940-1945. 
The Farmerette. December 1918-May 1920. 
Farmer's Advocate. 26 Jvine 1941-26 November 1942. 
New York Times. 1942-1945. 
PM's Daily Picture Magazine. 1943 
Saturday Evening Post. 25 July 1942, 16 December 1944. 
Washington Evening Star. 1943 
Washington Post. 21 March 1943. 
Wyoming Eagle. 1943-1945. 
338 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
Books 
Anderson, Karen. Wartime Women.- Sex Roles. Family Relations, 
and the Status of Women during World War II. Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981. 
Britnell, George E., and Vernon C. Fowke. Csmadian 
Agriculture in War and Peace. 1935-50. Stanford: Stanford 
University, 1962. 
Braeman, John, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody, eds. The 
New Deal: The National Level. Vol. 1. Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 1975. 
Campbell, D'Ann. Women at War with America: Private Lives in a 
Patriotic Era. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984. 
Chafe, William Henry. The American Woman: Her Changing Social. 
Economic, and Political Roles, 1920-1970. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1972. 
. The Paradox of Change: American Women in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) . 
(Revision of The American Woman) 
Fink, Deborah. Agrarian Women: Wives and Mothers in Rural 
Nebraska. 1880-1940. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1992} . 
. Open Country. Iowa: Rural Women. Tradition and Change. 
Albany, State University of New York Press, 1986) . 
Fite, Gilbert C. Cotton Fields No More: Southern Agriculture. 
1865-1980. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984. 
Gamboa, Erasmo. Mexican T.ahn-r and World War II: Braceros in 
the Pacific Northwest. 1942-1947. Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1990. 
Genung, A. B. The Agricultural Depression Following World War 
I and its Political Consequences: An Accovint of the 
Deflation Episode. 1921-1934. Ithaca, N.Y.: Northeast 
Farm Foundation, 1954. 
339 
Greenwald, Maurine Weiner. Women. War, and WOrk: The Impact of 
World War I on Women Workers in the United States. 
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 
Gregory, Chester W. Women in Defense Work During World War II: 
An Analysis of the T.ahnr- Problem and Women^s Rights. New 
York: Exposition Press, 1974. 
Hartmann, Susan M. The Home Front and Beyond: American Women 
in the 1940s. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982. 
Higonnet, Margaret Randolph, et al., eds. Behind the Lines: 
Gender and the Two World Wars. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987. 
Hooks, Gregory. Forging the Military-Industrial Complex: 
World War 11^s Battle of the Potomac. Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1991. 
Hurt, R. Douglas. Agricultural Technology in the Twentieth 
Century. Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 
1991. 
. American Agriculture: A Brief History. Ames: Iowa State 
University Press, 1994. 
Janiewski, Dolores E. Sisterhood Denied: Race. Gender, and 
Class in a New South Community. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1985). 
Jellison, Katherine. Entitled to Power: Farm Women and 
Technology. 1913-1963. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1993. 
Koistinen, Paul A. C. The Military-Industrial Complex: A 
Historical Perspective. New York: Praeger, 1980. 
Leuchtenburg, William E. The FDR Years: On Roosevelt and His 
Legacy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 
. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. 1932-1940. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1963. 
McElvaine, Robert S. The Great Depression: America. 1929-
1941. New York: Times Books, 1984. 
340 
Milkman, Ruth. Gender at Work: The Dynamics of Job Segregation 
by Sex during World War II. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1987). 
Nash, Gerald D. The Great Depression and World War II; 
Organizing America. 1933-45. New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1979. 
The New Deal Viewed from Fifty Years: Papers Commemorating 
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Launching of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal in 1983. Edited by 
Lawrence E. Gelfand and Robert J. Neymeyer. Iowa City, 
la.: The Center for the Study of the Recent History of 
the United States, 1983. 
Saloutos, Theodore. The American Farmer and the New Deal. 
Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1982. 
Scott, Anne Firor. The Southern Ladv: From Pedestal to 
Politics. 1830-1930. Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1995. 
Shideler, James H. Fann Crisis. 1919-1923. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1957. 
Spielvogel, Jackson J. Western Civilization. Vol. 2, 2d ed. 
St. Paul, Minn.: West Pxiblishing Company, 1994. 
Taylor, Sandra C. Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American 
Internment at Topaz. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993. 
Tentler, Leslie Woodcock. Wage-Earning Women: Industrial Work 
and Family Life in the United States. 1900-1930. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 
War Business, and American Society: Historical Perspectives on 
the Military-Industrial Complex. Port Washington, N.Y. : 
Kennikat Press, 1977. 
Wartime Agriculture in Australia and New Zealand. 1939-50. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954. 
Wise, Nancy Baker, and Christy Wise. A Mouthful of Rivets: 
Women at Work in World War II. San Francisco, Calif.: 
Jossey-Bass Piiblishers, 1994. 
341 
Journal articles 
Allen, Susan L. "Preparing Women for the National Crisis: The 
Role of Oklahoma A. and M. College." Chronicles of 
Oklahoma 69 (Winter 1991-1992): 392-407. 
Anderson, Karen. "Work, Gender, and Power in the American 
West." Pacific Historical Review 61 (November 1992): 481-
99. 
Bearden, Russell. "Life Inside Arkansas's Japanese-American 
Relocation Centers." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 48 
(Summer 1989): 169-96. 
Buecker, Thomas R. "Nazi Influence at the Fort Robinson 
Prisoner of War Catr^j During World War II." Nebraska 
History 73 (Spring 1992): 32-41. 
Carpenter, Stephanie Ann. "At the Agricultural Front: The 
Women's Land Army in World War II." Agricultural History 
71 (Spring 1997): 163-85. 
Corbett, William P. "'They Hired Every Parmer in the Country': 
Establishing the Prisoner of War Camp at Tonkawa." 
Chronicles of Oklahoma 69 (Winter 1991-1992): 368-91. 
Crawford, J. G., et al. "Wartime Agriculture in Australia, 
1939-50." In Wartime Agriculture in Australia and New 
Zealand. 1939-50. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1954, 1-237. 
Daniels, Roger. "The Decisions to Relocate the North American 
Japanese: Another Look." Pacific Historical Review 51 
(February 1982): 71-77. 
Davidson, Joel. "Building for War, Preparing for Peace: World 
War II and the Military-Industrial Complex." In World War 
II and the American Dream: How Wartime Building Changed 
a Nation. Washington, D.C.: National Building Museum; 
Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 
1995, 184-229. 
Dawson, Marie. "Pitching in on the Homefront." Coiintrvside 1 
(Winter 1990): 84-86. 
342 
Doyle, Susan Badger. "German and Italian Prisoners of War in 
Albuquerq[ue, 1943-1946." New Mexico Historical Review 66 
(July 1991): 327-40. 
Fahey, John. "John Fahey on 'Reeducating' German Prisoners 
During World War II." Oregon Historical Quarterly 93 
(Winter 1992-1993): 368-93. 
Flora, Cornelia Butler and Jan L. Flora. "Structure of 
Agriculture and Women's Culture in the Great Plains." 
Great Plains Quarterly 8 (Fall 1988): 195-205. 
Flynn, George Q. "Drafting Farmers in World War II." In At 
Home on the Ranae: Essavs on the History of Western 
Social and Domestic Life. Edited by John R. Wunder. 
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985, 157-74. 
Gamboa, Erasmo. "Braceros in the Pacific Northwest: Laborers 
on the Domestic Front, 1942-1947." Pacific Historical 
Review 56 (1987): 378-98. 
. "Mexican Migration into Washington State: A History, 
1940-1950." Pacific Northwest Quarterly 72 (July 1981): 
121-31. 
Goldin, Claudia D. "The Role of World War II in the Rise of 
Women's Employment." American Economic Review 81 
(September 1991): 741-56. 
Harley, Sharon. "For the Good of Family and Race: Gender, 
Work, and Domestic Roles in the Black Community, 1880-
1930." Sicms 15 (Winter 1990): 336-49. 
Heinicke, Craig. "African American Migration and Urban Labor 
Skills: 1950 and 1960." Agricultural History 68 (Spring 
1994): 185-98. 
Hewitt, William L. "Mexican Workers in Wyoming During World 
War II: Necessity, Discrimination, and Protest." Annals 
of Wyoming 54 (Fall 1982): 20-33. 
Higginbotham, Evelyn Brooks. "African-American Women's History 
and the Metalanguage of Race." Signs 17 (Winter 1992) : 
251-74. 
343 
Hooks, Gregory. "The Weakness of Strong Theories: The U.S. 
State's Dominance of the World War II Investment 
Process." American Sociological Review 58 (February 
1993): 37-53. 
James, Thomas. "The Education of the Japanese Americans at 
Tule Lake, 1942-1946." Pacific Historical Review 56 
(February 1987): 25-58. 
Johnson, Melyn. "At Home in Amache: A Japanese-American 
Relocation Catip in Colorado." Colorado Heritage no. 1 
(1989): 2-11. 
Kirby, Jack Temple. "Black and White in the Rural South, 1915-
1954." In The History of Rural Life in America. Edited by 
Barbara R. Cotton. Washington, D.C.: Agricultural History 
Society, 1986. 
Liss, Samuel. "The Concept and Determination of Prevailing 
Wages in Agriculture During World War II." Agricultural 
History 24 (January 1950) : 4-18. 
. "Farm Wage Boards Under the Cooperative Extension 
Service During World War II." Agricultural History 27 
(July 1953): 103-108. 
. "Farm Wage Boards Under the Wage Stabilization Program 
During World War II." Agricultural History 3 0 (July 
1956): 128-37. 
Litoff, Judith Barrett, and David C. Smith. "'To the Rescue of 
the Crops': The Women's Land Army during World War II." 
Prologue 25 (Winter 1993): 347-61. 
Lobdell, George H. "A Tale of Two Christmases at the Algona 
Prisoner-of-War Camp." Palimpsest 73 (Winter 1992): 170-
83 . 
Martelet, Penny. "The Women's Land Army, World War I." In Clio 
was a Woman: Studies in the History of American Women. 
Edited by Mabel E. Deutrich and Virginia C. Purdy, 136-
46. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1980. 
Matsumoto, Valerie. "Japanese American Women During World War 
II." In Unequal Sisters: A Multi-cultural Reader in U.S. 
344 
Women's History. Edited by Ellen Carol DiiBois and Vicki 
L. Ruiz. New York: Routledge, 1990, 373-86. 
McAfee, Ward M. "A History of Convict Labor in California." 
Southern California Quarterly 72 (Spring 1990) : 91-140. 
. "America's Two Japanese-American Policies During World 
War II." Southern California Quarterly 69 (Summer 1987): 
151-64. 
McCain, Johnny M. "Texas and the Mexican Labor Question, 1942-
1947." Southwestern Historical Quarterly 85 (July 1981): 
45-64. 
Montgomerie, Deborah. "Men's Jobs and Women's Work: The New 
Zealand Women's Land Service in World War II." 
Agricultural Histoiry 63 (Summer 1989) . 
Neth, Mary. "Gender and the Family Labor System: Defining 
Work in the Rural Midwest." Journal of Social History 27 
(Spring 1994): 563-77. 
Richter, Anton H., ed. "A German P.O.W. at Camp Grant: 
TheReminiscences of Heinz Richter." Journal of the 
Illinois State Historical Society 76 (Spring 1983) : 61-
70 . 
Rogers, Joe D. "Camp Hereford: Italian Prisoners of War on the 
Texas Plains, 1942-1945." Panhandle-Plains Historical 
Review 62 (1989): 57-110. 
Ross, A. A. "Wartime Agriculture in New Zealand, 1939-50." In 
Wartime Agriculture in Australia and New Zealand. 193 9-
50. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954, 239-345. 
Sacks, Karen Brodkin. "Toward a Unified Theory of Class, Race, 
and Gender." American Ethnologist 16 (August 1989) : 534-
50. 
Scherini, Rose D. "Executive Order 9066 and Italian Americans: 
The San Francisco Story." California History 70 (Winter 
1991-1992): 366-77. 
Shea, William L., ed. "A German Prisoner of War in the South: 
The Memoir of Edwin Pelz." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 
44 (Spring 1985): 42-55. 
345 
Smith, Caron. "The Women's Land Army During World War II." 
Kansas History 14 (Summer 1991): 82-88. 
Taylor, Sandra C. "Interned at Topaz: Age, Gender, and Family 
in the Relocation Experience." Utah Historical Quarterly 
59 (Fall 1991): 380-94. 
. "Japanese Americans and Keetley Farms: Utah's 
Relocation Colony." Utah Historical Quarterly 54 (Fall 
1986): 328-44. 
"Uprooted: A Portfolio of Japanese Americans in World War II." 
Colorado Heritage no. 1 (1989): 14-27. 
Voorhees, Anita. "Qver Here: The Women's Land Army." Ms. 4 
(November 1975): 22. 
Waddell, Brian. "The Dimensions of the Military Ascendancy 
During U.S. Industrial Mobilization for World War II." 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology 23 (Summer 
1995): 81-98. 
Wages, Hazel. "Memphis Armed Service Forces Depot Prisoner of 
War Camp, 1944-1946." Tennessee Historical Quarterly 52 
(Spring 1993): 19-32. 
Walker, Melissa. "Home Extension Work among African American 
Farm Women in East Tennessee, 1920-1939." Agricultural 
History 70 (Summer 1996): 487-502. 
Wax, Rosalie H. "In and Qut of the Tule Lake Segregation 
Center: Japanese Internment in the West, 1942-1945." 
Montana 37 (Spring 1987): 12-25. 
Unpublished sources 
Dyson, Lowell K. "The Women's Land Army of World War II." 
Paper presented at Missouri Valley History Conference, 
Omaha, Nebraska, March 1991. 
Jungmeyer, Roger L. "The Bracero Program, 1942-1951: Mexican 
Contract Labor in the United States." Ph.D. diss.. 
University of Missouri-Columbia, 1988. 
